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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Spira v. Ethical Culture School

Bernard R. Spira, a plaintiff, sued his former employer, Ethical Culture School, and three individuals for age discrimination. He filed the complaint with the EEOC in September 1992 and received a 'Right-to-Sue' letter on November 8, 1994, which stated a 90-day period to file suit. Spira filed suit on March 7, 1995, approximately 114 calendar days after receipt. He argued that an EEOC worker orally misinformed him that the 90-day period was in working days, not calendar days. The defendants moved to dismiss based on the failure to comply with the 90-day limitations period. The court granted the motion, finding no extraordinary circumstances or affirmative misconduct by the EEOC to warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period.

Age DiscriminationEmployment LawStatute of LimitationsEquitable TollingEEOC ProceduresRight-to-Sue LetterMotion to DismissRule 12(b)(6)Affirmative MisconductFederal Courts
References
7
Case No. 2018 NY Slip Op 05907 [164 AD3d 43]
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 23, 2018

AWI Sec. & Investigators, Inc. v. Whitestone Constr. Corp.

This case concerns a dispute between AWI Security and Investigations, Inc. (AWI), a subcontractor, and Whitestone Construction Corp. (Whitestone), a general contractor, over unpaid security services for public construction projects. Whitestone moved to dismiss AWI's action, citing a contractual six-month limitations period that it claimed began in April 2012. AWI appealed the Supreme Court's decision, arguing that the limitations period was unenforceable because Whitestone had stated that payment was contingent on the resolution of a separate prevailing wage class action. Citing precedent, the Appellate Division found that Whitestone's position nullified the contractual limitations period, as it created a scenario where AWI would be forced to sue for a claim that was not yet ripe. Consequently, the Appellate Division reversed the lower court's order, denying Whitestone's motion to dismiss the action as time-barred.

Contractual Limitations PeriodStatute of LimitationsSubcontractor PaymentPublic Construction ProjectCondition PrecedentAccrual of Cause of ActionMotion to DismissAppellate ReviewRipeness of ClaimIndemnity Provision
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Stafford v. Sealright, Inc.

Plaintiff Tina Stafford sued Sealright, Inc., alleging gender-based discrimination under Title VII and New York Executive Law § 296 after experiencing sexually inappropriate remarks and resigning in 1998. Stafford filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC and received an 'early' Right to Sue letter, allowing her to file suit before the 180-day administrative investigation period expired. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the early Right to Sue letter was jurisdictionally defective and violated Title VII's mandatory waiting period for EEOC investigation and conciliation. The Court agreed with the defendant, holding that Title VII prohibits the issuance of a Right to Sue notice prior to the 180-day period, especially when no meaningful inquiry was conducted by the EEOC. Therefore, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss Stafford's Title VII claim and remanded the action to the EEOC for further proceedings, declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.

Gender discriminationEEOCRight to Sue letterTitle VIIAdministrative exhaustionMotion to dismissFederal jurisdictionStatutory interpretationEmployment lawSexual harassment
References
30
Case No. ADJ9066748
Regular
May 23, 2014

RAMATU KABBA vs. DAMERON HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION

Applicant Ramatu Kabba sought reconsideration of a finding that her psychiatric injury claim was not presumed compensable. The applicant argued the 90-day presumption period under Labor Code § 5402(b) began when the employer allegedly failed to provide a claim form promptly after receiving notice of injury. However, the Board denied reconsideration, adhering to the holding in *Honeywell v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* that the 90-day period runs from the filing of the claim form, not the employer's breach. Absent evidence of the employer misleading the applicant into not filing, the presumption did not arise.

Labor Code section 5402(b)presumption of compensabilitypetition for reconsiderationclaim formdenial of liabilityHoneywell v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Wagner)estoppelDWC Form 1industrial injurypsyche
References
4
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Rasmussen v. Sigma Corp. of America

Plaintiff Kathleen Rasmussen sued her former employer, Sigma Corporation of America, and supervisor, Yo-shio Yamaki, alleging discrimination under Title VII and ADEA after her employment was terminated in 1995. Rasmussen claimed she experienced anti-American, anti-female, and age-related comments, and her discharge was pretextual. The core legal issue revolved around the timeliness of her lawsuit, specifically when the 90-day period for filing after receiving a right-to-sue letter began. The court, citing precedent, ruled that receipt by a household member at the claimant's residence triggers the 90-day period, finding no equitable grounds for tolling, and therefore granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint as time-barred.

Employment DiscriminationTitle VIIADEARight-to-sue LetterStatute of LimitationsEquitable TollingSummary JudgmentReceipt of NoticeHousehold Member ReceiptFederal Court Procedure
References
37
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Grimmer v. Lord Day & Lord

This case is a class action brought under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act) by former employees of the law firm Lord Day & Lord, Barrett Smith. The employees alleged that the firm violated the WARN Act by closing its offices without providing the required sixty days' advance notice. Lord Day asserted statutory exceptions, specifically the 'faltering company' and 'unforeseeable business circumstances' exceptions, as affirmative defenses. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, contending that Lord Day's notice was insufficient as it merely recited the language of a statutory exception without providing a 'brief statement of the basis' for reducing the notice period. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, ruling that simply citing a statutory exception is inadequate and that specific factual basis is required, thus granting the motion and striking Lord Day's affirmative defenses.

WARN Actplant closingmass layoffnotice periodunforeseeable business circumstancesfaltering company exceptionaffirmative defensessummary judgmentstatutory interpretationemployee rights
References
2
Case No. 2023 NY Slip Op 00704 [213 AD3d 1050]
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 09, 2023

Matter of Paka (Same Day Delivery Inc.--Commissioner of Labor)

The case involves Jacques Paka, a delivery driver, who applied for unemployment insurance benefits after working for Same Day Delivery Inc. The Department of Labor initially determined Paka was an employee, making Same Day liable for contributions. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board initially overruled this, finding Paka to be an independent contractor. However, upon reconsideration requested by the Commissioner of Labor, the Board rescinded its prior decision and sustained the Department's original determination, finding an employment relationship. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the Board's decision, rejecting Same Day's arguments against the reopening of the case and finding substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that Same Day exercised sufficient control over Paka to establish an employment relationship. The Court also affirmed that these findings apply to similarly situated individuals.

Unemployment InsuranceIndependent ContractorEmployment RelationshipControl TestAppellate ReviewUnemployment Insurance Appeal BoardLabor LawUnemployment BenefitsDelivery DriverSubstantial Evidence
References
11
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re the Arbitration Between Cady & Aetna Life & Casualty Co.

The case concerns the validity of a New York State Insurance Department regulation limiting the time to commence a proceeding under CPLR article 75. The regulation set a 51-day period to challenge a master arbitrator's award under the No-Fault Insurance Law. The lower courts and the Court of Appeals found this regulation invalid, as it conflicted with the 90-day limitations period provided by CPLR 7511 (subd [a]). The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order, confirming the invalidity of the regulation.

regulation validityNo-Fault Insurance LawCPLR Article 75arbitration awardstatutory limitationsadministrative lawNew York Court of AppealsInsurance Departmentmaster arbitratorjudicial review
References
4
Case No. ADJ8642319
Regular
Apr 24, 2015

ISABEL RAMIREZ-RAMOS (spouse), ANGEL RAMIREZ (deceased) vs. OSTERIA COPPA, LLC, TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE (FARMERS INSURANCE)

This case involves a deceased worker whose employer, Osteria Coppa, LLC, is challenging the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board's award of death benefits. The employer argued the WCJ erred by disallowing cross-examination and excluding a medical report. The Board denied reconsideration, affirming the original award because the employer failed to reject the claim within 90 days, thus triggering a presumption of compensability under Labor Code section 5402(b). Furthermore, the employer could not rebut this presumption with the excluded medical report, as the information it contained was discoverable within the 90-day period through reasonable diligence.

WCABIsabel Ramirez-RamosAngel RamirezOsteria CoppaLLCTruck Insurance ExchangeADJ8642319Opinion and Order Denying Petition for Reconsiderationindustrial injurydeath benefits
References
3
Case No. ADJ8741424
Regular
May 19, 2016

CHARLES LAUDERDALE (Dec'd), KATHLEEN LAUDERDALE (Widow) vs. CRISP ENTERPRISES, INC. dba C2 REPROGRAPHICS, GOLDEN EAGLE INSURANCE COMPANY

This case concerns a widow's claim for workers' compensation benefits after her husband's death. The initial ruling denied the claim, finding no injury arising out of employment. However, the Appeals Board granted reconsideration, finding the employer failed to deny the claim within the 90-day period required by Labor Code § 5402(b), thus creating a presumption of compensability. The Board determined the employer's evidence to rebut this presumption was insufficient because the witness testimony used was available and discoverable within the 90-day timeframe. Therefore, the Board found the decedent sustained an injury to his left foot arising out of and in the course of employment.

WCABPetition for ReconsiderationFindings and OrderLabor Code Section 5402(b)Presumed CompensableRebuttal of PresumptionReasonable DiligencePercipient WitnessSpecific InjuryLeft Foot
References
0
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