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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 04-11-00076-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 11, 2011

Dora Gulley (Appellant/Cross Appellee) v. State Farm Lloyds (Appellee/Cross Appellant)

Dora Gulley sued State Farm Lloyds for additional insurance benefits after foundation damage from a plumbing leak was covered under the Dwelling Foundation Endorsement, subject to a 15% limitation, while Gulley sought coverage under a Water Damage Endorsement. Both parties filed competing summary judgment motions, which the trial court denied without making a substantive ruling on which endorsement applied, but certified an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court found that the trial court erred in declining to decide the substantive legal issue presented by the competing summary judgment motions. The court clarified that section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is not a mechanism for a certified question before a substantive ruling. Thus, the decision was reversed and remanded for the trial court to make a substantive ruling.

Insurance coverageHomeowners policyFoundation damagePlumbing leakEndorsement interpretationSummary judgmentInterlocutory appealAppellate procedureTrial court errorStatutory interpretation
References
15
Case No. 04-12-00702-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 13, 2013

John Homer Coonly (Appellant/Cross-Appellee) v. Gables Residential Services, Inc., D/B/A Gables West Avenue (Appellee/Cross-Appellant)

John Homer Coonly appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Gables Residential Services, Inc., which resulted in Coonly taking nothing on his claims for negligence, premises liability, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). Coonly's claims stemmed from the theft and vandalism of his motorcycles from the apartment parking garage owned by Gables. Gables filed a cross-appeal regarding the denial of attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment on negligence and premises liability claims, finding the lease agreements validly waived such claims. However, the court reversed and remanded the summary judgment on Coonly's DTPA claim, concluding that the waiver language in the agreements did not meet the DTPA's statutory requirements and Coonly's affidavit raised a material issue of fact regarding Gables' representations about the access gate.

NegligencePremises LiabilityDeceptive Trade Practices ActDTPASummary JudgmentLease AgreementExculpatory ClauseWaiver of LiabilityAttorney's FeesContract Law
References
19
Case No. 04-10-00802-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 08, 2012

Callaghan Ranch, Ltd (Appellant/Cross Appellee) v. David Killam (Appellee/Cross Appellant)

Callaghan Ranch, Ltd. appealed the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, challenging a jury's finding that a disputed portion of San Ygnacio Road was not impliedly dedicated to the public. The Ranch had sought a declaratory judgment to affirm the road's public status. Concurrently, the Killams, as appellees and cross-appellants, contested the trial court's refusal to award attorney's fees. The appellate court upheld the lower court's decision, concluding that Callaghan Ranch failed to conclusively prove implied dedication due to disputed evidence. Furthermore, the court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of attorney's fees, citing that both parties had legitimate interests to pursue.

Implied DedicationDeclaratory JudgmentJudgment Notwithstanding VerdictPublic RoadPrivate RoadAttorney's FeesAppellate ReviewSufficiency of EvidenceProperty RightsTexas Law
References
32
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Rodriguez v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n

This case concerns an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of a workers' compensation carrier. The appellant's husband died at work, and the carrier denied death benefits, leading the appellant to sue for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act and for treble damages under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). While the appellant successfully recovered workers' compensation benefits, the trial court granted summary judgment on the DTPA claim, ruling that the decedent was not a "consumer" as defined by the Act. The appellate court affirmed this decision, concluding that the relationship between the decedent and the compensation carrier was statutory, not contractual, meaning there was no "purchase" of goods or services to establish consumer status under the DTPA. Therefore, the denial of workers' compensation liability alone did not give rise to a cause of action under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

Workers' CompensationDeceptive Trade PracticesSummary Judgment AppealConsumer StatusInsurance LiabilityStatutory RelationshipContractual RelationshipDeath Benefits ClaimTreble DamagesAppellate Court Decision
References
2
Case No. 03-13-00077-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 25, 2015

Texas State Board of Examiners of Marriage and Family Therapists Charles Horton in His Official Capacity Sandra DeSobe in Her Official Capacity, and Texas Association of Marriage // Cross-Appellant,Texas Medical Association v. Texas Medical Association// Texas State Board of Examiners of Marriage and Family Therapists Charles Horton in His Official Capacity Sandra DeSobe in Her Official Capacity, and Texas Association of Marriage

The amicus brief, submitted by The Association of Marital and Family Therapy Regulatory Boards (AMFTRB), urges the Third Court of Appeals to grant en banc reconsideration and reverse a panel's decision that found 22 TEX. ADMIN CODE §801.42(13) invalid. The brief argues that Licensed Marriage and Family Therapists (LMFTs) are fully qualified, trained, and tested to perform diagnostic assessments within their therapeutic role. It asserts that diagnosis alone, in the context of marriage and family therapy, does not constitute the practice of medicine under the Texas Medical Practice Act, and preventing LMFTs from performing these assessments would effectively prohibit their professional practice and create a shortage of mental health professionals in Texas. The AMFTRB also highlights that the legislature did not intend for LMFTs to be supervised by physicians and that the structure of the Occupations Code supports marriage and family therapy as a stand-alone profession. Additionally, the brief questions the qualification of the Texas Medical Association's expert witness due to prior ethical lapses.

Marriage and Family TherapyDiagnostic AssessmentMedical Practice ActOccupations CodeRegulatory BoardsLicensureScope of PracticeMental Health ServicesTexasAccreditation
References
9
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

I. Appel Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.

This appeal concerns the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of St. Paul insurance company, which held that St. Paul had no duty to defend its insured, I. Appel. The underlying lawsuit involved Brenda Kelley, who alleged retaliatory discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress against I. Appel, stemming from an incident with Mike Landreth. St. Paul denied coverage based on policy exclusions for intentional acts and injuries to fellow employees. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding that the policy's exclusionary language clearly applied to I. Appel's alleged intentional acts, thereby relieving St. Paul of its defense obligation.

Insurance contractDuty to defendSummary judgmentPolicy exclusionIntentional bodily injuryRetaliatory dischargeEmotional distressCommercial general liabilityExcess liabilityInsurer obligations
References
5
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Claim of Clark v. New York City Transit Authority

The motion seeking leave to appeal from the Appellate Division order denying appellant’s motion to vacate and the Appellate Division order denying appellant’s motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed. The dismissal was based on the ground that the said orders do not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. The motion for leave to appeal was otherwise denied.

Leave to appealAppellate DivisionMotion to vacateCourt of AppealsDismissedFinal determinationConstitutional interpretationMotion denied
References
0
Case No. 05-19-01013-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 01, 2020

Luxottica of America Inc. F/K/A Luxottica Retail North America Inc. and EyeMed Vision Care LLC, Gutman Vision, Inc., Alex Gutman, and Milana Gutman v. Jeffrey Gray, Dawn Gray and Brave Optical, Inc.

The case is an interlocutory appeal from the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas concerning the denial of motions to dismiss filed by Luxottica of America Inc. and EyeMed Vision Care LLC (Luxottica Appellants), and Gutman Vision, Inc., Alex Gutman, and Milana Gutman (Gutman Appellants). Jeffrey Gray, Dawn Gray, and Brave Optical, Inc. (Gray Appellees) sued the appellants for claims including conspiracy to commit fraud, alleging that the appellants failed to disclose crucial information during negotiations for the purchase of two Pearle Vision optical stores. Specifically, appellees claimed appellants withheld the fact that EyeMed had terminated its contract with Gutman Vision due to fraudulent billing practices prior to the sale. Appellants moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), asserting their communications were protected. The trial court denied these motions by operation of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, concluding that the appellees' claims were based on the appellants' alleged failure to disclose information or misrepresentations, rather than on communications protected by the TCPA's rights of free speech or association.

fraudconspiracyTexas Citizens Participation ActTCPAinterlocutory appealbusiness disputenondisclosureEyeMedLuxotticaPearle Vision
References
20
Case No. 03-13-00790-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 06, 2015

T. Mark Anderson, as Co-Executor of the Estate of Ted Anderson, and Christine Anderson, as Co-Executor of the Estate of Ted Anderson//Cross-Appellants, David R. Archer, Carol Archer Bugg, John v. Archer, Karen Archer Ball, and Sherri Archer v. Richard T. Archer, David R. Archer, Carol Archer Bugg, John v. Archer, Karen Archer Ball, and Sherri Archer//Cross-Appellees, T. Mark Anderson, Co-Executor of the Estate of Ted Anderson, and Christine Anderson, as Co-Executor

This case involves a tortious interference with inheritance lawsuit. Richard T. Archer and family (Appellees/Cross-Appellants) sued T. Mark Anderson and Christine Anderson (Appellants/Cross-Appellees), co-executors of Ted M. Anderson's estate. The Archers alleged that Ted Anderson tortiously interfered with their inheritance from John R. 'Jack' Archer by causing Jack, after a debilitating stroke that left him mentally incapacitated, to sign new estate planning documents that disinherited the Archers in favor of charities. The Archers incurred significant attorney's fees and settlement costs in prior litigation to reinstate Jack's original estate plan, which favored them. A jury found Ted Anderson liable for tortious interference and awarded damages, which the district court modified to include an additional settlement amount with charities. The appellees are now seeking to affirm the liability finding and modify the damage award on cross-appeal.

Tortious Interference with InheritanceEstate Planning DisputeMental IncapacityUndue InfluenceFiduciary Duty BreachGuardianship ProceedingWill ContestAttorney's Fees as DamagesPrejudgment InterestAppellate Review
References
78
Case No. 03-05-00620-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 14, 2008

Texas Orthopaedic Association, Texas Medical Association and Andrew M. Kant, M.D. v. Texas State Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners Texas Podiatric Medical Association And Bruce A. Scudday, D.P.M.

The Texas Orthopaedic Association and others challenged a rule by the Texas State Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners that defined 'foot' to include portions of the ankle and soft tissues extending into the leg. Appellants argued this rule impermissibly expanded the scope of podiatry beyond its statutory definition and intruded into the practice of medicine. The district court initially found the rule valid. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the Board exceeded its authority. The appellate court concluded that the rule's expansive definition authorized podiatrists to treat anatomical features located well above the traditional foot and ankle, which is inconsistent with the occupations code and constitutes an unauthorized practice of medicine.

Podiatry ScopeRegulatory AuthorityStatutory InterpretationAdministrative Rule ValidityMedical Practice ActTexas Occupations CodeDeclaratory JudgmentAnkle TreatmentFoot DefinitionMedical Licensing Board
References
29
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