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The court affirmed an order that granted a stay to the petitioner in arbitration proceedings. Additionally, the order denied a motion made by the unions to compel the petitioner to proceed with arbitration. The decision included an award of $10 costs and disbursements. All judges concurred with the ruling.
In a legal proceeding, an appellant sought to obtain a stay of an arbitration. The arbitration concerned the alleged discharge of three employees, a matter that purportedly violated the seniority provisions outlined in a collective bargaining agreement between the appellant and the respondent union. The court affirmed the order that denied the appellant's request for a stay of the arbitration proceedings, and awarded $10 in costs and disbursements.
This case involves an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court concerning two proceedings. Proceeding No. 1, initiated by Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) on behalf of Garmon Carnibucci, sought to confirm an arbitration award regarding the restoration of sick leave accruals for Carnibucci, who was terminated by the Division For Youth (DFY) under Civil Service Law § 71. Proceeding No. 2, commenced by Carnibucci, sought to hold DFY in contempt for allegedly failing to comply with a prior judgment mandating back pay and benefits. The Supreme Court confirmed the arbitration award and found no contempt, prompting an appeal from the petitioners. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal in proceeding No. 1, determining that CSEA was not an aggrieved party since the relief it sought (confirmation of the award) was granted. In proceeding No. 2, the court affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment, finding no error in the appointment of a Referee to assess back pay calculations and concluding that DFY was not in contempt due to the lack of specificity in the prior judgment regarding the computation of back pay.
In a proceeding initiated to permanently stay arbitration, the Supreme Court, Kings County, denied the application. The subsequent appeal challenged this denial. Despite some dispute regarding the extent of the Transit Authority's involvement in the arbitration, the appellate court found sufficient evidence of their participation. Consequently, the judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, which denied the application to stay arbitration, was affirmed with costs.
This case concerns an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, which directed the parties to proceed to arbitration and permitted J. Kenneth O’Connor, Esq., to act as attorney for the petitioner union. The appellate court modified the order by limiting arbitration to the issue of whether a supervisory employee, Clarence Martin, could return to the bargaining unit, based on the interpretation of Article X (subd 5, par [a]) of the agreement. The part of the order allowing J. Kenneth O’Connor to serve as attorney was deleted as his representation was withdrawn. The court also held that the dispute regarding union members' severance pay was non-arbitrable due to the National Labor Relations Board's sole jurisdiction over unfair labor practice allegations, specifically citing violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act.
The Candor Central School District (the district) applied to the court for an order restraining the American Arbitration Association (AAA) from proceeding with arbitration. This application was made while a CPLR 7503 proceeding to stay arbitration, involving the district and the Candor Faculty Association, was pending in another court. The district argued against the need for a temporary restraining order in the CPLR 7503 proceeding, citing judicial time and client costs. The AAA countered that its impartiality would be compromised if it were named an adverse party and stressed the importance of proceeding with arbitration unless explicitly stayed by stipulation or court order. The court ultimately denied the district's application, concluding that restraining the AAA was inappropriate and advising the district to seek relief within the pending CPLR 7503 proceeding.
This case involves a motion to stay arbitration filed by petitioners, who are employees of I. Miller & Sons, Inc. The petitioners sought to stay an arbitration proceeding between their employer and a respondent union. The union and employer had an agreement requiring new employees to join the union after thirty days as a condition of employment. The petitioners refused to join the union, and the employer declined the union's request to discharge them, citing the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Law). The petitioners argued the agreement was invalid under the Taft-Hartley Act and they had no obligation to arbitrate. The court denied the motion to stay arbitration, ruling that the petitioners, not being parties to the arbitration agreement, lacked standing to interfere with the proceeding. The court clarified that the phrase 'any party to the controversy' in the Civil Practice Act sections 1462 and 1462-a refers to parties to the arbitration agreement itself.
The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment dismissing Joseph's petition to stay arbitration and granting Toufic's cross-petition to compel arbitration, concurrently vacating an earlier stay pending appeal. The dispute arose from an oral grain sale agreement between Joseph, a Minnesota seller, and Toufic, a buyer from France and Lebanon, where both parties exchanged telex confirmations that largely agreed but had minor differences, and crucially incorporated a North American Export Grain Association (NAEGA) contract containing a broad arbitration clause enforceable in New York. The court determined that a valid agreement to arbitrate existed, asserting that New York law governed the arbitration provision due to its significant contacts, irrespective of the performance location. The majority opinion found the arbitration agreement valid, with some justices viewing it as part of a valid sales contract under UCC 2-207(2)(b), while others deemed the arbitration clause separable. Justice Nunez dissented, arguing for a remand to ascertain the validity of the underlying sales agreement, highlighting telex discrepancies and the non-execution of a formal contract as crucial factors impacting the arbitration agreement's existence.
The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) suspended employee Marvin Moses after he drove a bus with a suspended license. The appellant union, on behalf of Moses, filed a grievance asserting Moses was entitled to a determination whether his suspension was for cause, arguing his license suspension was in error and he was not properly notified. After the grievance procedure, the union demanded arbitration. The NYCTA commenced a proceeding to stay arbitration, arguing the grievance was not arbitrable because it involved enforcing statutory obligations under the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The Supreme Court granted the petition and permanently stayed arbitration. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding, finding that the broad arbitration provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement encompassed the dispute and that the arbitrability of such issues was for the arbitrator to determine.
This case involves appeals stemming from a CPLR article 75 proceeding concerning an arbitration award between family members, the Grassos. Initially, the Supreme Court partially vacated the arbitration award, which was later modified by the Appellate Division, reinstating a provision for an arbitration hearing to determine asset valuation. During these proceedings, petitioners successfully moved to hold Joseph F. Grasso Jr. in contempt for non-compliance, leading to a judgment against him. On appeal, the court determined that the Supreme Court should have vacated its judgment upon reconsideration, especially after the Appellate Division's decision to reinstate the arbitration provision. Consequently, the judgments against Grasso Jr. were vacated, and the matter of any final judgment was held in abeyance pending further arbitration to determine the value of Trans-American.
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