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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Glisson v. General Cinema Corp. of Texas

James E. Glisson and Dorothy Glisson appealed a summary judgment that denied them exemplary damages for the death of their son, David Anthony Glisson, who was fatally injured while employed by General Cinema Corporation of Texas. Although they received death benefits, the Glissons sought additional exemplary damages under Article 8306, Section 5 of the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law and Article 16, Section 26 of the Texas Constitution, alleging gross negligence. The trial court's summary judgment was based on the interpretation that parents are not included among the beneficiaries authorized to recover exemplary damages under these statutes. The appellate court affirmed, upholding the lower court's construction that the statutory language "heirs of his or her body" does not encompass parents, aligning with long-standing Texas precedent. The court also dismissed the Glissons' equal protection challenge, finding a rational basis for the classification of beneficiaries.

Workers' CompensationExemplary DamagesTexas ConstitutionEqual ProtectionFourteenth AmendmentSurvival StatuteWrongful Death StatuteStatutory InterpretationBeneficiary ClassHeirs of the Body
References
14
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

General Elevator Corp. v. Champion Papers

This is an appeal from a summary judgment in a workers' compensation and wrongful death case. Keith Joseph Broussard was fatally injured in an elevator accident while working for Champion Papers. His surviving spouse and son sued the elevator owners/operators (Champion group), the servicing company (General Elevator), and the manufacturer (Otis Elevator Company). General Elevator settled with the plaintiffs for $500,000 and then filed a cross-action against the Champion group for contribution or indemnity. The Champion group successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the exclusive remedies section of the Workers' Compensation statute (Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8306 §§ 3 and 3a) insulated them from liability. General Elevator appealed, contending that contribution is not barred by the Workers' Compensation statute and that if it is, the statute is unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no conflict with the Texas Comparative Negligence Act and upholding the constitutionality of Article 8306 Section 3.

Workers' CompensationWrongful DeathContributionIndemnitySummary JudgmentExclusive RemedyComparative NegligenceStatutory InterpretationTexas ConstitutionImplied Repeal
References
7
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Hines v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

This is an appeal concerning the calculation of worker's compensation benefits following an injury to the appellant's right leg on August 20, 1986. The jury found a total loss of use for a period, followed by a 75% permanent loss of use, with 50% attributable to a prior knee injury. The core legal question is whether the percentage of contribution from a prior injury should be applied to the average weekly wage rate before the basic compensation figure is calculated, or after. The court examines the Texas Worker’s Compensation Act, specifically Article 8306, Sections 10-12, 29, and 12c. The appellant argued for a higher recovery by applying the prior injury contribution to the average weekly wage first. The court, however, affirmed the trial court's method, which calculates the basic wage figure first (66.66% of average weekly wage or statutory limit) and then applies the percentage of incapacity caused by the *current* injury, taking into account the prior injury's contribution.

Worker's CompensationBenefit CalculationSpecific InjuryPrior Injury ContributionAverage Weekly WageStatutory InterpretationTexas LawLeg InjuryIncapacity PercentageTrial Court Affirmation
References
4
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Ernest Claridy v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association

Ernest Claridy sought worker's compensation benefits from Texas Employers’ Insurance Association (TEIA) for a back injury sustained on April 8, 1987, during his employment with Flowers Construction Company. TEIA argued that a subsequent neck injury from July 16, 1987, substantially contributed to Claridy's incapacity. A jury found the April 1987 injury caused total but temporary incapacity, ending April 12, 1995, and determined the July 1987 neck injury contributed 65% to the total incapacity. The trial court's judgment reflected this reduction in benefits. Claridy appealed, contending Section 12c of Article 8306 applies only to prior injuries reducing liability for subsequent ones. The appellate court, citing precedent, ruled that the statute's principle extends to subsequent injuries to prevent double recovery and reduce the carrier's liability to the extent of the actually insured injury. Medical testimony from Dr. Slade, Dr. Campbell, and Dr. Etheridge provided varying assessments of the neck injury's contribution, with percentages ranging from over fifty percent to one hundred percent. The jury's 65% finding was deemed within the evidence's range. Consequently, the judgment was affirmed.

Subsequent Injury ContributionPrior Injury ContributionIncapacity AssessmentInsurance Liability ReductionJury Verdict ReviewMedical Expert EvidenceBack InjuryNeck InjuryStatutory InterpretationTexas Civil Statutes
References
5
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

People v. Gajadhar

Defendant Winston Gajadhar was tried before a 12-member jury. During deliberations, a juror became ill, and defendant, opposing a mistrial, waived his right to a 12-person jury, requesting that deliberations continue with the remaining 11 jurors. The Supreme Court granted this request, and Gajadhar was convicted of attempted robbery and felony murder. On appeal, defendant argued that the state constitution does not permit a defendant to consent to a jury of less than 12 members. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that article I, section 2 of the state constitution, as amended in 1938, allows a noncapital criminal defendant to waive the right to a 12-person jury and consent to deliberations by 11 jurors under proper circumstances, provided the waiver is made in writing and in open court.

Jury WaiverEleven-Member JuryCriminal Procedure LawConstitutional LawJury DeliberationsTrial by JuryFelony MurderAttempted RobberyAppellate ReviewJury Substitution
References
34
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Independent Bankers Ass'n of New York State Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A.

This case involves an action brought by the Independent Bankers Association of New York State, Inc. and The Canadaigua National Bank and Trust Company against Marine Midland Bank, N.A. and Wegman’s Food Markets, Inc. Plaintiffs allege that Marine Midland violated Section 36 of the National Banking Act by operating an automated teller machine (ATM) at a Wegman's supermarket, constituting unauthorized branch banking. Concurrently, a state law claim was brought against Wegman's for violating Section 131 of the New York Banking Law, which prohibits unauthorized banking activities. Wegman's filed a motion to dismiss, arguing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claim, specifically concerning the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over a party not otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction. The court determined that it possessed both the constitutional power under Article III and the statutory power under 12 U.S.C. Section 36 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 to exercise pendent party jurisdiction. Finding that judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants would be served by hearing the claims together, the court exercised its discretion and denied Wegman’s motion to dismiss.

Pendant JurisdictionNational Banking ActNew York Banking LawATMBranch BankingSubject Matter JurisdictionJudicial PowerFederal Question JurisdictionArticle IIIStatutory Construction
References
19
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Duhart v. State

Justice Campbell dissents, arguing that Article 6674s, which provides workers' compensation for State Highway Department employees, incorporates Section 5 of Article 8306. This incorporation, the dissent contends, creates a valid cause of action for exemplary damages for survivors of employees whose death results from the employer's gross negligence. The opinion distinguishes previous cases by focusing on the specific legislative intent behind Article 6674s and asserts that sovereign immunity is waived in such circumstances. Therefore, the dissent concludes that the Duharts should have a cause of action for gross negligence against the State.

Workers' CompensationExemplary DamagesSovereign ImmunityGross NegligenceState Highway DepartmentTexas LawStatutory InterpretationCause of ActionEmployee RightsLegislative Intent
References
3
Case No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 03 Civ. 0167, 03 Civ. 0168, 03 Civ. 0169, 03 Civ. 0170, 03 Civ. 0171, 03 Civ. 0337, 03 Civ. 0890, 03 Civ. 0891, 03 Civ. 0892, 03 Civ. 1283, 03 Civ. 1284, 03 Civ. 2839, 03 Civ. 3859, 03 Civ. 3860, 03 Civ. 4499, 03 Civ. 4500, 03 Civ. 6226, 03 Civ. 6227, 03 Civ. 6592, 03 Civ. 7297, 03 Civ. 7806, 03 Civ. 8269, 03 Civ. 8270, 03 Civ. 8271, 03 Civ. 8923, 03 Civ. 8924, 03 Civ. 9168, 03 Civ. 9400, 03 Civ. 9401, 03 Civ. 9402, 03 Civ. 9823, 03 Civ. 9824
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 20, 2004

In Re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation

This case addresses motions for reconsideration and dismissal in a multi-district litigation stemming from the WorldCom, Inc. financial collapse. The court affirmed that Section 13 of the Securities Act, not the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's Section 804, dictates the statute of limitations for Section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims, as these actions were deliberately pleaded as strict liability/negligence rather than fraud. It also held that the 'American Pipe' tolling doctrine does not apply to individual actions filed independently before class certification, leading to many time-barred claims. Furthermore, the court upheld the dismissal of a Section 12(a)(2) claim regarding a December 2000 private placement, affirming that such placements fall outside the scope of Section 12(a)(2). Requests for leave to amend complaints were largely denied due to lack of diligence and bad faith in strategic pleading.

Securities LitigationClass ActionStatute of LimitationsSarbanes-Oxley ActSecurities Act of 1933American Pipe Tolling DoctrineRule 15(c) Relation-BackPrivate PlacementMotion to DismissMotion for Reconsideration
References
56
Case No. 04-14-00301-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 15, 2015

City of San Antonio v. Gerard Cortes

The Court previously held that collateral estoppel prevented relitigation of issues in this appeal, applying it to Gerard Cortes's case despite a prior lawsuit involving the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 624. Cortes, the appellee, argues that the Court's previous opinion failed to recognize the procedural and substantive differences unique to his case, specifically citing Article 30, Section B of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). This section, according to Cortes, explicitly authorizes individual firefighters to bypass arbitration and proceed to district court for statutory or constitutional claims, a right not available to the Union. Cortes contends that the Court misapplied collateral estoppel by equating his individual statutory claims under Chapters 143 and 174 of the Texas Local Government Code with the Union's claims, which were subject to arbitration under a different section of the CBA (Article 30, Section A). He asserts that the issue of an individual firefighter's right to judicial review under Article 30, Section B has never been litigated.

Collateral EstoppelCollective Bargaining AgreementArbitrationJudicial ReviewStatutory RightsIndividual Employee ClaimsUnion GrievanceTexas Local Government Code Chapter 143Texas Local Government Code Chapter 174Firefighter Rights
References
4
Case No. 2021 NY Slip Op 04349 [196 AD3d 560]
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 14, 2021

Membrives v. HHC TRS FP Portfolio, LLC

This class action was initiated by Pedro Membrives and others against HHC TRS FP Portfolio, LLC, and related entities, alleging violations of Labor Law article 6, specifically concerning sections 196-d, 12 NYCRR 146-2.18, and 12 NYCRR 146-2.19. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants improperly retained administrative fees from catered events without adequately disclosing that these fees were not gratuities. The Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, modified the Supreme Court's order by denying summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the Labor Law § 196-d claim, citing a triable issue of fact regarding the plaintiffs' employee status. However, the Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs concerning the violations of 12 NYCRR 146-2.18 and 146-2.19, as the defendants failed to rebut the presumption that the administrative fees were purported gratuities and did not provide proper disclosure.

Class ActionLabor LawWage and HourGratuityAdministrative FeeEmployee StatusSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewNYCRRHotel Industry
References
11
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