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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 06, 1981

Lindamood v. Link-Belt Corp.

This case addresses a motion filed by the Plaintiffs' attorney for an award of attorney's fees, to be paid out of the Intervenor First Employees Insurance Company's recovery in a settlement agreement. The attorney's claim was based on Article 8307, Section 6a of the Texas Worker’s Compensation and Crime Victims’ Compensation Law. The Court denied the motion, finding that the Intervenor's interest was actively represented by its own attorneys who actively participated in obtaining the recovery. Consequently, the Plaintiffs' attorney was not entitled to a portion of the Intervenor's subrogation recovery, especially given that the interests of the Plaintiffs and Intervenor were not always aligned and the Intervenor's counsel independently secured the full satisfaction of its subrogation claim.

Attorney's FeesWorker's CompensationSubrogationSettlement AgreementInterventionActive RepresentationTexas LawInsurance CarrierLegal FeesThird-Party Tortfeasor
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. Flurry

This case addresses whether attorney's fees can be awarded from a recovery paid to the Subsequent Injury Fund under the "new law" workers' compensation scheme. Nancy Flurry, initially awarded death benefits as Kenneth Flurry's common-law spouse, later had that finding overturned in district court, which determined she was not his legal beneficiary. Consequently, the death benefits of $110,065.02 were paid to the Commission's Subsequent Injury Fund as per the Workers’ Compensation Act. The trial court, however, awarded Nancy Flurry's attorney $27,516.25 in fees from the Fund's recovery. The appellate court reversed this award, holding that the Subsequent Injury Fund is not a "claimant" under the relevant statute, and therefore, attorney's fees cannot be paid from its recovery, especially when the attorney's client did not prevail.

Attorney's FeesWorkers' CompensationSubsequent Injury FundDeath BenefitsClaimant DefinitionStatutory InterpretationCommon-Law SpouseLegal BeneficiaryInsuranceAppellate Review
References
0
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Martin v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO. OF RHODE ISLAND

This case examines whether attorney fees can be recovered from a workers’ compensation carrier under TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 2226, in addition to fees already awarded under art. 8306, § 7c. The appellant argued that a workers' compensation claim against the carrier, based on a contract, should allow for additional attorney fees under article 2226. However, the court ruled against this, citing that article 2226 is not applicable when attorney fees are already available through other specific statutes. The decision referenced prior cases like Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Burke, which established that article 2226 excludes claims against insurance companies where other statutes provide for attorney fees. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of additional attorney fees.

Attorney FeesWorkers' Compensation LawStatutory InterpretationTexas Civil StatutesInsurance Contracts ExclusionLegislative IntentAppellate ReviewLegal PrecedentIndemnityCarrier Liability
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Buscher v. Bulldog Steel Products

Buscher, an injured worker, settled his workers' compensation claim with Texas General Indemnity (TGI). He and TGI then successfully pursued a third-party action against Bulldog Steel and Bobby Bryant, resulting in a $100,000 settlement, with TGI recouping its $49,000 subrogation interest and Buscher receiving $51,000. Buscher's attorney, Sam Chase, received a contingency fee from Buscher's portion but was denied a statutory attorney's fee from TGI's subrogation recovery by the trial court. Chase appealed, arguing his efforts benefited TGI by making the settlement possible. The appellate court agreed that Chase's services did benefit TGI to some extent, citing the statute requiring apportionment of fees when both claimant's and association's attorneys actively participate. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for the proper apportionment of attorney's fees.

Worker's CompensationAttorney's FeesSubrogationThird-Party ActionTexas LawInsurance CarrierSettlementLegal ServicesBenefitJudicial Discretion
References
1
Case No. 03-02-00114-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 19, 2002

Texas Health Care Information Council and the State of Texas, Office of the Attorney General v. Seton Health Plan, Inc.

This case involves an appeal by the Texas Health Care Information Council and the State of Texas, Office of the Attorney General, against Seton Health Plan, Inc. The core dispute centered on the interpretation of civil penalties for Seton's failure to file annual Health Plan Employer Data Information Set (HEDIS) reports as required by the Texas Health and Safety Code. Seton sought a declaratory judgment asserting that the maximum penalty for such a violation was $10,000 per report, while the State initially pursued a penalty based on each day of violation. The district court sided with Seton on the maximum penalty, assessed minimum penalties of $1,000 for each of the two unfiled reports, denied the State's request for injunctive relief, and ordered the State to pay Seton's attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's declaratory judgment, the denial of injunctive relief, and the penalty assessment. However, the appellate court reversed and remanded the issue of the State's attorney's fees, ruling that the State was statutorily entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under Government Code section 402.006(c) due to its recovery of a civil penalty.

Texas LawHealth Care RegulationHEDIS Report ViolationCivil PenaltiesDeclaratory Judgment ActionSovereign Immunity WaiverInjunctive Relief DeniedAttorney's Fees AwardStatutory ConstructionAdministrative Law
References
44
Case No. 03-99-00427-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 11, 2000

Carole Keeton Rylander, as Successor to John Sharp, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas And John Cornyn, as Successor to Dan Morales, Attorney General of the State of Texas v. Bandag Licensing Corporation

This case involves an appeal by the Comptroller of Public Accounts and the Attorney General of Texas from a district court judgment. The district court awarded Bandag Licensing Corporation (BLC) a recovery of $503,726 in franchise taxes paid under protest for the years 1992-96, along with attorney's fees. The central issue was whether BLC's mere possession of a certificate of authority to do business in Texas, without physical presence or intrastate business, constituted a 'substantial nexus' for franchise tax purposes under the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that such passive possession was insufficient for taxation. Furthermore, the court found section 112.108 of the Texas Tax Code, which prohibited attorney's fees in declaratory judgment actions against the state, unconstitutional, thereby upholding the award of attorney's fees to BLC.

Franchise TaxCommerce ClauseDue Process ClauseDeclaratory Judgment ActGovernmental ImmunitySubstantial NexusCertificate of AuthorityInterstate CommerceTaxation LawConstitutional Law
References
34
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Yeshiva University v. New England Educational Institute, Inc.

In a Lanham Act action, defendants, who prevailed after a jury trial against plaintiff Yeshiva, sought approximately $50,000 in attorney's fees. The application presented a novel question: whether a prevailing defendant is entitled to fees when the plaintiff's liability claims were asserted in good faith but the damage claims were grossly exaggerated. The court first affirmed the applicability of the Lanham Act's attorney fee provision, § 35(a), to actions involving unregistered marks, citing precedent. Despite acknowledging the plaintiff's highly exaggerated damage claims, the court determined that the case, which was close on the merits regarding the initial copying allegations, did not meet the 'exceptional cases' standard required for awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant. Consequently, the defendants' application for attorney's fees was denied.

Lanham ActAttorney's FeesPrevailing DefendantExceptional CasesUnregistered MarkDamage ClaimsExaggerated DamagesGood Faith LitigationJury VerdictNon-profit Dispute
References
7
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.

This case involves a plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees following a remand from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Plaintiff Stephen King sought fees due to defendant New Line Cinema's contempt of court for numerous violations of a Final Consent Decree concerning the misattribution of 'The Lawnmower Man' film. The District Court had previously found the defendant in contempt and awarded fees in 1994 and 1995. The Second Circuit affirmed some parts of the 1994 order but vacated others, along with the entire 1995 order, remanding the attorney's fees issue for reconsideration, specifically questioning the willfulness of the noncompliance. Upon review, this court concluded that while the defendant's conduct was negligent and contumacious, it did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard for willfulness required for an award of attorney's fees for civil contempt under Second Circuit law. Consequently, the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees was denied.

Civil ContemptAttorney's FeesWillfulness StandardSecond Circuit RemandConsent Decree ViolationsLanham ActFilm MisattributionThe Lawnmower ManInjunctive ReliefCompensatory Damages
References
27
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
May 01, 2005

In Re Balderas

This decision addresses post-confirmation attorneys' fees in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, using the Balderas case as a factual background. The debtors in the Balderas case sought modification of their plan due to payment defaults and requested $350 in attorney's fees for the motion. The court outlines the history of the Balderas' numerous modifications, moratoriums, and associated attorney fee awards, totaling $3,495, highlighting how these fees were paid out of plan distributions at the expense of creditors. The court analyzes sections 1326(b)(1) and 330(a)(4)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code to determine the reasonableness and payment method of such fees. Ultimately, the court establishes new rules for post-confirmation attorney fee awards in the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, including a $2,500 prima facie base fee, a $100 per month payment rate for additional fees, and specific guidelines for various types of motions. The current $350 fee request for the Balderas case's moratorium is approved but with caution against future similar requests.

BankruptcyChapter 13Attorneys' FeesPost-Confirmation FeesPlan ModificationCreditor DistributionsSecured ClaimsAdministrative ExpensesDebtor RepresentationFeasibility
References
26
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Black v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim for a 12 percent penalty, interest, and attorney's fees, which was severed from a workers' compensation case. The appellant sought these fees due to the appellee's alleged nonpayment to various health care providers for medical and chiropractic services. The trial court dismissed the claim, stating that such recovery is not permitted under Texas Workers' Compensation Laws for the claimant. The appellate court affirmed this decision, clarifying that Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 8306, § 7, which the appellant relied on, specifically grants these recovery rights to 'PROVIDERS OF MEDICAL CARE' and not to the compensation claimant. Additionally, the court found the appeal to be taken for delay and without sufficient cause, awarding damages to the appellee against the appellant.

Workers' CompensationPenalty ClaimAttorney's FeesInterestMedical ExpensesTexas LawStatutory InterpretationAppellate ProcedureClaimant RightsHealth Care Providers
References
1
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