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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Volt Technical Services Corp. v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

Plaintiff Volt Technical Services Corp. applied for H-2 visas for nuclear start-up technicians, which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied, asserting the need was permanent, not temporary. After the denial was affirmed on appeal, Volt filed suit, alleging the INS's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court upheld the INS's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), which requires the employer's need for services to be temporary, not just the individual assignments. Finding that Volt demonstrated a recurring need for such technicians over several years, the court granted the INS's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Volt's.

Immigration LawH-2 visasNonimmigrant WorkersTemporary EmploymentImmigration and Nationality ActAdministrative Procedures ActDeclaratory Judgment ActAgency InterpretationJudicial ReviewNuclear Industry
References
5
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Central Counties Center for Mental Health & Mental Retardation Services v. Rodriguez

This case consolidates two interlocutory appeals from district court orders denying pleas to the jurisdiction by Central Counties Center for Mental Health & Mental Retardation Services (the "Center") and Austin State Hospital (the "Hospital"). Karen Rodriguez sued the Center for personal injuries, including sexual exploitation by an employee. Debbie Fiske and Raymond Rodriguez sued the Hospital for damages related to their son's suicide while a patient. The core legal question is whether the Texas Health and Safety Code clearly and unambiguously waives sovereign immunity for mental health facilities. The court concludes that Code section 321.003 clearly waives both immunity from liability and immunity from suit for mental health facilities, including the Center and the Hospital. Therefore, the court affirms the district courts' orders denying the appellants' pleas to the jurisdiction.

Sovereign ImmunityWaiver of ImmunityMental Health FacilitiesHealth and Safety CodePatient's Bill of RightsInterlocutory AppealPlea to JurisdictionStatutory ConstructionGovernmental ImmunityPersonal Injury
References
19
Case No. 03-00-00369-CV, 03-00-00640-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 29, 2001

Central Counties Center for Mental Health & Mental Retardation Services v. Karen Rodriguez

This case consolidates two interlocutory appeals concerning sovereign immunity waivers for mental health facilities. Central Counties Center for Mental Health & Mental Retardation Services and Austin State Hospital appealed the denial of their pleas to the jurisdiction. Karen Rodriguez sued the Center for personal injuries and sexual exploitation by an employee. Debbie Fiske and Raymond Rodriguez sued the Hospital for damages and on behalf of their son, Christopher Roy Rodriguez, who committed suicide while a patient. The appeals court reviewed the issue de novo, determining whether the Texas Health and Safety Code clearly and unambiguously waives sovereign immunity. The court concluded that sections 321.003(a) and (b) of the Code explicitly waive both immunity from liability and immunity from suit for mental health facilities that violate patient rights. The court affirmed the district courts' orders denying the pleas to the jurisdiction.

Sovereign ImmunityWaiver of ImmunityMental Health FacilitiesPatient's Bill of RightsTexas Health and Safety CodeStatutory ConstructionInterlocutory AppealPlea to JurisdictionPersonal InjurySexual Exploitation
References
19
Case No. 03-14-00372-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 06, 2015

Elizabeth A. White v. Clean Slate Service, Inc. D/B/A Servpro of North Austin

Appellant Elizabeth A. White filed suit for damages against Appellee Clean Slate Services, Inc. d/b/a Servpro of North Central Austin for alleged breach of contract related to water removal services. Appellant obtained a default judgment against Appellee, first for liability and then for damages totaling $4,850,000.00. Appellee filed a timely motion for new trial, asserting lack of service, which the trial court granted. Appellant then appealed the granting of the new trial. Appellee argues that the appellate court lacks jurisdiction because the order granting a new trial is not a final judgment, and alternatively, that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision.

Default JudgmentMotion for New TrialAppellate JurisdictionImproper ServiceBreach of ContractDamagesTrial Court Plenary PowerTexas Civil ProcedureAppellate ReviewVacate Judgment
References
5
Case No. 03-98-00022-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 26, 1999

Concho Residential Service, Inc. v. MHMR Services for the Concho Valley A/K/A Concho Valley Center for Human Advancement, in Its Capacity as an Unincorporated Association, Its Capacity as a Mental Retardation Authority, and as a Purported Community MHMR Center

Concho Residential Services, Inc. (CRS) sued MHMR Services for the Concho Valley and 22 others for damages and injunctive relief, alleging statutory and common-law causes of action. The trial court rendered summary judgment, which CRS appealed. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment in part, finding that community centers are governmental entities entitled to sovereign immunity, thus dismissing antitrust, RICO, DTPA, and common-law tort claims. It also dismissed CRS's claim for injunctive relief due to lack of standing and claims under the Persons with Mental Retardation Act. The summary judgment for Hale County was also affirmed.

Antitrust ImmunityState Action ExemptionSovereign ImmunityMental Health ServicesMental Retardation ServicesCommunity CentersGovernmental EntitiesSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewStanding
References
23
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Prevost v. New York State Department of Social Services

The petitioners, maternal grandparents, initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge a determination by the State Commissioner of Social Services and the Warren County Department of Social Services. They sought to expunge a report from the State Central Register indicating inadequate guardianship concerning their grandson, Justin. Justin had been placed in foster care, and concerns arose about his behavior after monthly visits with the petitioners, prompting a psychiatrist to recommend discontinuing overnight visits. The psychiatric report detailed Justin's anger towards his grandmother and later allegations of diapering. Despite the petitioners' denials and claims of bias, the agency's decision to indicate inadequate guardianship was upheld after administrative review and a fair hearing. The court ultimately confirmed the determination, citing substantial evidence based on Justin's consistent accounts.

Child protective servicesInadequate guardianshipFoster careAdoption eligibilityCPLR article 78 proceedingAdministrative reviewExpungement of reportHearsay evidenceCredibility determinationSocial Services Law
References
3
Case No. 03-10-00709-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 31, 2011

Green Tree Servicing, LLC, as Authorized Servicing Agent for Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation v. Travis County

Green Tree Servicing, LLC appealed a post-answer default judgment concerning ad valorem taxes on mobile homes. The original suit was filed by Travis County and other entities against Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation, later substituted with Green Tree. Green Tree failed to appear at trial, resulting in a default judgment. Green Tree filed a motion for new trial, asserting its failure to appear was due to an accident or mistake (attorney transition) and that it had a meritorious defense, arguing that as a repossessing lienholder and not an owner, it was not liable for the taxes under Texas Tax Code Ann. § 32.07. The appellate court applied the Craddock test and found that Green Tree satisfied all three elements. The court adopted the interpretation that a repossessing lienholder is not considered an 'owner' under the tax code. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

Post-answer default judgmentAd valorem taxesMobile homesLienholder liabilityProperty ownershipMeritorious defenseCraddock testNew trialStatutory interpretationTexas Tax Code
References
22
Case No. 15-25-00012-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 17, 2025

State of Texas, Acting by and Through the Texas Facilities Commission, for and on Behalf of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission; The Texas Facilities Commission; Mike Novak, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Texas Facilities Commission; The Texas Health and Human Services Commission; And Rolland Niles in His Official Capacity as Deputy Executive Commissioner for the System Support Services Division of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. 8317 Cross Park, LLC

This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial-in-part of Appellants’ plea to the jurisdiction. Appellee filed an action against the State of Texas, TFC, HHSC, Executive Director Mike Novak of TFC, and Deputy Executive Commissioner for System Support Services Division of HHSC Rolland Niles alleging causes of action for breach of lease, ultra vires conduct related to the termination of the lease, and declaratory relief. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their plea because Chapter 114 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code does not waive sovereign immunity for the State of Texas, HHSC, or TFC for breach of lease claims, and the lease is not a contract for goods or services covered by Chapter 114. Furthermore, Appellants contend that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) does not waive sovereign immunity for Appellee's declaratory judgment claim as it does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of a statute, and Appellee has not alleged a cognizable ultra vires claim against the state officials. Appellants seek reversal of the partial denial of their plea to the jurisdiction and dismissal of Appellee's claims.

Sovereign ImmunityBreach of LeaseDeclaratory JudgmentUltra ViresTexas Civil Practices and Remedies CodeTexas Government CodeAppellate ProcedureJurisdictionState AgenciesContract Law
References
44
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Superior Snubbing Services, Inc. v. Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc.

Superior Snubbing Services, Inc. appealed a summary judgment granted in favor of Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc. The case originated from an injury sustained by a Superior employee, Daryll Faulk, while working under a Master Service Agreement between Superior and Mitchell Energy Corporation (now Devon Energy Operating, L.P.). Faulk sued Energy and others, leading to a settlement, after which Energy and Mitchell sought indemnity from Superior based on the contract. Superior argued that Energy's claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Texas Labor Code and the contract was unenforceable under the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that under Texas Labor Code section 417.004, third-party beneficiaries like Energy are not permissible indemnitees because the agreement was not directly with the 'third party'.

Workers' CompensationIndemnificationContractual LiabilityTexas Labor CodeOilfield Anti-Indemnity ActSummary JudgmentStatutory InterpretationThird-Party BeneficiaryAppellate ReviewReverse and Remand
References
12
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Young v. Central Square Central School District

Plaintiff sued Central Square Central School District under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging discrimination due to her multiple sclerosis diagnosis and the District's failure to provide reasonable accommodations. The District moved for summary judgment, arguing collateral estoppel from a prior administrative hearing that found Plaintiff unfit to teach, and also sought to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel. The Court denied the summary judgment motion, ruling that collateral estoppel did not bar the litigation of reasonable accommodation issues. However, the motion to disqualify Plaintiff's law firm, O'Hara & O'Connell, was granted because an associate had previously worked on the District's defense in related matters, creating an appearance of impropriety. Consequently, Plaintiff must secure new legal representation or proceed pro se within ninety days.

Americans with Disabilities ActRehabilitation ActReasonable AccommodationMultiple SclerosisEmployment DiscriminationCollateral EstoppelAttorney DisqualificationConflict of InterestSummary JudgmentTeacher Disability
References
26
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