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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Elmgren v. Ineos USA, LLC

Johannes "Joe" Elmgren, an employee of Zachry Industrial, Inc., suffered severe burns from an explosion and superheated gas release while replacing valves at an Ineos plant. Joe and his wife, Valarie Elmgren, sued Ineos USA, LLC and Jonathan Pavlovsky for negligence and wrongful termination. The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing protection under Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which limits property owner liability to contractors' employees. The trial court granted summary judgment, applying Chapter 95 to all claims. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment for Ineos regarding premises-liability negligence claims, finding that Chapter 95 applied and the Elmgrens failed to raise a fact issue on Ineos's actual knowledge of the danger. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for Pavlovsky, concluding he did not prove Chapter 95's applicability to him as an employee. The appellate court also reversed the summary judgment for both Ineos and Pavlovsky concerning negligent-activity and negligent-undertaking claims, stating that Chapter 95 does not inherently bar these distinct negligence theories.

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies CodeChapter 95 ApplicabilityPremises LiabilityNegligent ActivityNegligent UndertakingSummary Judgment AppealProperty Owner DutyContractor Employee InjuryIndustrial AccidentChemical Plant Explosion
References
40
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Francis v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp.

Algenard Francis, an independent subcontractor working on Coastal Gas Corporation's premises, sustained serious injuries in an explosion. He sued Coastal for negligence, premises liability, and negligence per se. A jury initially awarded Francis damages under common-law negligence, but the trial court set aside this verdict and rendered a take-nothing judgment for Coastal, applying Chapter 95 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code as the exclusive remedy. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Chapter 95 applied to Francis's claims, Coastal was a 'property owner,' the well was an 'improvement to real property,' and cleaning the well constituted repair or renovation. The court also found no error in allowing a trial amendment to assert Chapter 95, concluded that Chapter 95 does not violate the 'open courts' provision of the Texas Constitution, and ruled that negligence per se based on Railroad Commission regulations was not applicable.

Explosion InjuryIndependent Contractor LiabilityProperty Owner LiabilityChapter 95 Civil Practice and Remedies CodeOil and Gas Well OperationsWorkplace AccidentNegligence ClaimsPremises LiabilityNegligence Per SeTrial Amendment
References
26
Case No. 12-20-00243-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 30, 2021

Bobby Martin v. WPP Properties, LLC, Jennifer M. Williams, William R. Pulley and Zachary D. Pulley

Bobby Martin, an independent contractor, sustained a fractured hip after tripping and falling down an external staircase while performing 'make ready' renovation work at the Manor Terrace Apartment complex, owned by WPP Properties, LLC. He subsequently sued WPP Properties, LLC, Jennifer M. Williams, William R. Pulley, and Zachary Pulley (Appellees) alleging negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment for Appellees, concluding that Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applied and that Appellees did not retain control over Martin's work. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Martin's work constituted 'renovation' under Chapter 95, the staircase was part of the same 'improvement' as the apartment, and Martin failed to establish a fact issue regarding Appellees' control over his work, which is a prerequisite for liability under Chapter 95.

Negligence ClaimPremises LiabilityIndependent Contractor InjurySummary Judgment AffirmationTexas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 95Property Owner ImmunityWorkplace InjuryRenovation WorkControl Over WorkActual Knowledge
References
20
Case No. 14-13-00044-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 20, 2014

Johannes Joe Elmgren and Valarie Elmgren, Individually and as Next Friends of Their Minor ChildrenAPE Rehear v. INEOS USA, LLC F/K/A Innovene USA, LLC, INEOS Polymers, Inc., A/K/A/ INEOS Olefins, Ineos Olefins & Polymers USA, a Division of Ineos USA, LLC and Jonathan Bubba Pavlovsky

Joe Elmgren, an employee of a subcontractor, suffered severe burns from an explosion and super-heated gas release while replacing valves at an Ineos plant. The Elmgrens (Joe, Valarie, and their minor children) sued Ineos and Jonathan "Bubba" Pavlovsky for negligence and wrongful termination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ineos and Pavlovsky, applying Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment for Ineos on premises-liability claims as the Elmgrens failed to show actual knowledge of the danger. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for Pavlovsky, stating that Chapter 95 does not apply to employees, and also reversed the summary judgment for both Ineos and Pavlovsky regarding negligent-activity and negligent-undertaking claims, finding Chapter 95 does not automatically bar these distinct negligence theories.

Summary JudgmentNegligencePremises LiabilityTexas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 95Negligent ActivityNegligent UndertakingPersonal InjurySubcontractor LiabilityProperty Owner LiabilityActual Knowledge
References
38
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 18, 2015

First Texas Bank v. Chris Carpenter

Chris Carpenter, a roofing contractor, was injured after falling from a ladder while inspecting hail damage on First Texas Bank's roof with an insurance adjuster. Carpenter sued the Bank, alleging a defective ladder, but the Bank invoked Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which limits a property owner's liability to contractors under certain conditions. The trial court initially granted summary judgment for the Bank. The court of appeals reversed, concluding Carpenter was not a 'contractor' as contemplated by the statute due to the absence of a formal contract. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court's definition of 'contractor' under Chapter 95, stating that an actual contract isn't always required and Carpenter was indeed a contractor. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment to remand the case because the evidence did not establish that Carpenter's injury occurred while he was performing work explicitly covered by Chapter 95, as the Bank had not yet decided on specific repairs.

Contractor definitionProperty owner liabilityChapter 95Texas Civil Practice and Remedies CodeStatutory constructionPremises liabilityScope of workSummary judgment reversalRoofing workInjury claim
References
7
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In re Ortiz-Peredo

The Chapter 13 Trustee objected to the Debtors' Chapter 13 plan, arguing they did not meet the "best efforts" test by not including lawsuit settlement proceeds in their disposable income. The Debtors contended the lawsuit proceeds were exempt property and thus not liable for pre-petition debts. The Court reviewed the interplay between exemption provisions (§ 522(c)) and disposable income requirements (§ 1325(b)), distinguishing between majority and minority views on the matter. Following the majority view and *In re Launza*, the Court determined that once settlement proceeds are defined as income and "disposable income" under § 1325(b), they qualify as projected disposable income, irrespective of their exempt status. Consequently, the Court granted the Trustee's Objection, requiring the Debtors to propose a new plan within fourteen days or face dismissal.

BankruptcyChapter 13Disposable IncomeExempt PropertySettlement ProceedsPlan ConfirmationTrustee ObjectionBest Efforts TestSan Antonio DivisionPost-Petition Income
References
9
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Nassau Chapter of Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. County of Nassau

This case involves an appeal concerning the commencement of county service for employees initially hired under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) for purposes of a collective bargaining agreement between the Nassau Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (plaintiff) and the County of Nassau (defendant). The plaintiff sought to include CETA employment prior to December 31, 1976, as commencement of county service under 'Plan A' of the agreement. The defendant appealed a Supreme Court judgment that had initially granted this relief. The appellate court reversed the judgment, holding that CETA employment, despite county supervision, should not be considered the commencement of county service for employment agreement purposes due to its temporary nature. The court concluded that service should only be deemed to begin when a position is obtained under Civil Service Law procedures. Consequently, CETA employees hired by the county after December 31, 1976, are excluded from Plan A, regardless of prior CETA service.

CETA EmploymentCivil Service LawCollective Bargaining AgreementCounty Service CommencementTemporary EmploymentIncremental Salary PlanPublic Sector EmploymentEmployee Benefits EligibilityAppellate DivisionNassau County
References
4
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Nassau Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. County of Nassau

The Nassau Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) initiated an action against the County of Nassau, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the proper salary plan for CETA-funded employees who transitioned to county-funded positions after January 1, 1977. CSEA contended that these workers, having commenced service prior to the cut-off date, were 'employees' under existing collective bargaining agreements and should remain on the 'Incremental Graded Salary Plan' (Plan A). The County argued they were 'new employees' after 1976, falling under the 'Non-Incremental Graded Salary Plan' (Plan B). The court reviewed the federal CETA legislation, the collective bargaining agreement, and the County's past conduct towards CETA workers, which consistently treated them as county employees with various benefits. Concluding that CETA workers qualified as 'employees' from their initial service date, the court ruled in favor of CSEA. The decision mandates that these workers be continued under Plan A, citing principles of statutory parity, established case law, and the policy goals of the CETA program for upward mobility.

Collective BargainingSalary PlansCETA ProgramPublic EmploymentEmployee RightsDeclaratory JudgmentCivil Service LawUnion RepresentationStatutory InterpretationGovernment Employees
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Reed v. Cooper (In Re Cooper)

This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses a motion by The Cadle Company, an individual creditor, seeking authorization to prosecute the Chapter 7 estate's causes of action, specifically a Section 542 turnover action and state law fraud claims. The motion was opposed by the debtors, Gary R. and Junanne M. Cooper, and conditionally by the Chapter 7 Trustee. The court analyzes whether an individual creditor in a Chapter 7 case can be granted independent or derivative standing to pursue estate causes of action, distinguishing between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 contexts. The court concludes there is no textual basis in the Bankruptcy Code for such standing in a Chapter 7 case, noting the unique role of the Chapter 7 trustee as an independent fiduciary without the conflicts of interest often present in Chapter 11. Even if such power existed, the court finds Cadle did not present a compelling argument, as the Trustee had exercised business judgment in attempting to settle the claims. The court ultimately DENIES Cadle's Standing Motion, stating that while Cadle can pursue its independent Section 727(d) action, it cannot usurp the Trustee's role.

Chapter 7 BankruptcyDerivative StandingCreditor StandingTrustee AuthorityEstate Causes of ActionAvoidance ActionsBankruptcy Code InterpretationEquitable PowersJudicial DiscretionMotion Denied
References
32
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Guido

This case addresses the appropriate commission for a Chapter 7 trustee under 11 U.S.C. section 326(a). The trustee sought the maximum statutory commission of $16,705.95, calculated from a $269,118.91 base derived from the debtor's personal injury settlement. The debtor objected, arguing against a 'double-charge' on funds already disbursed to personal injury counsel and the worker’s compensation carrier. The court ruled that the commission base should only include funds actually received by the trustee, not those subject to constructive liens or paid directly to other parties. Considering the trustee's limited time investment of approximately 15 hours, the court exercised its discretion to reduce the commission to $3,642, based solely on the $28,921.65 distributed to unsecured creditors. The decision emphasizes that the statutory maximum is not a minimum and that, in cases where the burden falls heavily on an injured individual, sound discretion favors maximizing distribution to the debtor.

Bankruptcy LawChapter 7Trustee Compensation11 U.S.C. Section 326(a)Personal Injury SettlementAsset AdministrationSecured CreditorsUnsecured CreditorsJudicial DiscretionCost Efficiency
References
5
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