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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Claim of Blanchard v. Eagle Nest Tenancy In Common

Claimant's decedent, a superintendent for Eagle Nest Tenancy In Common, died in an unwitnessed one-car motor vehicle accident on the employer's premises. His widow filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, arguing his death was causally related to his employment. Both the Workers' Compensation Law Judge and the Board affirmed this finding, prompting an appeal by the employer's insurance carrier. The carrier contested that the accident occurred "in the course of employment," despite testimony suggesting the decedent intended to address maintenance issues after returning home. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board's amended decision, finding sufficient evidence to support that the accident occurred in the course of employment, especially given the presumption afforded to unwitnessed accidents within the scope of employment under Workers' Compensation Law § 21.

Workers' Compensation BenefitsEmployment CausalityMotor Vehicle FatalityOn-Premises AccidentWorkers' Compensation Board AppealScope of EmploymentUnwitnessed Accident PresumptionJudicial ReviewAppellate Division AffirmationInsurance Carrier Appeal
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 07, 2011

De Oleo v. Charis Christian Ministries, Inc.

In this case, the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries sustained during construction work at a building owned by Charis, whose employer was St. Loren Construction Corp. Charis, the defendants/third-party plaintiffs, moved for a default judgment on their third-party claims for common-law and contractual indemnification and contribution against St. Loren, the third-party defendant. The Supreme Court denied the motion. On appeal, the court modified the lower court's order, granting the motion as to the claim for common-law indemnification, while otherwise affirming. The appellate court found Charis provided sufficient proof of St. Loren's negligence and their own lack of negligence. It was also noted that Charis did not need to disprove Workers’ Compensation Law § 11, as it must be pleaded as an affirmative defense.

common-law indemnificationcontractual indemnificationcontributiondefault judgmentconstruction injuryemployer negligenceaffirmative defenseappellate reviewmotion practice
References
7
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

McFadden v. Lee

The plaintiff, a self-employed painter, suffered personal injuries after falling from a ladder while performing exterior painting for the defendants at their home. He filed an action alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and 241 (6). The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims. The appellate court affirmed this decision, concluding that the defendants did not exercise supervisory control over the plaintiff's work, which is a prerequisite for liability under these specific statutes and common-law negligence when the injury stems from the work method rather than a dangerous premises condition.

Personal InjuryLadder FallLabor Law 200Common Law NegligenceSummary JudgmentAppellate DecisionHomeowner LiabilityIndependent ContractorSupervisory AuthoritySafe Place to Work
References
8
Case No. 11 civ. 913, 11 civ. 4212
Regular Panel Decision

Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.

Irving Picard, the SIPA Trustee for Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (BMIS), sued JPMorgan Chase & Co. and UBS AG, along with their affiliates and feeder funds, to recover billions in damages. The Trustee alleged that these defendants aided and abetted Madoff's Ponzi scheme through common law claims such as fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the Trustee lacked standing to pursue claims belonging to BMIS's customers, not BMIS itself. The court agreed, holding that a bankruptcy trustee typically represents the debtor, and Madoff's misconduct, imputed to BMIS, invoked the in pari delicto doctrine, precluding BMIS from suing. The court also rejected the Trustee's arguments for standing based on Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a), New York's contribution statute, and common law bailment or equitable subrogation. Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss all common law claims was granted due to the Trustee's lack of standing.

Ponzi SchemeSecurities Investor Protection ActBankruptcy TrusteeStanding to SueCommon Law ClaimsAiding and Abetting FraudBreach of Fiduciary DutyIn Pari DelictoCreditor ClaimsDebtor's Estate
References
22
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Konopczynski v. Adf Constr. Corp.

Plaintiff brought a Labor Law and common-law negligence action for injuries sustained after tripping in a floor depression at a worksite. The Supreme Court initially granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the order was modified. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim, agreeing that the floor depressions were an integral part of the construction. However, the court reinstated the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, finding that the defendant failed to prove a lack of constructive notice regarding the hazardous conditions, despite the open and obvious nature of the depression.

Personal InjuryWorkplace AccidentTripping HazardSummary JudgmentPremises LiabilityConstructive NoticeComparative FaultLabor Law § 200Labor Law § 241(6)Common-Law Negligence
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 03, 2000

Tapia v. 126 First Avenue, L. L. C.

The Supreme Court, Bronx County, initially denied cross motions for summary judgment between defendant-appellant 126 First Avenue, L. L. C. (126) and defendant Kinta Corp. regarding common-law indemnification. The Appellate Division modified this order, granting 126's cross motion for summary judgment on its indemnification claim. The court found that 126's liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) was purely vicarious as an owner without supervisory authority over the worksite where the plaintiff was injured. Therefore, 126 was entitled to full common-law indemnification from Kinta, the actively negligent contractor. Kinta's argument for protection under Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 was rejected due to a lack of evidentiary proof that it was the plaintiff's employer, with documentary evidence showing the plaintiff was employed by a different entity.

Summary JudgmentCommon-Law IndemnificationVicarious LiabilityLabor LawWorkers' Compensation LawCross ClaimActive NegligenceOwner LiabilityContractor LiabilityEmployer Status
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 05, 1999

Light v. Antedeminico

Roger Light, a maintenance worker for Pawling Corp., initiated this action against Anthony Antedeminico d/b/a Tony’s Construction, a subcontractor, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained after falling into an excavated pit. The Supreme Court, Dutchess County, initially denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the common-law negligence claim, maintaining that triable issues of fact existed regarding the defendant's potential negligence. Upon reargument, the Supreme Court adhered to its original decision, prompting the defendant to appeal. The appellate court subsequently reversed the lower court's order, granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the common-law negligence cause of action. The court reasoned that the defendant successfully demonstrated a lack of sufficient control over the construction site, thereby owing no duty of care to the injured plaintiff, and the plaintiffs failed to present a triable issue of fact to counter this.

Personal InjuryCommon-Law NegligenceSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewDuty of CareConstruction SiteSubcontractor LiabilityPremises LiabilityDutchess CountyNew York Law
References
4
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Claim of Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans.

The dissenting opinion argues that the Workers' Compensation Board erred as a matter of law by failing to consider the intent of the parties to be husband and wife. This intent, evidenced by their conduct in New York State before and after their trips to Georgia, was overlooked in the Board's determination regarding a common-law marriage. The dissent highlights that while initial cohabitation in New York might have been meretricious, the parties' intent should be weighed when evaluating their Georgia visits. Furthermore, the Board's conclusory finding that no common-law marriage was effected in Georgia is deemed insufficient for judicial review due to the absence of relevant factual findings and a clear application of Georgia law. Consequently, the dissent concludes that the decision should be reversed and the matter remitted to the Workers' Compensation Board for further consideration.

Common-Law MarriageGeorgia LawNew York LawMarital IntentCohabitationJudicial Review StandardsWorkers' CompensationAppellate ProcedureRemittalDissenting Opinion
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 14, 2009

Kitkas v. Windsor Place Corp.

This case involves an appeal by Boca Electric Corp., a second third-party defendant, from an order denying its motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff, an employee of Boca, sustained personal injuries in an electrical explosion at a construction site. Boca argued that the plaintiff's injuries did not constitute a "grave injury" under Workers' Compensation Law § 11, which would preclude claims for contribution and common-law indemnification against an employer. The appellate court found that Boca met its burden of proof, and the plaintiff and Windsor Place Corp., the premises owner, failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact regarding a qualifying grave injury. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the lower court's order and granted Boca's motion for summary judgment, dismissing all causes of action for contribution and common-law indemnification against it.

Personal InjurySummary JudgmentContributionCommon-law IndemnificationWorkers' Compensation LawGrave InjuryEmployer LiabilityConstruction AccidentElectrical InjuryAppellate Review
References
5
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Sep 21, 1999

Taylor v. V.A.W. of America, Inc.

Scott Taylor, an employee of Vanguard, Inc. and Vanguard Organization, Inc., suffered personal injuries when he fell through a roof owned by V.A.W. of America, Inc. while performing repairs, having been supplied no safety devices. Taylor initially moved for partial summary judgment against VAW under Labor Law § 240 (1), which was denied, as was VAW's cross-motion for common-law indemnification against Vanguard. On appeal, the court reversed the prior order, granting Taylor's motion for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) and VAW's cross-motion for common-law indemnification against Vanguard, concluding that VAW failed to provide required safety devices and was entitled to indemnification.

Personal InjuryLabor LawConstruction AccidentElevated WorksiteScaffold LawSummary JudgmentIndemnificationThird-Party ActionAppellate ReviewPremises Liability
References
7
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