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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. E2007-02602-SC-R11-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Sep 20, 2010

Gerry G. Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC - Concurring

The Supreme Court of Tennessee at Knoxville heard an appeal in Gerry G. Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC, concerning a retaliatory discharge claim. Justice Cornelia A. Clark authored a concurring opinion, affirming the Court of Appeals' decision to deny summary judgment for the employer. The opinion clarifies the proper application of the McDonnell Douglas framework in conjunction with Tennessee's summary judgment procedures in employment discrimination and retaliation cases. Kinsler, terminated after rejecting a workers' compensation settlement, argued pretext in Berkline's stated reason of inability to perform job duties due to lifting restrictions. The court found genuine issues of material fact regarding the employer's stated reasons for termination, highlighting discrepancies in job requirements and potential disparate treatment.

Workers' CompensationRetaliatory DischargeSummary JudgmentPretextMcDonnell Douglas FrameworkEmployment DiscriminationCausationFunctional CapacityJob RequirementsLifting Restrictions
References
13
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Neagle v. Nelson

Justice Robertson concurs with the majority opinion but respectfully disagrees with Justice Kilgarlin’s conclusions. Robertson argues that the legislative intent to abolish the “discovery rule” in *Gaddis v. Smith* via Tex.Ins.Code Ann. art. 5.82 and Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 4590i is not manifest in the plain language of the statutes and that legislative history should not be the starting point without ambiguity. He also finds the analogy to workers’ compensation law for determining permissible delay in malpractice cases to be strained due to numerous distinctions. Robertson maintains that the "discovery rule" issue and alternatives to workers' compensation analogy remain open questions, suggesting common law and equitable doctrines like laches. Justice Kilgarlin also provides a concurring opinion, addressing questions left unanswered by the court. He states that if the fact that Neagle reasonably should not have known of his injury during the limitations period is controverted, Neagle bears the burden of proof. Kilgarlin concludes that the legislative intent was to overrule *Gaddis v. Smith*'s discovery rule, and therefore, a two-year period after discovery cannot be reinstated. He proposes adopting the "good cause" standard from workers’ compensation law to determine permissible delay for filing suit after discovery in medical malpractice cases where discovery could not occur within two years of the tort or last treatment. Both justices concur in reversing and remanding the case.

Medical MalpracticeDiscovery RuleStatute of LimitationsLegislative IntentWorkers' Compensation AnalogyOpen Courts ProvisionGood CauseTexas LawConcurring OpinionJudicial Interpretation
References
9
Case No. 03S01-9608-CH-00086
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 04, 1999

Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr., Director of the Division of Workers Compensation, Tennessee Dept of Labor - Concurring

The Tennessee Supreme Court issued a concurring opinion in the case of Wayne Eldred Hill. Justice Janice M. Holder agreed with the majority's finding that this case falls under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a). However, she reiterated her prior dissenting view from Bomely v. Mid-America Corp. (1998) regarding the application of subsections (a) and (b) of the statute. Justice Holder posited that subsection (a) should apply solely when a subsequent injury leads to permanent and total disability. In contrast, she argued that subsection (b) should be reserved for instances where employees can still earn wages but have vocational disabilities exceeding statutory limits. This clarifies her interpretation of the statute's scope in workers' compensation cases.

Workers' CompensationSecond Injury FundPermanent Total DisabilityVocational DisabilityStatutory InterpretationConcurring OpinionAppellate LawDisability BenefitsSubsequent InjuryTennessee Supreme Court
References
1
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Formosa Plastics Corp., USA v. Kajima International, Inc.

This is a concurring opinion by Justice Castillo concerning an appeal in a fraud lawsuit between Kajima International, Inc. and Formosa Plastics Corporation, USA. The majority reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment, finding an abuse of discretion in not disqualifying Kajima's expert witness. Justice Castillo concurs with the reversal and remand but for different reasons, arguing that the trial court properly admitted the expert's testimony regarding reliability and found no disqualifying conflict of interest. The case involved claims related to construction contracts, and the jury awarded Kajima $15,432,123.45 in fraud damages. Justice Castillo further addresses and supports the trial court's decisions on mitigation evidence, single business enterprise, and broad-form fraud questions.

FraudExpert Witness DisqualificationSide-Switching ConflictConfidentiality WaiverConstruction LawDamages CalculationMitigation of DamagesSingle Business EnterpriseJury InstructionsAppellate Review
References
62
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 20, 2003

Williams v. Houston Firemen's Relief & Retirement Fund

This opinion presents a concurring and dissenting view on a rehearing. Justice Taft concurs with affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of the City of Houston based on governmental immunity, but dissents regarding the Houston Firemen’s Relief and Retirement Fund and its trustees. The dissent argues that the trial court possessed inherent jurisdiction to interpret the former retirement statute’s prior service credit provision, concluding the Fund's interpretation and resultant guidelines were incorrect. Furthermore, Justice Taft contends that the trustees failed to establish their affirmative defenses of official, judicial, and legislative immunity against Williams's common-law claims, and that the Texas Tort Claims Act did not bar these claims. Therefore, the justice would reverse the judgment for the Fund and trustees and remand the case for a declaratory judgment in Williams’s favor.

Governmental ImmunityPension FundStatutory InterpretationJudicial ReviewExclusive JurisdictionOfficial ImmunityAbsolute Judicial ImmunityAbsolute Legislative ImmunityTexas Tort Claims ActAdministrative Agency
References
61
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger

Justice O'Neill, joined by Justice Smith, penned a concurring opinion regarding the viability of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, specifically criticizing the Court's 'gap-filler' approach as unworkable. The opinion argues for emphasizing a stringent threshold for such claims in the workplace, requiring conduct to be 'extreme and outrageous' and beyond all bounds of decency. Referencing GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, O'Neill asserts that Zeltwanger's allegations, while reprehensible, do not meet the high standard of severe physical abuse, intimidation, or threats required to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress liability. Therefore, while concurring with the judgment, O'Neill disagrees with the Court's reasoning.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional DistressWorkplace ConductSexual Harassment ClaimsExtreme and Outrageous Conduct StandardTort LawConcurring OpinionEmployer LiabilityEmployment DisputesLegal ThresholdEvidentiary Sufficiency
References
4
Case No. 03-10-00472-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 10, 2012

City of Austin v. Ronnie Esparza

The opinion by Justice David Puryear serves as a concurring and dissenting statement to the majority's decision in a case involving the City of Austin and Ronnie Esparza. Justice Puryear concurs with the majority's handling of the first appellate issue but expresses strong disagreement with the remainder of the opinion. His dissent focuses on the perceived legal and factual insufficiency of evidence supporting the jury's finding that Esparza was disabled due to a work-related injury. Puryear argues that Esparza failed to adequately demonstrate a reduction in earning capacity at pre-injury wages, a key component of the Texas Labor Code's definition of "disability," beyond merely testifying about pain. He concludes that the evidence presented did not meet the required legal standard to affirm the jury's disability determination.

DisabilityWorkers' CompensationLegal SufficiencyFactual SufficiencyEarning CapacityPre-injury WageTexas Labor CodeAppellate ReviewJury VerdictBurden of Proof
References
23
Case No. 02-S-01-9508-CV-00077
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 01, 1998

Patricia Love v. American Olean Tile Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Divison of Workers' Compensation, State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting

The concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Janice M. Holder addresses the majority's decision regarding workers' compensation. Justice Holder concurs with the majority's conclusion that permanent and total disability awards are payable until age sixty-five and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a) is applicable to the case. However, she dissents from the majority's analysis of apportionment, arguing it discourages hiring the handicapped and contradicts the legislative intent of the Second Injury Fund. She contends that an employer's liability should be capped at 400 weeks unless a subsequent injury independently caused permanent and total disability. Furthermore, Justice Holder disagrees with the majority's interpretation that subsections (a) and (b) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102 are not mutually exclusive, advocating for the exclusive application of subsection (a) in cases of prior injuries leading to total disability, and subsection (b) solely when an employee has received multiple permanent partial disability awards exceeding 100 percent in aggregate.

Workers' CompensationPermanent Total DisabilityApportionmentSecond Injury FundStatutory InterpretationEmployer LiabilityPrior InjuriesSubsequent InjuryTennessee LawJudicial Dissent
References
1
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 09, 1984

Nacogdoches Memorial Hospital v. Justice

Joseph Justice, an employee of Nacogdoches Memorial Hospital, suffered a heart attack while working, leading to a worker's compensation claim. A jury found his heart attack was work-related, causing total temporary incapacity for 370 weeks, and that the hospital failed to provide reasonable medical care. Despite the jury's initial finding on wages, the trial court disregarded it, ruling that Justice's average daily wage qualified for the maximum compensation rate. Justice died after the verdict but before the judgment was signed. The hospital appealed, challenging the court's wage determination and a perceived improper argument by Justice's counsel, but the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding the wages conclusively proved and the argument error waived.

Worker's CompensationHeart AttackTemporary IncapacityJury VerdictTrial Court DiscretionAverage Weekly Wage CalculationMaximum Compensation RateJudgment Non Obstante VeredictoImproper ArgumentWaiver of Error
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton

Justice Cornyn's concurring opinion in 'Allbritton's Claim' highlights the historical development of causation in American and Texas jurisprudence, criticizing the Court's opinion for conflating foreseeability and cause-in-fact. He advocates for a bifurcated causal analysis, distinguishing between cause-in-fact (using 'but for' and 'substantial factor' tests as factual inquiries) and legal/proximate cause (incorporating foreseeability and policy-based limitations on liability). Applying this framework to Sue Allbritton's injury, Justice Cornyn argues that while the defective pump was a cause-in-fact, neither Union Pump's negligence nor the defective pump was a legal cause or producing cause of her injury. This is because her injury was not foreseeable and did not occur in a natural and continuous sequence from the defect, but rather resulted from a dangerous shortcut taken after the crisis had subsided, placing her outside the scope of products liability protection. Consequently, he concurs in the Court's judgment, which effectively denies Allbritton's claim, but for the distinct reasons outlined in his analysis.

CausationNegligenceProducts LiabilityForeseeabilityCause-in-FactProducing CauseSubstantial FactorTexas Supreme CourtLegal RealismTort Law
References
37
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