Neagle v. Nelson
Justice Robertson concurs with the majority opinion but respectfully disagrees with Justice Kilgarlin’s conclusions. Robertson argues that the legislative intent to abolish the “discovery rule” in *Gaddis v. Smith* via Tex.Ins.Code Ann. art. 5.82 and Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 4590i is not manifest in the plain language of the statutes and that legislative history should not be the starting point without ambiguity. He also finds the analogy to workers’ compensation law for determining permissible delay in malpractice cases to be strained due to numerous distinctions. Robertson maintains that the "discovery rule" issue and alternatives to workers' compensation analogy remain open questions, suggesting common law and equitable doctrines like laches. Justice Kilgarlin also provides a concurring opinion, addressing questions left unanswered by the court. He states that if the fact that Neagle reasonably should not have known of his injury during the limitations period is controverted, Neagle bears the burden of proof. Kilgarlin concludes that the legislative intent was to overrule *Gaddis v. Smith*'s discovery rule, and therefore, a two-year period after discovery cannot be reinstated. He proposes adopting the "good cause" standard from workers’ compensation law to determine permissible delay for filing suit after discovery in medical malpractice cases where discovery could not occur within two years of the tort or last treatment. Both justices concur in reversing and remanding the case.