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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Willis

The debtor, Trennis Earl Willis, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. An asset in his estate is a personal injury claim, for which he had a contingency fee contract with attorney Frank L. Supercinski. Supercinski sought approval for his fees ($20,000 plus expenses) from a $50,000 settlement of the personal injury claim and approval of a disbursement scheme. Both the Debtor and the Chapter 7 Trustee objected, arguing the contingency fee contract was executory and rejected by the estate. The Court, presided over by Judge Donald R. Sharp, found the contingency fee agreement to be executory and deemed rejected as not assumed by the Trustee. However, applying the common fund doctrine, the Court acknowledged Supercinski's entitlement to fees from the settlement proceeds with priority. Despite this, all of Supercinski's motions (for fees, settlement approval, and relief from stay) were denied due to procedural flaws, such as the settlement not being finalized or approved, and the lack of a settlement agreement copy. The Court clarified that the settlement check is property of the Debtor's estate and must be administered under bankruptcy rules, instructing Supercinski to file a proper application once the settlement is finalized and approved.

Chapter 7 BankruptcyContingency Fee AgreementAttorney's FeesExecutory ContractAutomatic Stay ReliefCommon Fund DoctrineQuantum MeruitTexas LawPersonal Injury SettlementBankruptcy Estate
References
29
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 24, 1999

Town of Hempstead v. Inc. Village of Atlantic Beach

This case involves two related actions arising from inter-municipal agreements for waste disposal services. The defendants appealed from initial court orders concerning their obligations to pay minimum waste commitment tonnage fees and their entitlement to various credits, including those for private carters, recyclable materials, and yard waste. The plaintiffs cross-appealed regarding the methodology for calculating yard waste credits and the fees for using the Town's transfer facility. The Supreme Court, Nassau County, issued an initial order and a subsequent amended order upon reargument, clarifying several points. The Appellate Division affirmed the amended order, holding that the agreements unambiguously required villages to pay minimum tonnage fees regardless of actual waste delivered. The court also determined that the villages were only obligated to pay transfer facility fees based on actual waste delivered and that any ambiguities regarding yard waste credits should be interpreted against the Town as the drafter of the agreements.

Inter-municipal agreementsWaste disposalSummary judgmentContract interpretationMinimum commitment feesYard waste creditTransfer facility feesUnambiguous agreementsExtrinsic evidenceAmbiguity construction
References
10
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 21, 2014

Marin v. Constitution Realty, LLC

This case involves an appeal from an order regarding the division of attorneys' fees among Sheryl Menkes (appellant), David B. Golomb, and Jeffrey A. Manheimer (respondents). Menkes, attorney of record for plaintiffs in a personal injury action, had agreements with both Golomb and Manheimer for fee sharing. The primary dispute concerned Golomb's share, contingent on whether the case settled at a specific mediation session (12% fee) or later (40% fee). The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding the contract unambiguous that the mediation session concluded on a specific date, entitling Golomb to the higher fee, and that Manheimer was entitled to 20% as per his agreement. The court rejected Menkes's arguments based on contract interpretation and professional conduct rules.

Attorney's FeesContract InterpretationMediation AgreementFee DisputePersonal Injury ActionQuantum MeruitProfessional ConductNew York LawSettlement NegotiationsStructured Settlement
References
13
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co.

This appeal concerns a dispute over a contingent fee agreement between Tillery, a law firm, and Zurich Insurance Company. Zurich initially retained Tillery for a medical malpractice claim and a subrogation intervention in products liability cases. Zurich later directed Tillery to cease work on the intervention claim and transferred responsibility to its in-house counsel, subsequently refusing to pay Tillery a contingent fee from the intervention's recovery. Tillery argued the agreement was binding and Zurich breached it, but the appeals court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court ruled that the contingent fee agreement was voidable by Zurich because it lacked Zurich's signature as required by Texas Government Code § 82.065, and Zurich validly voided the agreement before Tillery had fully performed. The court also rejected Tillery's arguments regarding full performance, excused performance, ratification, and estoppel.

Contingent Fee AgreementAttorney FeesVoidable ContractTexas Government CodeContract EnforcementProfessional ResponsibilitySubrogation ClaimMedical MalpracticeAppellate ReviewTrial Court Judgment
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Adkins v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.

This case addresses whether a Texas trial judge has the authority to change the terms of attorneys’ fee contracts between attorneys and their clients in mass tort litigation that is not a class action. The Appellants, consisting of 49 law firms led by Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, representing approximately 37,000 plaintiffs, challenged a trial court’s order that reduced their contingent fees and expenses from a settlement with Shell Oil Company and Hoechst Celanese Corporation regarding defective polybutylene plumbing systems. The appellate court reviewed general contract law, exceptions (fraud, incapacity), and the inapplicability of class action and common fund doctrines. It also considered whether the settlement agreement itself granted the trial judge such authority. The court concluded that, absent pleading and proof of barratry, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, incapacity, illegality, class action, or common fund doctrine applicability, a trial judge lacks the power to modify a fully-performed attorney fee contract. Therefore, the court reversed the portions of the appealed judgments dealing with the award of attorneys’ fees and remanded the cases for further proceedings.

Attorney's FeesContingency Fee ContractsContract LawAppellate ReviewMass Tort LitigationTrial Court AuthoritySettlement AgreementTexas LawClass Action InapplicabilityCommon Fund Doctrine Inapplicability
References
26
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 09, 1993

Krug v. Offerman, Fallon, Mahoney & Cassano

The plaintiff, an attorney, sued the law firm Offerman, Fallon, Mahoney & Cassano and its partner Leo J. Fallon for breach of contract regarding a fee-splitting agreement. The plaintiff was retained by the firm to represent their client, Charles Hahn, in workers' compensation hearings, specifically to oppose the claim and preserve Hahn's personal injury action. The plaintiff's efforts were successful, leading to a $1.8 million settlement in the personal injury case and a $600,000 contingent fee for the firm. The firm subsequently refused to pay the plaintiff a percentage of the fee. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Workers’ Compensation Law § 24 and the invalidity of the fee-splitting agreement under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Supreme Court denied the motions, finding the action was not barred by Workers’ Compensation Law § 24 and the fee agreement was enforceable. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, concluding that the plaintiff's claim was for services rendered in the personal injury action and that a fee-splitting agreement does not require a writing unless joint responsibility is assumed, which was not the case here.

breach of contractfee-splitting agreementworkers' compensationpersonal injury litigationattorney compensationjurisdictionprofessional ethicsappellate reviewcontingent feeslegal malpractice
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In re Relativity Fashion, LLC

This Memorandum Opinion addresses a motion for attorneys' fees and expenses filed by Relativity Media, LLC (and its affiliates RML Distribution Domestic, LLC, Armored Car Productions, LLC, and DR Productions, LLC, collectively 'Relativity') and Mr. Ryan Kavanaugh against Netflix, Inc. The dispute arose from Netflix's refusal to execute 'Date Extension Amendments' related to a License Agreement, prompting Relativity to seek relief under Section 1142 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court previously ruled that Netflix was barred by res judicata and judicial estoppel from asserting its claimed contractual rights to distribute films before theatrical release. In this opinion, the Court determined that Relativity was the 'prevailing party' under California Civil Code Section 1717 and the License Agreement's fee provision. Consequently, Relativity is entitled to reimbursement for its own reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. However, the Court denied Mr. Kavanaugh's request for reimbursement of his counsel's fees and expenses, concluding that he was not a party to the License Agreement and did not meet the exceptions for non-signatories to recover fees. The Court awarded Relativity $818,547.48, comprising $795,732.50 in attorneys’ fees and $22,814.98 in litigation expenses, against Netflix.

Attorneys FeesLitigation ExpensesContract LawCalifornia Civil Code Section 1717Bankruptcy Code Section 1142Prevailing PartyLodestar MethodHourly RatesJudicial EstoppelRes Judicata
References
85
Case No. 07-03-0292-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 03, 2004

James L. Killion v. Chuck Lanehart, Successor & Independent of the Estate of Bill A. Davis

This case involves an appeal by James L. Killion challenging a trial court judgment in favor of Chuck Lanehart, the successor independent executor of Bill A. Davis's estate. The central dispute concerned the attorney's fee arrangement between Killion and the deceased attorney, Davis. Killion argued there was no written contingent fee agreement, rendering any such arrangement voidable. The jury found that the parties did not have a definite agreement on attorney's fees beyond an initial $5,000 retainer, and that Davis performed compensable work. Consequently, the jury awarded $40,000 based on quantum meruit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings regarding the absence of a clear fee agreement, the applicability of quantum meruit, and the reasonableness of the awarded fee.

Fee disputeAttorney feesContingent feeQuantum meruitContract disputeLegal sufficiencyFactual sufficiencyJury verdictImplied agreementTexas law
References
18
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 10, 2004

Claim of Mickens v. New York City Transit Authority

The claimant suffered a work-related injury in 1993 and subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. A stipulation agreement between the claimant and employer, which adjusted weekly awards and set future payments, was approved by a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge. The claimant appealed this decision to the Workers’ Compensation Board, asserting the stipulation's invalidity, inadequate legal representation, and excessive counsel fees. The Board upheld the WCLJ's decision and denied the claimant's request for reconsideration. The appellate court affirmed the Board's decisions, finding the stipulation binding and the counsel fee award within the Board's discretion, and no abuse of discretion in denying reconsideration.

Stipulation AgreementCounsel FeesBoard ReviewAppellate ReviewPsychological ImpairmentsWork-related InjuryDecision AffirmedDiscretionary PowersLegal RepresentationBenefit Adjustment
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Roeglin v. Daves

The district court initially found a valid and enforceable Rule 11 agreement where Alfred and Sandra Daves settled claims against Scott Roeglin for injuries Alfred Daves sustained in an automobile collision. The Daveses appealed, asserting no such agreement existed, while Roeglin appealed the denial of attorney's fees. The dispute revolved around a series of letters exchanged between the Daveses, Universal Underwriters Insurance Company (Alfred Daves's worker's compensation carrier), and Roeglin, which Roeglin contended formed a binding Rule 11 agreement. The appellate court, after reviewing the correspondence, concluded that the letters did not satisfy the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for an agreement between the Daveses and Roeglin. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the Daveses' action against Roeglin, remanding that portion for further proceedings, and affirmed the denial of Roeglin's attorney's fees.

Rule 11 AgreementSettlement AgreementContract EnforcementAppellate ReviewAttorney's FeesSubrogation ClaimWorkers' CompensationAutomobile CollisionTexas Civil ProcedureStatute of Frauds
References
7
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