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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 34145/20; Appeal No. 5727; Case No. 2025-02172
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 03, 2026

Coronel v. Marcal Contract Co., LLC

Plaintiff Nelson Guadalupe Coronel, a carpenter for Capital Concrete NY, Inc., moved for summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1) after being injured by a falling concrete form. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted plaintiff's motion, denied Capital's cross-motion to dismiss the Labor Law § 241(6) claim, and denied defendants Marcal Contract Co., LLC and AW Pelham, LP's motion to dismiss common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims against Marcal and for contractual indemnification against Capital. The Appellate Division, First Department, modified the order. It affirmed the grant of summary judgment for plaintiff on Labor Law § 240(1) liability. However, it granted defendants' motion to dismiss the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 causes of action against Marcal, finding Marcal lacked actual control over the work. Consequently, the Appellate Division also granted Marcal and AW Pelham's motion for contractual indemnification against Capital.

Labor Law § 240(1)Labor Law § 200Contractual indemnificationSummary judgmentConstruction accidentElevation-related hazardProximate causeGeneral contractor liabilityThird-party liabilityAppellate review
References
5
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 06, 2003

Petrillo v. Durr Mechanical Construction, Inc.

This case concerns an order from the Supreme Court, New York County, which was unanimously affirmed by an appellate panel. The order granted summary judgment to third-party defendants Proven Electrical Contracting Co. and Barrier Electrical Contracting, Inc., leading to the dismissal of the third-party complaint filed by Durr. The court determined that Durr's claims for contribution and common-law indemnification against Proven, the plaintiff's employer, were barred by Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 because the plaintiff's injuries were not considered "grave." Additionally, Durr failed to demonstrate the existence of contracts requiring indemnification or insurance procurement from Proven. Barrier was also granted summary judgment after establishing it was not present at the job site during the accident and had no relevant contractual obligations to Durr. Durr's speculative request for further discovery was rejected as insufficient grounds to deny summary judgment.

Summary JudgmentThird-Party ComplaintWorkers' Compensation LawContributionCommon-Law IndemnificationContractual IndemnificationInsurance ProcurementGrave InjuryEmployer LiabilityAppellate Division
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Mantovani v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the third-party defendant ADCO Electrical Corp. appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification. Concurrently, the defendant third-party plaintiff Herbert G. Martin, Inc., cross-appeals from the same order, which denied its cross-motion for summary judgment on that cause of action. The underlying personal injury action involved an unnamed plaintiff, an employee of ADCO, who was injured while working as a subcontractor for Martin. The Workers' Compensation Law generally precludes indemnification claims against employers, with an exception for express contractual agreements. The court found sufficient evidence of a written contract in the form of a certificate of liability insurance between ADCO and Martin to deny both motions for summary judgment, citing a triable issue of fact regarding the indemnification obligation. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's order.

Contractual IndemnificationSummary JudgmentWorkers' Compensation LawThird-Party ActionAppealCross-AppealEmployer LiabilitySubcontractor AgreementPersonal Injury DamagesAppellate Affirmation
References
9
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Millennium Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Brown & Root Holdings, Inc.

Plaintiff Millennium Petrochemicals Inc. sought indemnification from Defendant Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. for asbestos-related injury lawsuits filed against Millennium by Brown & Root employees. The dispute centered on a 1961 contract, subsequently amended in 1973 and 1994, regarding indemnification provisions. Millennium argued that the 1973 amendment obligated Brown & Root to indemnify it for its own negligence. Brown & Root moved for summary judgment, asserting that its indemnification duty ceased upon the contract's termination in 1995. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Brown & Root, ruling that the indemnification obligation terminated with the contract. Furthermore, the court held that even if the obligation survived, the 1994 amendment applied, and it did not satisfy the 'express negligence rule' required under Texas law to indemnify a party for its own negligence.

Contract DisputeIndemnification AgreementSummary JudgmentAsbestos ExposureExpress Negligence RuleContract TerminationAccrual of ClaimsTexas LawDeclaratory JudgmentSuccessor in Interest
References
23
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Staub v. William H. Lane, Inc.

Plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor (third-party defendant), was injured while working on a building project and initiated an action against the general contractor (defendant) alleging negligence and Labor Law violations. The general contractor subsequently filed a third-party action against the subcontractor, seeking contractual indemnification based on an unsigned written proposal that referenced AIA Contract A401. The Supreme Court partially granted the general contractor's cross-motion for conditional indemnification. The subcontractor appealed this order. The appellate court found that material questions of fact remained regarding whether the parties had genuinely agreed to be bound by the indemnification provisions of AIA Contract A401, particularly because no formal contract was signed and the AIA contract itself was not provided to the general contractor. Consequently, the appellate court modified the lower court's order, denying the general contractor’s cross motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

IndemnificationSubcontractorGeneral ContractorLabor LawWorkers' Compensation LawSummary JudgmentContractual AgreementAIA ContractMeeting of the MindsUnsigned Contract
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 02, 1997

Small v. Yonkers Contracting Inc.

This case concerns an appeal for reargument in a personal injury action. The plaintiff, Charles Small, sued Yonkers Contracting Inc., which then filed a third-party complaint against Rice Mohawk, U.S. Construction Co., Ltd. for indemnification and contribution. Rice Mohawk had insured Yonkers as an additional insured through Admiral Insurance Co. The Supreme Court partially dismissed Yonkers' claims, citing the antisubrogation rule. The appellate court granted reargument, vacated the previous decision, and modified the order. It ruled that the indemnification and contribution claims against Rice Mohawk should be dismissed only to the extent of actual payments made by Admiral to Yonkers, balancing the antisubrogation rule with Yonkers' right to recover uncompensated losses. The order was modified and, as modified, affirmed.

Antisubrogation RuleCommon-Law IndemnificationContribution ClaimsPersonal Injury ActionThird-Party ActionInsurance CoverageAdditional InsuredWorkers' Compensation LawGeneral Obligations LawAppellate Review
References
8
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 05, 1998

Perez v. Spring Creek Associates, L.P.

This case involves an appeal by Accura Contracting Corporation from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County. The initial action stemmed from a personal injury sustained by an unnamed plaintiff, an employee of Accura, who fell while performing exterior scraping work and alleged violations of Labor Law sections 200, 240, and 241. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) against the defendants, collectively known as Spring Creek, and subsequently granted Spring Creek's motion for common-law indemnification against Accura. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the plaintiff was not provided with adequate safety equipment for elevated work, a direct cause of the injuries, thus entitling the plaintiff to summary judgment under Labor Law § 240 (1). The appellate court further concluded that Spring Creek, being vicariously liable, was rightfully granted full indemnification from Accura, the party determined to be wholly at fault.

Personal InjuryLabor LawSummary JudgmentLiabilityIndemnificationCommon-Law IndemnificationVicarious LiabilityAppellate ReviewConstruction AccidentScaffolding Law
References
10
Case No. 15918/93, 19316/93
Regular Panel Decision

Stein v. Yonkers Contracting, Inc.

This case involves two personal injury actions brought by Ronald Stein, an employee of Rice Mohawk, against Yonkers Contracting, Inc. and the New York City Department of Transportation. Yonkers Contracting, as a third-party plaintiff, appealed parts of two Supreme Court orders: one denying its motion for summary judgment on a third-party complaint for indemnity and contribution, and another precluding its counsel from trial. The appeals by the New York City Department of Transportation were dismissed. The Appellate Division modified the order regarding common-law and contractual indemnification and contribution, applying the antisubrogation rule to dismiss claims only to the extent of payments made by Admiral Insurance Co. It also reversed the order precluding Yonkers' counsel from participating in the trial, citing an error of law.

Personal InjurySummary JudgmentThird-Party ActionCommon-Law IndemnificationContractual IndemnificationContributionAntisubrogation RuleAdditional InsuredCounsel PreclusionWorkers' Compensation Law
References
10
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

New York Hospital Medical Center v. Microtech Contracting Corp.

This case addresses whether an employer's protection from third-party claims under Workers' Compensation Law § 11 is lost when its injured employees are undocumented aliens. Plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center sued defendant Microtech Contracting for common-law and contractual contribution and indemnification, following a judgment paid to Microtech's injured undocumented employees, Luis and Gerardo Lema. The hospital argued that Microtech's alleged violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in hiring the Lemas should preclude it from invoking Section 11's shield. Both the Supreme Court and Appellate Division dismissed the hospital's claims, affirming that employee immigration status does not negate an employer's statutory rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the illegality of the employment contract under IRCA does not override the employer's protections under Workers' Compensation Law § 11, particularly as the hospital did not pursue conflict preemption on appeal.

Workers' Compensation Law § 11Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)Undocumented AliensThird-Party ClaimsContribution and IndemnificationGrave InjuryPreemptionLabor LawEmployer LiabilityEmployee Rights
References
11
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Buccini v. 1568 Broadway Associates

The appellate court reversed a lower court order denying summary judgment to 1568 Broadway, Inc., Manhattan Suites Realty Corp., and HRH Construction Corp. (collectively, "appellants"), who were general partners and a construction manager. Appellants had sought contractual and common-law indemnification, as well as damages for breach of an insurance procurement clause, from Marine Contractors, Inc., a subcontractor. This stemmed from an injury sustained by Anthony Buccini, a Marine employee, who successfully sued the appellants under Labor Law § 240. The appellate court found appellants were entitled to indemnification because their liability was statutory and not based on their own negligence, with Marine primarily responsible for worker safety. Additionally, Marine was found to have breached its contract by failing to name appellants as additional insureds.

Workers' CompensationConstruction AccidentLabor Law § 240IndemnificationContractual IndemnificationCommon-law IndemnificationSummary JudgmentBreach of ContractInsurance ProcurementThird-Party Action
References
11
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