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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 2014 NY Slip Op 05293 [119 AD3d 718]
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 16, 2014

Caiazzo v. Mark Joseph Contracting, Inc.

Ronald Caiazzo, Jr. sued Mark Joseph Contracting, Inc., Julia Coen, and Ana Reyes for personal injuries sustained while installing an air conditioning system at a house owned by Julia Coen. Caiazzo fell from a makeshift step, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), 241(6) and common-law negligence. The Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment dismissing certain claims. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6) claims against Mark Joseph Contracting, Inc., and Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims against Julia Coen, citing the homeowner exemption for Coen. However, the court reversed the denial of summary judgment to Mark Joseph Contracting, Inc. on the common-law negligence claim, granting dismissal. The denial of summary judgment for Julia Coen on Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence was affirmed, as triable issues of fact remained regarding her notice of a dangerous condition.

Personal InjuryLabor LawConstruction SiteSummary JudgmentCommon-law NegligenceElevated Work SiteDangerous ConditionHomeowner ExemptionAppellate ReviewSuffolk County
References
25
Case No. 34145/20; Appeal No. 5727; Case No. 2025-02172
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 03, 2026

Coronel v. Marcal Contract Co., LLC

Plaintiff Nelson Guadalupe Coronel, a carpenter for Capital Concrete NY, Inc., moved for summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1) after being injured by a falling concrete form. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted plaintiff's motion, denied Capital's cross-motion to dismiss the Labor Law § 241(6) claim, and denied defendants Marcal Contract Co., LLC and AW Pelham, LP's motion to dismiss common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims against Marcal and for contractual indemnification against Capital. The Appellate Division, First Department, modified the order. It affirmed the grant of summary judgment for plaintiff on Labor Law § 240(1) liability. However, it granted defendants' motion to dismiss the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 causes of action against Marcal, finding Marcal lacked actual control over the work. Consequently, the Appellate Division also granted Marcal and AW Pelham's motion for contractual indemnification against Capital.

Labor Law § 240(1)Labor Law § 200Contractual indemnificationSummary judgmentConstruction accidentElevation-related hazardProximate causeGeneral contractor liabilityThird-party liabilityAppellate review
References
5
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

FLOTO v. Manhattan Woods Golf Enterprises, LLC

Plaintiff was fired from Manhattan Woods Golf Club after taking a day off for his dying mother's emergency brain surgery. He sued for FMLA violation and breach of contract. A jury awarded him damages for both claims. Defendants subsequently moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that he qualified for FMLA leave. The court granted the defendants' motion regarding the FMLA claim (Count I), finding insufficient evidence that the plaintiff was 'needed to care for' his mother as per FMLA regulations, and dismissed the claim. The motion for reduction of FMLA damages became moot. However, the court denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract claim (Count II), upholding the jury's finding that the employer lacked 'reasonable cause' to terminate the plaintiff's employment.

FMLABreach of ContractJudgment as a Matter of LawEmployment LawEmployee TerminationFamily and Medical LeavePsychological CareDamagesPost-trial MotionsRule 50
References
8
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

New York Hospital Medical Center v. Microtech Contracting Corp.

This case addresses whether an employer's protection from third-party claims under Workers' Compensation Law § 11 is lost when its injured employees are undocumented aliens. Plaintiff New York Hospital Medical Center sued defendant Microtech Contracting for common-law and contractual contribution and indemnification, following a judgment paid to Microtech's injured undocumented employees, Luis and Gerardo Lema. The hospital argued that Microtech's alleged violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in hiring the Lemas should preclude it from invoking Section 11's shield. Both the Supreme Court and Appellate Division dismissed the hospital's claims, affirming that employee immigration status does not negate an employer's statutory rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the illegality of the employment contract under IRCA does not override the employer's protections under Workers' Compensation Law § 11, particularly as the hospital did not pursue conflict preemption on appeal.

Workers' Compensation Law § 11Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)Undocumented AliensThird-Party ClaimsContribution and IndemnificationGrave InjuryPreemptionLabor LawEmployer LiabilityEmployee Rights
References
11
Case No. 15918/93, 19316/93
Regular Panel Decision

Stein v. Yonkers Contracting, Inc.

This case involves two personal injury actions brought by Ronald Stein, an employee of Rice Mohawk, against Yonkers Contracting, Inc. and the New York City Department of Transportation. Yonkers Contracting, as a third-party plaintiff, appealed parts of two Supreme Court orders: one denying its motion for summary judgment on a third-party complaint for indemnity and contribution, and another precluding its counsel from trial. The appeals by the New York City Department of Transportation were dismissed. The Appellate Division modified the order regarding common-law and contractual indemnification and contribution, applying the antisubrogation rule to dismiss claims only to the extent of payments made by Admiral Insurance Co. It also reversed the order precluding Yonkers' counsel from participating in the trial, citing an error of law.

Personal InjurySummary JudgmentThird-Party ActionCommon-Law IndemnificationContractual IndemnificationContributionAntisubrogation RuleAdditional InsuredCounsel PreclusionWorkers' Compensation Law
References
10
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Kendle v. August Bohl Contracting Co.

Samuel Kendle, an employee of subcontractor Clifford Quay & Sons, Inc., was injured while operating a motorized wheelbarrow at a construction site in Saratoga County. He fell when plywood covering a trench, allegedly dug by defendant August Bohl Contracting Company, Inc. (Bohl), buckled. Kendle and his wife sued the property owners, construction manager, and Bohl, alleging violations of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence. The Supreme Court dismissed Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 claims but denied Bohl's cross-motion to dismiss the Labor Law § 200 and negligence causes of action. On appeal, the court reversed the Supreme Court's decision, finding that Bohl did not exercise supervisory control over Kendle's work, a necessary element for Labor Law § 200 liability. The court also dismissed the negligence claim, noting that the trench was readily observable to the experienced plaintiff.

Construction AccidentMotorized Wheelbarrow InjuryWorksite HazardSubcontractor NegligenceLabor Law LiabilityLack of Supervisory ControlCommon-Law NegligenceSummary Judgment AppealAppellate ReversalPlywood Failure
References
7
Case No. 2017 NY Slip Op 02888 [149 AD3d 500]
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 13, 2017

O'Leary v. S&A Electrical Contracting Corp.

Plaintiff Patrick O'Leary sustained injuries from an electrical shock while overseeing renovation work. He sued S&A Electrical Contracting Corp. and 1435 Broadway, LLC (Owner) under Labor Law § 241 (6). The Supreme Court granted O'Leary partial summary judgment on liability, denied Owner's motion to dismiss, and denied Nygard's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's order, granting Owner summary judgment on its contractual indemnification claim against Nygard International Partnership and dismissing all claims against Nygard NY Retail, LLC, while otherwise affirming the lower court's decision. The court found that O'Leary was engaged in construction work, a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.13 (b) (4) occurred due to negligence, and New York law governed the third-party claims.

Construction accidentLabor Lawindemnificationsummary judgmentvicarious liabilityelectrical shockpremises liabilitythird-party claimschoice of lawcomparative negligence
References
9
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Beltran v. City of New York

This case involves a third-party defendant, Mulvihill Electrical Contracting Corp., moving to dismiss a third-party action filed by New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) based on the exclusivity provision of Workers' Compensation Law § 11. The underlying case stems from a plaintiff's injury sustained while employed by Mulvihill, who was under contract with NYCTA. NYCTA sought indemnification or contribution from Mulvihill under common law and contract, and for breach of contract due to Mulvihill's failure to procure insurance. The court analyzed the Workers' Compensation Law § 11 amendment regarding 'grave injury' as a bar to common-law claims. It ruled that while common-law indemnification/contribution claims are barred without grave injury, contractual indemnification claims are permissible. The court also allowed the breach of contract claim for failure to procure insurance. Consequently, Mulvihill’s motion to dismiss common-law indemnification and contribution claims was granted, but the motion to dismiss contractual claims and the breach of contract claim was denied.

Workers' Compensation LawCPLR 3211Exclusivity ProvisionIndemnificationContributionBreach of ContractGrave InjuryThird-Party ClaimMotion to DismissContractual Obligation
References
7
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
May 19, 2011

Kausal v. Educational Products Information Exchange Institute

The plaintiff initiated legal action against the defendant, seeking damages for the breach of an employment contract and a violation of Labor Law article 6. The core of the dispute revolved around an employment agreement where the defendant, through its project manager, sponsored the plaintiff for an H1B work visa, promising a minimum annual salary of $46,500 and tuition benefits. Despite these terms being formalized in visa application documents signed by the defendant's representative, the plaintiff alleged non-payment in accordance with the agreement. Initially, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dismissed the complaint, ruling in favor of the defendant by misclassifying the plaintiff as an independent contractor. However, the appellate court reversed this judgment, reinstating the complaint and awarding judgment to the plaintiff on the issue of liability, concluding that a valid employment contract existed and the plaintiff was indeed an employee under Labor Law, remitting the case for a trial on damages.

breach of contractemployment contractLabor LawH1B visawage disputewrongful dismissalappellate reviewnonjury trialdamagesliability
References
18
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 05, 1998

Perez v. Spring Creek Associates, L.P.

This case involves an appeal by Accura Contracting Corporation from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County. The initial action stemmed from a personal injury sustained by an unnamed plaintiff, an employee of Accura, who fell while performing exterior scraping work and alleged violations of Labor Law sections 200, 240, and 241. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) against the defendants, collectively known as Spring Creek, and subsequently granted Spring Creek's motion for common-law indemnification against Accura. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the plaintiff was not provided with adequate safety equipment for elevated work, a direct cause of the injuries, thus entitling the plaintiff to summary judgment under Labor Law § 240 (1). The appellate court further concluded that Spring Creek, being vicariously liable, was rightfully granted full indemnification from Accura, the party determined to be wholly at fault.

Personal InjuryLabor LawSummary JudgmentLiabilityIndemnificationCommon-Law IndemnificationVicarious LiabilityAppellate ReviewConstruction AccidentScaffolding Law
References
10
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