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The court granted a motion to dismiss an appeal, leading to the dismissal of the appeal itself, with associated costs. However, this dismissal is conditional. If the appellant serves and files the required undertaking on appeal and pays $10 costs within 10 days from the order's date, the motion to dismiss will be denied, and the appeal will presumably proceed.
The employer-respondent moved to dismiss an appeal as untimely. The Board had previously affirmed a referee's determination in June 1977, disallowing a claim. The appellant did not appeal this decision but sought reconsideration. In December 1977, the Board advised no further action was warranted. In January 1978, the appellant requested an appeal of both the June and December 1977 determinations. The appeal from the June 1977 decision was deemed untimely under Workers’ Compensation Law § 23, leading to the granting of the employer-respondent's motion to dismiss that appeal. The appellant's separate motion for an extension of time to prosecute the appeal was also denied without costs.
The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed based on two primary grounds. The first ground cited CPLR 5511, stating that an appeal cannot be taken from an order of the Appellate Division which dismissed an appeal from an order entered on consent. The second reason for dismissal was that the Appellate Division's order, which denied the motion for reargument or leave to appeal, does not constitute a final determination of the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Therefore, the court found no basis for further appeal in this matter.
This case involves an order from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas. Initially, several appeals concerning "In re: Vivian Jackson, an Incapacitated Person" were dismissed at the appellants' request. The document then details a separate appeal brought by the State Office of Risk Management (SORM) concerning worker's compensation death benefits for Officer Jose Herrera. SORM challenged the determination that Herrera was acting in the service of the State at the time of his death, which would make SORM responsible for benefits. The trial court dismissed SORM's petition for judicial review, ruling it was filed too late. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal, holding that the issue was one of "compensability," allowing SORM 40 days for judicial review, and thus SORM's petition was timely. The cause was remanded for further proceedings.
An order granting a motion for leave to appeal was vacated. The appeal itself was subsequently dismissed without costs. The dismissal was based on the ground that the order being appealed from did not constitute a final determination of the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. A reference was made to the case of Matter of Industrial Union of Mar. & Shipbuilding Workers of Amer., Local 39, C.I.O. [Todd Shipyards Corp.], 300 N. Y. 549.
This legal decision pertains to a motion that was granted and an appeal that was subsequently dismissed. The dismissal was predicated on the finding that the appellant was not considered an aggrieved party by the modification made at the Appellate Division, referencing CPLR 5601, subdivision [a], paragraph [iii]. Furthermore, the order specifies that the timeframe within which the appellant may pursue permission to appeal will be computed in accordance with the provisions of CPLR 5513, as per CPLR 5514, subdivision [a]. The decision highlights a procedural aspect of legal appeals, specifically addressing the criteria for an appellant to be considered "aggrieved." The court's action of granting the motion and dismissing the appeal underscores the importance of proper standing in appellate proceedings. This ruling impacts how future appeals are processed concerning modifications made at the Appellate Division. The explicit mention of CPLR sections indicates a reliance on specific procedural codes for determining both the appeal's viability and the subsequent calculation of time limits for further legal action.
This case involves an appeal concerning a personal injury action. Defendants Henry Micheletti and Castagna & Son, Inc., along with third-party defendants Castagna & Son, Inc. — Raisler Corp., a joint venture, and Raisler Corp., appealed a Supreme Court order. The order had granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss workers' compensation affirmative defenses and denied the defendants' cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the purported order was a non-appealable trial ruling made after the commencement of the trial, not a proper appealable order. Despite the procedural dismissal, the court reviewed the merits for judicial economy and found that, if properly before them, they would affirm the lower court's determination that the personal injury action was not barred by workers' compensation, as Micheletti was a general employee of Castagna & Son, Inc., not the joint venture that employed the injured plaintiff, Curtis Brown.
Claimant Huffman sought workers' compensation benefits from Lake City Contracting Corporation. A referee found a 66% schedule loss of a left arm and dual insurance coverage by State Insurance Fund and USF&G. Both insurers contested coverage and the award's excessiveness. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the schedule award but found State Insurance Fund had no coverage and required further development on USF&G's liability, remanding the case. The employer and USF&G appealed this non-final Board decision. The Workers' Compensation Board then moved to dismiss these appeals on the grounds that its decision was interlocutory and non-appealable. The court granted the motion, dismissing the appeals, noting that non-final decisions are not appealable and protective notices of appeal are unnecessary in such instances.
Motion to dismiss the appeal granted and the appeal dismissed, with costs and $20 costs of motion, upon the ground that no appeal lies as of right from the Appellate Division order of unanimous affirmance (CPLR 5601, subd [a]).
The appeal was dismissed because the board's decision was deemed interlocutory. This means the decision did not address all the substantive matters or any fundamental legal questions, making it unappealable at this specific phase of the legal process. The court concluded that the case was not ripe for appeal, and therefore, the motion to dismiss the appeal was granted without costs. The panel of judges, including Casey, J. P., Weiss, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Levine, JJ., all concurred with this decision, highlighting the procedural unreadiness of the appeal.
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