CompFox Logo
AboutWorkflowFeaturesPricingCase LawInsights

Updated Daily

Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 01-99-01345-CV; Trial Court Cause No. 95CV0220
Regular Panel Decision
May 31, 2002

Coastal Tankship, U.S.A., Inc. v. Florence Anderson, Administratrix of the Estate of Morris Anderson

This en banc opinion addresses a personal injury suit under the Jones Act and general maritime law, where Florence Anderson sued Coastal Tankships, U.S.A., Inc. for her deceased husband Morris Anderson's bronchiolitis obliterans organizing pneumonia (BOOP), allegedly caused by naphtha exposure. The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Anderson's medical expert, Dr. David Miller, to testify on medical causation. The court found that Dr. Miller's differential diagnosis could only reliably establish specific causation, not general causation (i.e., whether naphtha can generally cause BOOP). As the record lacked reliable general-causation evidence, the appellate court concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court was reversed, and judgment was rendered in favor of Coastal Tankships, U.S.A., Inc.

Jones ActMaritime LawNegligenceUnseaworthinessMedical CausationExpert TestimonyDifferential DiagnosisDaubert StandardToxic TortBronchiolitis Obliterans Organizing Pneumonia (BOOP)
References
51
Case No. 03-13-00790-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 06, 2015

T. Mark Anderson, as Co-Executor of the Estate of Ted Anderson, and Christine Anderson, as Co-Executor of the Estate of Ted Anderson//Cross-Appellants, David R. Archer, Carol Archer Bugg, John v. Archer, Karen Archer Ball, and Sherri Archer v. Richard T. Archer, David R. Archer, Carol Archer Bugg, John v. Archer, Karen Archer Ball, and Sherri Archer//Cross-Appellees, T. Mark Anderson, Co-Executor of the Estate of Ted Anderson, and Christine Anderson, as Co-Executor

This case involves a tortious interference with inheritance lawsuit. Richard T. Archer and family (Appellees/Cross-Appellants) sued T. Mark Anderson and Christine Anderson (Appellants/Cross-Appellees), co-executors of Ted M. Anderson's estate. The Archers alleged that Ted Anderson tortiously interfered with their inheritance from John R. 'Jack' Archer by causing Jack, after a debilitating stroke that left him mentally incapacitated, to sign new estate planning documents that disinherited the Archers in favor of charities. The Archers incurred significant attorney's fees and settlement costs in prior litigation to reinstate Jack's original estate plan, which favored them. A jury found Ted Anderson liable for tortious interference and awarded damages, which the district court modified to include an additional settlement amount with charities. The appellees are now seeking to affirm the liability finding and modify the damage award on cross-appeal.

Tortious Interference with InheritanceEstate Planning DisputeMental IncapacityUndue InfluenceFiduciary Duty BreachGuardianship ProceedingWill ContestAttorney's Fees as DamagesPrejudgment InterestAppellate Review
References
78
Case No. 01-21-00008-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 29, 2024

Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. and Kannappan Krishnaswamy, M.D. v. Dr. Atul Dhingra, Dr. Swapan Dubey and Dr. Sanjeev Dubey

Appellants Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C., and Dr. Kannappan Krishnaswamy appealed a trial court's summary judgment in favor of appellees Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of America, L.L.C., Dr. Atul Dhingra, Dr. Swapan Dubey, and Dr. Sanjeev Dubey. The dispute arose from a management agreement for an emergency room, with appellants bringing counterclaims and third-party claims for breach of contract, fraud, fraudulent inducement, and negligence. After a previous dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction was reversed by the Texas Supreme Court, the First District of Texas Court of Appeals reviewed the merits. The court found that the appellants failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on any of their claims, concluding that the alleged breaches of contract were not supported by the agreement's plain language or that the best-efforts clause was unenforceable. Furthermore, claims of fraud and negligence were not substantiated or were barred by the economic loss rule. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment.

Contract DisputeSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewBreach of ContractFraudFraudulent InducementNegligenceEconomic Loss RuleTexas LawHealthcare Management
References
45
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Coastal Tankships, U.S.A., Inc. v. Anderson

Justice Murry B. Cohen dissents from part IV(E) of the en banc court's opinion, arguing that there was sufficient evidence to prove causation in the case of Anderson v. Coastal. Cohen asserts that Dr. Brown's medical diagnosis, supported by testimony from Coastal's own expert, Dr. Wilson, and the naphtha material safety data sheet (MSDS), established the necessary general causation link. The dissent highlights the lenient 'even the slightest' evidence standard under the Jones Act, concluding that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in finding both specific and general causation, and thus the verdict for Anderson should have been upheld. The core of the dissent challenges the majority's assessment of expert testimony and documentary evidence regarding Anderson's exposure to naphtha and subsequent medical conditions.

Jones ActCausationExpert TestimonyMedical RecordsNaphtha ExposureChemical PneumoniaBOOPMSDSSufficiency of EvidenceStandard of Review
References
20
Case No. 08-07-00156-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 12, 2009

Patrick Wm. Anderson v. Cynthia Diane Anderson

Patrick Wm. Anderson appealed a default divorce judgment granted to Cynthia Diane Anderson after he failed to appear at the final hearing due to his attorney's illness. His motion for new trial, which was denied by operation of law without a hearing, alleged an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Anderson argued that his absence was not intentional, he possessed a meritorious defense regarding separate property, and granting a new trial would not cause injury or delay. The appellate court, applying the Craddock elements, found that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion without a hearing, as Anderson's affidavits supported his claims. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the default judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, finding his arguments dispositive.

Divorce LawDefault JudgmentMotion for New TrialAbuse of DiscretionCraddock ElementsMeritorious DefenseSeparate PropertyCommunity PropertyAppellate ReviewTexas Civil Procedure
References
12
Case No. 12-15-00169-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Oct 20, 2015

Earl Anderson, Carrie Bell Scott, Sharon Anderson, Evance Anderson, Bill Burton, Willie Mae Anderson, and Jerry J. Anderson (Smith) v. Robert Louis Durham

The appellants, Earl Anderson et al., are filing a reply brief in the Twelfth Court of Appeals, Tyler, Texas, against appellees Robert Louis Durham and Frank L. Zellers, III. They are appealing a trial court's summary judgment that dismissed their claims. Appellants argue that the trial court erred by allowing an improper challenge to their petition via a no-evidence motion for summary judgment instead of special exceptions, thereby denying them due process and the opportunity to cure defects and conduct discovery. They assert that fact questions exist regarding an altered warranty deed, and that Durham failed to verify his challenge to alleged defects in parties, thus waiving these defects. Appellants pray for the court to reverse and vacate the trial court's summary judgment.

Summary JudgmentAppellate ReviewPleading RequirementsDue Process ViolationEvidentiary IssuesReal Property DisputesDeed AlterationsTrial Court ErrorCivil ProcedureDiscovery Limitations
References
5
Case No. W2006-01967-COA-R3-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Oct 01, 2008

Carl Anderson, Ed Howell Anderson, and Gary Anderson v. U.S.A. Truck, Inc., an Arkansas Corporation and Lonzie E. Neal

This case involves a vehicular accident where Carl, Ed Howell, and Gary Anderson were rear-ended by a truck driven by Lonzie E. Neal, an employee of U.S.A. Truck, Inc. The plaintiffs sought damages for personal injuries, including back and neck pain. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants on punitive damages, and the jury awarded varying damages to the plaintiffs, reducing them by 30% due to comparative fault attributed to the driver, Mr. Anderson, which was imputed to all plaintiffs due to a joint venture finding. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, upholding the punitive damages ruling, finding the joint venture error harmless, and supporting the jury's damage awards and fault allocation.

Vehicular AccidentPersonal InjuryNegligenceComparative FaultPunitive DamagesJoint Venture DoctrineJury VerdictDirected VerdictMedical TreatmentChronic Pain
References
25
Case No. 03-10-00019-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Oct 12, 2011

Dr. Don Brantley, Belinda Castillo, Dr. Corinne Alvarez-Sanders and Patricia Logterman// Texas Youth Commission Cherrie Townsend in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director v. Texas Youth Commission Cherrie Townsend in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director// Dr. Don Brantley, Belinda Castillo, Dr. Corinne Alvarez-Sanders

This case concerns challenges by current and former employees of the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) against the constitutionality of Senate Bill 103, which converted TYC employment from 'for-cause' to 'at-will.' The plaintiffs, including Dr. Don Brantley, Belinda Castillo, Dr. Corinne Alvarez-Sanders, and Patricia Logterman, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief based on alleged wrongful termination, due process violations, defamation, and unconstitutional takings. The district court partially granted and denied TYC's plea to the jurisdiction. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of Castillo's claims for lack of ripeness and the defamation and takings claims for all plaintiffs due to sovereign immunity. It reversed in part, allowing Alvarez-Sanders and Logterman to replead their wrongful-termination/due-process claims for equitable relief against a proper state official, and similarly reversed in part Brantley's wrongful-termination/due-process claim.

Employment LawPublic EmployeesAt-Will EmploymentFor-Cause EmploymentDue ProcessConstitutional LawRetroactive LegislationEx Post Facto LawBill of AttainderSovereign Immunity
References
37
Case No. 78-1358-B
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 13, 1980

Anderson v. New York Underwriters Insurance Co.

Melba Anderson appealed from a summary judgment in a worker’s compensation case. She initially brought suit against New York Underwriters Insurance Company after the Industrial Accident Board declined to change its prior award denying her claim for back injuries sustained while working for Honey Togs Industries. Anderson had previously filed a lawsuit (cause No. 78-1358-B) to set aside the Board's 1978 award, which resulted in a summary judgment for the insurer due to her failure to provide timely notice of appeal. Subsequently, Anderson filed a motion for review with the Board, asserting a 'mistake of fact' based on her physician's, Dr. Charles Bloom's, medical reports and a clarifying letter. The Board again declined to change its award. The present appeal contests the trial court's granting of summary judgment to New York Underwriters. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that there was no evidence to justify a finding of 'mistake' as contemplated by Article 8306, sec. 12d, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., and that Anderson's allegations constituted a 'mistake in judgment' by the Board, for which the proper remedy was an appeal, not a review under the cited statute.

Worker's CompensationSummary JudgmentIndustrial Accident BoardAppealMistake of FactJurisdictionTexas LawMedical EvidenceClaim DenialStatutory Interpretation
References
5
Case No. M2004-00078-COA-R3-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 23, 2005

Melinda Diane Anderson (Byrd) v. Donald Matthew Anderson, Sr.

This case details an enduring post-divorce dispute between Melinda Diane Anderson (Byrd) and Donald Matthew Anderson, Sr., involving child support, alimony, and property division. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant was challenged on appeal. The Court of Appeals found procedural deficiencies in the summary judgment motion and identified unresolved factual issues, particularly concerning BellSouth retirement benefits and child support derived from variable income. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case, instructing the defendant to file a proper responsive pleading and emphasizing the need for a structured resolution of the long-standing issues.

Post-Divorce LitigationChild Support ArrearageAlimony ArrearageProperty DivisionSummary Judgment StandardsAppellate ReviewRemand for Further ProceedingsVariable IncomeRetirement BenefitsProcedural Due Process
References
7
Showing 1-10 of 3,083 results

Ready to streamline your practice?

Apply these legal strategies instantly. CompFox helps you find decisions, analyze reports, and draft pleadings in minutes.

CompFox Logo

The AI standard for workers' compensation professionals. Faster research, deeper analysis, better outcomes.

Product

  • Platform
  • Workflow
  • Features
  • Pricing

Solutions

  • Defense Firms
  • Applicants' Attorneys
  • Insurance carriers
  • Medical Providers

Company

  • About
  • Insights
  • Case Law

Legal

  • Privacy
  • Terms
  • Trust
  • Cookies
  • Subscription

© 2026 CompFox Inc. All rights reserved.

Systems Operational