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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Handel

HSBC Bank USA objected to Joel M. Handel's exemptions of his interest in a profit-sharing plan and three life insurance policies in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy. HSBC argued that Handel's actions, including unauthorized withdrawals and false representations as a trustee, violated the plan's terms, ERISA, and IRC Section 401(a), thereby rendering his interest non-exempt. The court acknowledged Handel's violations but, citing Patterson v. Shumate, ruled that an anti-alienation provision enforceable under ERISA excludes the plan interest from the bankruptcy estate, irrespective of operational compliance or tax-qualified status. Additionally, the court found Handel adequately identified the life insurance policies. Consequently, HSBC's motion was denied, preserving Handel's exemptions.

BankruptcyERISAPension PlanExemptionAnti-alienationDebtor's EstateIRC 401(a)Life InsuranceDebtor's ConductFiduciary Duty
References
48
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Smith

Maurice K. Guinn, the Chapter 7 Trustee, objected to Norma Howard Smith's amended exemption claim of $10,000.00 from a National Service Life Insurance Policy. The Debtor sought exemption under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1970(g) and § 5301. The court ruled that § 1970(g) does not cover National Service Life Insurance, but found the proceeds exempt under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5301(a) from creditors' claims. Additionally, the court decided that the funds maintained their exempt status after being invested in a certificate of deposit. Consequently, the Trustee's objection was denied, upholding the Debtor's exemption claim.

BankruptcyExemption ClaimChapter 7National Service Life InsuranceVeterans' BenefitsStatutory ConstructionCreditor ClaimsCertificate of DepositLife Insurance ProceedsFederal Exemption Law
References
21
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Lowe

This is a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case involving a Trustee's objection to the Debtor's claim of exemption for accrued funds from a General Motors-United Auto Workers profit-sharing plan. The central legal question was whether these funds qualify for exemption under New York's "opt-out" exemption statutes, specifically Debtor and Creditor Law § 282 or CPLR § 5205(c), or as a spendthrift trust under federal bankruptcy law. The Debtor presented six arguments, including claims of express statutory exemption, exclusion from the bankruptcy estate, and a cash exemption, along with arguments based on the de minimis amount and equitable considerations. The Court meticulously analyzed New York's convoluted exemption schema and ultimately rejected each of the Debtor's proposed arguments, emphasizing that exemptions must be statutory and cannot be created by the court. Consequently, the Court sustained the Trustee's objection, ordering the Debtor to turn over the profit-sharing funds to the Trustee.

BankruptcyExemption LawProfit Sharing PlanChapter 7Debtor and Creditor LawSpendthrift TrustERISAStatutory InterpretationTrustee ObjectionNew York Exemption Law
References
8
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 01, 1995

In Re Minor

The court consolidated two Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, In re Minor and In re Mills, concerning objections by the Chapter 13 Trustee to the debtors' claims of exemption for lump-sum workers' compensation benefits. Debtors Kevin S. Minor, Angela D. Minor, and Martin Blaine Mills had received these settlements post-confirmation and sought to exempt them under Tennessee law. The primary issues resolved by Chief Judge Richard S. Stair, Jr. were whether these awards constituted property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.A. § 1306(a) and whether they should be included as "disposable income" for plan confirmation under 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(2). The court held that workers' compensation awards are indeed property of the estate and, despite state law exemptions, must be included in the calculation of disposable income to be applied to the Chapter 13 plan, to the extent not reasonably necessary for the debtors' support or business operations. Consequently, the Trustee's objection to amended exemptions was sustained in part, affirming that the benefits are property of the estate and disposable income, but overruled in part as debtors could still claim exemption under state law.

Chapter 13 BankruptcyWorkers' CompensationExemptionsDisposable IncomeProperty of EstatePost-Confirmation ModificationBankruptcy CodeTennessee LawLump Sum SettlementStatutory Interpretation
References
19
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Harlan

The Debtors, who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, claimed an exemption for the proceeds from the voluntary sale of their homestead under Article 3834, Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated. Kettering Construction Company, a creditor, objected, arguing that the exemption's intent was for reinvestment in a new homestead within six months, and the court should verify this use. The Court, referencing White v. Stump, determined that exemption rights are fixed at the time of the bankruptcy petition's filing. Since the Debtors filed within the six-month period, the proceeds were exempt at that time, and subsequent use is irrelevant. The Court found no fraud in the timing of the petition to protect the exemption. Therefore, Kettering Construction Company's objection was overruled.

BankruptcyHomestead ExemptionChapter 7State Exemption LawsProceeds of SaleDate of FilingCreditor ObjectionFraud AllegationTexas LawStatutory Interpretation
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 28, 1989

In Re Volpe

This case addresses the objection by NCNB-Texas National Bank to the exemption claimed by Dr. and Mrs. Volpe (Debtors) for their qualified employee profit sharing plan and individual retirement accounts under Chapter 7 bankruptcy. NCNB argued that the relevant Texas Property Code (T.P.C. § 42.0021) was preempted by ERISA and that debtors could only exempt a single account. The court, after an extensive analysis of ERISA's preemption clause and Supreme Court precedents like Mackey, concluded that T.P.C. § 42.0021 is not preempted by ERISA, as its connection to ERISA plans is too remote to be considered regulatory. Furthermore, applying a liberal interpretation of Texas exemption laws, the court determined that a debtor's overall retirement plan, even if held in multiple accounts, is exempt. Therefore, NCNB's objection was overruled, and the debtors' accounts were deemed exempt.

Bankruptcy LawExemption ClaimERISA PreemptionTexas Property CodeRetirement BenefitsProfit Sharing PlanIndividual Retirement AccountsFederal Bankruptcy CodeState Exemption LawSpendthrift Trust
References
41
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Messing

The debtor, Patrick F. Messing, sought to exempt his $6,365.45 interest in an ERISA-qualified pension benefit plan established by his employer, J.B.F. Associates, Inc. He claimed the exemption under both Tennessee law (Tenn.Code Ann. § 26-2-104(b)) and federal law (11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2)(A)). The trustee, Ann Mostoller, objected to both claims. The court sustained the trustee's objection to the Tennessee law claim, finding the state statute preempted by ERISA. However, the court denied the trustee's objection to the federal law claim, concluding that ERISA § 206(d)(1) establishes a cognizable federal exemption. Therefore, the debtor's claim of exemption was granted under federal law but denied under state law.

ERISABankruptcyExemptionPension PlanEmployee BenefitsFederal PreemptionAnti-AlienationChapter 7Debtor's RightsTrustee Objection
References
38
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Luttrell

The Chapter 7 Trustee, Ann Mostoller, objected to the Debtor's claim of exemption for $150,000 received under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA). The Debtor, widow of a Department of Energy employee, received these benefits due to her husband's occupational illness (lung cancer) as a 'covered employee' under EEOICPA. The Trustee argued that the Tennessee exemption statute (Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111(1)(C)) applied only to the individual suffering the illness, not to a dependent. The court disagreed, finding that the EEOICPA benefits, like social security and veterans' benefits, vest in surviving spouses and fall within the scope of protections intended by the Tennessee General Assembly. Therefore, the court overruled the Trustee's objection, allowing the Debtor to exempt the entire $150,000.

BankruptcyExemptionChapter 7Occupational Illness Compensation Program ActEEOICPAEnergy EmployeesSurvivor BenefitsDisability BenefitsState ExemptionsFederal Exemptions
References
28
Case No. 05-91224
Regular Panel Decision

In Re McBride

This Memorandum Opinion addresses a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case where debtor Diane McBride claimed her ExxonMobil Savings Plan as exempt under Texas state law. The Trustee objected to the exemption of her after-tax contributions, amounting to $4,840.00. The Court analyzed whether ERISA-qualified savings plans, including after-tax contributions, are 'excluded' from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) due to an anti-alienation provision, or merely 'exempt' under state law. Citing Patterson v. Shumate, the Court concluded that the presence of an anti-alienation clause in an ERISA-qualified plan means the funds are excluded from the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, the Court overruled the Trustee's objection.

BankruptcyERISARetirement PlanAfter-Tax ContributionsExemptionExclusionAnti-alienation ProvisionSpendthrift TrustTexas Property CodeChapter 7
References
22
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Dye v. McIntyre Floral Co.

This suit was brought by employees against McIntyre Floral Company, alleging a deficiency in wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The core issue revolves around whether the employees are exempt from the Act's provisions due to their employment in agriculture, specifically in handling "agricultural or horticultural commodities for market." The chancellor initially sustained a demurrer, agreeing that the complainants were exempt. The court examined the Act's definition of "agriculture," which includes the cultivation and harvesting of horticultural commodities and practices incidental to farming, such as preparation for market. The court concluded that the employees' work, involving the receipt, care, and preparation of nursery products for shipment, falls under the "preparation for market" clause of the agricultural exemption, affirming the initial judgment. This construction aligns with the understanding of agriculture's seasonal nature, which includes horticulture.

Fair Labor Standards ActAgricultural ExemptionHorticultural CommoditiesNursery BusinessWage DeficiencyInterstate CommercePreparation for MarketFarm Laborer ExemptionStatutory InterpretationDavidson County
References
3
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