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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. ADJ994369
Regular
Jan 19, 2014

JOSE JUAREZ vs. WATKINS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) is reconsidering a decision that awarded the applicant medical mileage and a penalty for unreasonable delay in compensation payments but denied attorney's fees. The WCAB believes attorney's fees are warranted under Labor Code section 5814.5 for enforcing the payment of awarded compensation. The case is being returned to the trial level for the judge to determine and award these attorney's fees.

Workers' Compensation Appeals BoardPetition for ReconsiderationFindings and AwardMedical Mileage Expense ReimbursementAttorney's FeesLabor Code Section 5814Labor Code Section 5813Labor Code Section 5814.5Cumulative Industrial InjuryPulmonary System Injury
References
0
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Claim of Zizolfo v. Western Electric Co.

This case involves an appeal from a Workers’ Compensation Board decision, filed on November 29, 1978, concerning an attorney's fee. The claimant's attorney, designated as the appellant, sought an additional $1,500 fee, contending that the initial $500 awarded by a referee was inadequate. The Board, however, determined that the appellant had been sufficiently compensated for services rendered. The appellate court, referencing section 24 of the Workers’ Compensation Law, affirmed the Board's decision, asserting that its determination on attorney's fees would only be disturbed if the fee was arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably low. Finding no such grounds, the court upheld the Board's original ruling.

Attorney's FeesAppellate ReviewBoard DecisionFee DisputeJudicial DiscretionCompensation AwardsLegal ServicesAffirmationAdministrative Appeal
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Yeshiva University v. New England Educational Institute, Inc.

In a Lanham Act action, defendants, who prevailed after a jury trial against plaintiff Yeshiva, sought approximately $50,000 in attorney's fees. The application presented a novel question: whether a prevailing defendant is entitled to fees when the plaintiff's liability claims were asserted in good faith but the damage claims were grossly exaggerated. The court first affirmed the applicability of the Lanham Act's attorney fee provision, § 35(a), to actions involving unregistered marks, citing precedent. Despite acknowledging the plaintiff's highly exaggerated damage claims, the court determined that the case, which was close on the merits regarding the initial copying allegations, did not meet the 'exceptional cases' standard required for awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant. Consequently, the defendants' application for attorney's fees was denied.

Lanham ActAttorney's FeesPrevailing DefendantExceptional CasesUnregistered MarkDamage ClaimsExaggerated DamagesGood Faith LitigationJury VerdictNon-profit Dispute
References
7
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 06, 1988

Gelin v. Perales

This case concerns an appeal by the Nassau County Commissioner of Social Services from a Supreme Court judgment in a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The proceeding was initiated by Octoleme Gelin to compel compliance with determinations from the New York State Commissioner of Social Services, which had reversed denials of public assistance applications. The Supreme Court directed the local Commissioner to redetermine Gelin's financial eligibility and awarded attorney's fees. On appeal, the court found the local agency's contention of compliance meritless regarding eligibility determination. However, the appellate court ruled that the award of attorney's fees under 42 USC § 1988 was erroneous because the petitioner's federal claim, based on 45 CFR 205.10 (a) (16), was found to be insubstantial and failed the Gibbs test.

Public AssistanceAttorney's FeesCPLR Article 78Fair HearingSocial Services LawEligibility for BenefitsJudicial ReviewAppellate DivisionFederal Constitutional ClaimState Constitutional Claim
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Banner Employment Agency, Inc. v. O'Connell

This case concerns the annulment of a respondent's determination that a petitioner employment agency violated Section 185 of the General Business Law by charging an excessive fee. The dispute centered on the classification of an employee for fee calculation, with the respondent advocating for 'Class A1' and the petitioner for 'Class B'. The employee possessed an engineering background and technical experience. The court concluded that the employment did not fit into 'Class A1' or the professional aspect of 'Class B', instead falling under 'Class B's' residual 'other employment' category. Consequently, the respondent's initial determination was annulled.

Employment Agency FeesGeneral Business LawEmployment ClassificationStatutory InterpretationExcessive ChargeJudicial ReviewAnnulmentSkilled WorkerNon-Professional EmploymentClass B Employment
References
1
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In re Relativity Fashion, LLC

This Memorandum Opinion addresses a motion for attorneys' fees and expenses filed by Relativity Media, LLC (and its affiliates RML Distribution Domestic, LLC, Armored Car Productions, LLC, and DR Productions, LLC, collectively 'Relativity') and Mr. Ryan Kavanaugh against Netflix, Inc. The dispute arose from Netflix's refusal to execute 'Date Extension Amendments' related to a License Agreement, prompting Relativity to seek relief under Section 1142 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court previously ruled that Netflix was barred by res judicata and judicial estoppel from asserting its claimed contractual rights to distribute films before theatrical release. In this opinion, the Court determined that Relativity was the 'prevailing party' under California Civil Code Section 1717 and the License Agreement's fee provision. Consequently, Relativity is entitled to reimbursement for its own reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. However, the Court denied Mr. Kavanaugh's request for reimbursement of his counsel's fees and expenses, concluding that he was not a party to the License Agreement and did not meet the exceptions for non-signatories to recover fees. The Court awarded Relativity $818,547.48, comprising $795,732.50 in attorneys’ fees and $22,814.98 in litigation expenses, against Netflix.

Attorneys FeesLitigation ExpensesContract LawCalifornia Civil Code Section 1717Bankruptcy Code Section 1142Prevailing PartyLodestar MethodHourly RatesJudicial EstoppelRes Judicata
References
85
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Sep 09, 1991

Cleary v. Perales

This case concerns an appeal regarding the entitlement to attorney's fees for a mentally retarded man (petitioner) who successfully challenged the denial of Medicaid reimbursement for his transportation to a Federal sheltered workshop via a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The initial IAS Court found the denial of Medicaid coverage irrational and not in accordance with social services law. On appeal, the court unanimously reversed the lower court's denial of attorney's fees, concluding that the petitioner, as a prevailing party, was entitled to such fees under 42 USC § 1988. The court determined that the federal claim had sufficient substance and derived from a common nucleus of operative fact with the state claim. The matter was remanded for the calculation of attorney's fees, with the State respondent bearing the final responsibility.

Attorney's FeesMedicaid ReimbursementSocial Security DisabilityCPLR Article 78Federal Statutory RightsPrevailing PartyCommon Nucleus of Operative FactMental RetardationTransportation CostsSocial Services Law
References
9
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 30, 1979

Rosario v. Blum

The petitioner's grant of aid to dependent children was terminated due to her failure to provide information regarding her husband's presence in the household. She challenged this determination, along with issues concerning a prior termination and rent allowance, via an article 78 proceeding, also seeking $10,000 in damages and counsel fees. The court confirmed the administrative determination, finding substantial evidence that her husband was living in the household, thus affecting her eligibility for the grant. The petitioner's claims for damages and counsel fees were denied on both merit and procedural grounds, as such claims were deemed an impermissible intrusion in an article 78 proceeding.

Public AssistanceAid to Dependent ChildrenEligibilityDue ProcessArticle 78Damages ClaimCounsel FeesHousehold CompositionSpousal PresenceAdministrative Review
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 16, 1990

Continental Building Co. v. Town of North Salem

This case concerns an amended order regarding the award of attorney's fees under 42 USC § 1988. The court re-affirmed its previous finding that the plaintiff was a 'prevailing party' and that no 'special circumstances' existed to deny the award, rejecting arguments regarding defendants' good faith, plaintiff's financial ability, or third-party contributions. The court then determined the reasonableness of the fees, finding the hours expended and the hourly rate to be appropriate. Despite the 'lodestar fee' calculation, the court, exercising its discretion, reduced the final award to prevent overpricing litigation, ultimately granting $318,977.78 in attorney's fees and $73,022.22 in disbursements and expenses.

Civil RightsAttorney's FeesPrevailing PartySpecial CircumstancesLodestar MethodDisbursementsExpert Witness FeesSection 1983Section 1988Exclusionary Zoning
References
32
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 24, 1999

Town of Hempstead v. Inc. Village of Atlantic Beach

This case involves two related actions arising from inter-municipal agreements for waste disposal services. The defendants appealed from initial court orders concerning their obligations to pay minimum waste commitment tonnage fees and their entitlement to various credits, including those for private carters, recyclable materials, and yard waste. The plaintiffs cross-appealed regarding the methodology for calculating yard waste credits and the fees for using the Town's transfer facility. The Supreme Court, Nassau County, issued an initial order and a subsequent amended order upon reargument, clarifying several points. The Appellate Division affirmed the amended order, holding that the agreements unambiguously required villages to pay minimum tonnage fees regardless of actual waste delivered. The court also determined that the villages were only obligated to pay transfer facility fees based on actual waste delivered and that any ambiguities regarding yard waste credits should be interpreted against the Town as the drafter of the agreements.

Inter-municipal agreementsWaste disposalSummary judgmentContract interpretationMinimum commitment feesYard waste creditTransfer facility feesUnambiguous agreementsExtrinsic evidenceAmbiguity construction
References
10
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