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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 28, 2015

Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third & Fourth Departments

This putative class action challenges New York laws prohibiting non-lawyer equity ownership in law firms, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the dormant Commerce Clause. The case was remanded from the Court of Appeals after an initial dismissal for lack of standing. Plaintiffs Jacoby & Meyers, LLP and Jacoby & Meyers USA II PLLC argued these laws impede their ability to raise capital and expand legal services. However, the District Court concluded that the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges were without merit. The court found that the proposed activity constituted commercial conduct, not protected speech or association, and that the state laws were rationally related to New York's legitimate interest in regulating the legal profession. Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss the third amended complaint was granted.

First AmendmentFourteenth AmendmentDormant Commerce ClauseLegal Profession RegulationNon-Lawyer Equity OwnershipLaw Firm FinancingConstitutional LawFreedom of SpeechFreedom of AssociationEqual Protection
References
76
Case No. 10-06-00236-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 09, 2008

Navasota Resources, L.P. v. First Source Texas, Inc., First Source Gas, LP, Gastar Exploration Texas, LLC F/K/A Bossier Basin, LLC, First Texas Gas, LP, First Source Bossier LLC, Gastar Exploration, LTD., Chesapeake Energy Corp., Chesapeake Exploration LP & Chesapeake Operating. Inc

Navasota Resources, L.P. initiated a lawsuit to enforce a preferential right clause within a joint operating agreement with First Source Texas, Inc. and related entities concerning oil and gas interests. The trial court granted summary judgment for First Source and Chesapeake Energy Corp., denying Navasota's motion. On appeal, the court examined whether the preferential right was triggered by a multi-asset 'package deal' and if Navasota was obligated to accept all additional terms. The appellate court determined that the preferential right was indeed invoked, and Navasota was not required to agree to unrelated conditions like stock purchases or entry into an Area of Mutual Interest. Consequently, the court found a binding contract was formed, the preferential right provision was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation, and rejected defenses of mistake or unconscionability. The judgment of the trial court was reversed, with judgment rendered in favor of Navasota for breach of contract and specific performance, and the case was remanded for determination of attorney's fees and revenues.

Oil and GasPreferential RightJoint Operating AgreementSummary JudgmentBreach of ContractSpecific PerformanceRestraint on AlienationPackage DealAppellate ReviewContractual Option
References
92
Case No. 1:18-CV-1100
Regular Panel Decision

Amawi v. Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist.

This case involves a consolidated action where Plaintiffs challenge Texas House Bill 89 (H.B. 89) as violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. H.B. 89 prohibits state entities from contracting with companies that "boycott Israel," defining "boycott Israel" to include actions intended to penalize, harm, or limit commercial relations with Israel or entities doing business there. Plaintiffs allege they lost employment opportunities or were compelled to forgo their participation in the BDS movement against Israel due to this law. The Court found that Plaintiffs' boycotts are protected First Amendment speech, and H.B. 89 constitutes an unconstitutional content- and viewpoint-based restriction, imposes unconstitutional conditions on public employment, compels speech for an impermissible purpose, and is void for vagueness. Consequently, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of H.B. 89 and any "No Boycott of Israel" clauses in state contracts, and denied the Defendants' motions to dismiss.

First AmendmentFreedom of SpeechPolitical BoycottsBDS MovementIsrael-Palestine ConflictGovernment ContractsUnconstitutional ConditionsViewpoint DiscriminationVagueness DoctrinePreliminary Injunction
References
13
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Bobby Duncan v. First Texas Homes and First Texas Homes, Inc.

Bobby Duncan, an employee of First Texas Homes, sustained injuries after falling from stairs on a construction site. He alleged negligence, citing unsafe working conditions and failure to inspect the premises, particularly due to insufficient clearance on the stair platform that violated OSHA and company safety standards. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of First Texas. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding First Texas's actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, whether the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm, and if First Texas's negligence was the proximate cause of Duncan's injuries. The court emphasized that an employee's awareness of a defect does not necessarily eliminate the employer's duty in a nonsubscriber case.

Summary JudgmentPremises LiabilityEmployer NegligenceNonsubscriber EmployerOccupational SafetyConstruction Site InjuryHazardous ConditionForeseeabilityProximate CauseAppellate Review
References
61
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Texans Against Censorship v. State Bar of Texas

The case is a federal civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct that regulate attorney advertising and solicitation. Plaintiffs, including Texans Against Censorship, Inc. and individual attorneys, argued the rules violate First Amendment free speech and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The court, presided over by Justice, District Judge, analyzed the rules under commercial speech guidelines. It upheld most amended rules, such as those concerning trade names, false communications, comparison of services, telephone solicitation bans, and record-keeping, as constitutional. However, three rules were found unconstitutional: the "branch office rule" (7.04(j)) as applied to plaintiff Newton, and the bans on implying State Bar approval (7.05(b)(4)) and personally delivered mail (7.05(b)(5)) as facially unconstitutional. The court granted declaratory relief but declined injunctive relief.

Attorney AdvertisingCommercial SpeechFirst AmendmentConstitutional LawLegal EthicsProfessional ConductDeclaratory ReliefFree SpeechEqual ProtectionPrior Restraint
References
0
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
May 07, 1979

Barbre v. Garland Independent School District

Chris Barbre, a former teacher's aide, sued the Garland Independent School District and its officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging her non-renewal was due to protected First Amendment speech regarding "House Bill 1126" and her job classification. She also raised procedural due process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Court found that Barbre's speech, primarily focused on her personal pay and job reclassification, was not protected by the First Amendment as it significantly disrupted the workplace and undermined her superiors' authority. Furthermore, even if her speech were protected, her insubordinate conduct subsequent to the School Board Meeting provided an independent and valid reason for her non-renewal. Consequently, the Court denied all requested relief, ruling in favor of the defendants and dismissing her claims.

First AmendmentFreedom of SpeechPublic EmploymentTeacher's AideEmployment Non-renewalDue Process42 U.S.C. Section 1983Garland Independent School DistrictInsubordinationWorkplace Discipline
References
20
Case No. 03-05-00455-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 14, 2006

Startex First Equipment, Ltd. v. Aelina Enterprises, Inc.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the ownership of a .384-acre tract of commercial real property. Appellant Startex First Equipment, Ltd., appealed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of appellee Aelina Enterprises, Inc., which granted Aelina title to the property. The core issue was whether Startex's right of first refusal, originating from a 1970 Lease and Operating Agreement, survived previous sales of the property and was superior to Aelina's subsequent purchase option. The appellate court found that the explicit language in the Lease Agreement ensured the survival and assignability of the right of first refusal, making Startex's right superior. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and rendered judgment in favor of Startex.

Right of First RefusalReal Property DisputeContract InterpretationSummary Judgment AppealLease AgreementPurchase OptionAssignability of RightsSuperiority of RightsConstructive NoticeInquiry Notice
References
15
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Startex First Equipment, Ltd. v. Aelina Enterprises Inc.

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of commercial real property in Bastrop County, Texas. Appellant Startex First Equipment, Ltd., appealed a trial court’s summary judgment that granted title to appellee Aelina Enterprises, Inc. The core issue was whether Startex's right of first refusal, originally granted to Pioneer Oil Company in a 1970 Lease and Operating Agreement, survived subsequent property sales and was superior to Aelina's later-acquired purchase option. The appellate court determined that the right of first refusal, explicitly stating that sales were 'subject to the terms of this lease,' indeed survived previous property transfers and was properly assigned to Startex. Consequently, the court found Startex's right to be superior to Aelina's purchase option, reversing the district court's decision and rendering judgment in favor of Startex.

real propertyright of first refusalpurchase optioncontract interpretationsummary judgmentappealproperty ownershipcommercial leaseassignability of rightsconstructive notice
References
17
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 02, 2013

Ross v. New York City Department of Education

Plaintiff Brian Ross, a physical education teacher, sued Principal Beth Lubeck, two Assistant Principals, and the Department of Education for First and Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ross alleged retaliation after he reported unsafe and unsanitary conditions, including asbestos and lead paint, at the Settlement House where he was assigned to teach. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, ruling that Ross's complaints to administrators, his union, and OSHA were made "pursuant to his official duties" and therefore lacked First Amendment protection. Additionally, the court denied Ross's motion to amend his complaint to include other forms of speech, such as discussions with co-workers and a press conference, finding them either part of his official duties or not matters of public concern. Consequently, all of Ross's free speech and petition clause retaliation claims were dismissed, and the case was closed.

Public Employee SpeechFirst Amendment RetaliationWorkplace SafetyTeacher RightsOfficial Duty SpeechPublic Concern DoctrineSummary Judgment GrantMotion to Amend DenialOccupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)School Environment
References
37
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Agyeman v. Roosevelt Union Free School District

Plaintiff Ak-ousa Agyeman, an elementary school teacher, filed a civil rights action against the Roosevelt Union Free School District and several individuals, alleging violations of her First Amendment rights and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York Civil Service Law § 75-b. Agyeman claimed she was retaliated against for engaging in protected speech, specifically through internal emails and a letter to the New York State Education Department, regarding student needs, District policies, and alleged legal violations. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing her speech was not constitutionally protected. The Court granted the defendants' motion, concluding that Agyeman's speech was made as a public employee performing official duties, not as a private citizen, and therefore was not protected by the First Amendment. Consequently, the Section 1983 claim was dismissed, and the remaining state law claim was dismissed without prejudice for re-filing in state court.

First Amendment retaliationPublic employee speechCivil rights actionSummary judgmentNew York State law claimDismissal without prejudiceTeacher employment disputeSchool district liabilityFreedom of speechOfficial duties
References
56
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