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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 24, 1999

Town of Hempstead v. Inc. Village of Atlantic Beach

This case involves two related actions arising from inter-municipal agreements for waste disposal services. The defendants appealed from initial court orders concerning their obligations to pay minimum waste commitment tonnage fees and their entitlement to various credits, including those for private carters, recyclable materials, and yard waste. The plaintiffs cross-appealed regarding the methodology for calculating yard waste credits and the fees for using the Town's transfer facility. The Supreme Court, Nassau County, issued an initial order and a subsequent amended order upon reargument, clarifying several points. The Appellate Division affirmed the amended order, holding that the agreements unambiguously required villages to pay minimum tonnage fees regardless of actual waste delivered. The court also determined that the villages were only obligated to pay transfer facility fees based on actual waste delivered and that any ambiguities regarding yard waste credits should be interpreted against the Town as the drafter of the agreements.

Inter-municipal agreementsWaste disposalSummary judgmentContract interpretationMinimum commitment feesYard waste creditTransfer facility feesUnambiguous agreementsExtrinsic evidenceAmbiguity construction
References
10
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In re Relativity Fashion, LLC

This Memorandum Opinion addresses a motion for attorneys' fees and expenses filed by Relativity Media, LLC (and its affiliates RML Distribution Domestic, LLC, Armored Car Productions, LLC, and DR Productions, LLC, collectively 'Relativity') and Mr. Ryan Kavanaugh against Netflix, Inc. The dispute arose from Netflix's refusal to execute 'Date Extension Amendments' related to a License Agreement, prompting Relativity to seek relief under Section 1142 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court previously ruled that Netflix was barred by res judicata and judicial estoppel from asserting its claimed contractual rights to distribute films before theatrical release. In this opinion, the Court determined that Relativity was the 'prevailing party' under California Civil Code Section 1717 and the License Agreement's fee provision. Consequently, Relativity is entitled to reimbursement for its own reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. However, the Court denied Mr. Kavanaugh's request for reimbursement of his counsel's fees and expenses, concluding that he was not a party to the License Agreement and did not meet the exceptions for non-signatories to recover fees. The Court awarded Relativity $818,547.48, comprising $795,732.50 in attorneys’ fees and $22,814.98 in litigation expenses, against Netflix.

Attorneys FeesLitigation ExpensesContract LawCalifornia Civil Code Section 1717Bankruptcy Code Section 1142Prevailing PartyLodestar MethodHourly RatesJudicial EstoppelRes Judicata
References
85
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 21, 2014

Marin v. Constitution Realty, LLC

This case involves an appeal from an order regarding the division of attorneys' fees among Sheryl Menkes (appellant), David B. Golomb, and Jeffrey A. Manheimer (respondents). Menkes, attorney of record for plaintiffs in a personal injury action, had agreements with both Golomb and Manheimer for fee sharing. The primary dispute concerned Golomb's share, contingent on whether the case settled at a specific mediation session (12% fee) or later (40% fee). The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding the contract unambiguous that the mediation session concluded on a specific date, entitling Golomb to the higher fee, and that Manheimer was entitled to 20% as per his agreement. The court rejected Menkes's arguments based on contract interpretation and professional conduct rules.

Attorney's FeesContract InterpretationMediation AgreementFee DisputePersonal Injury ActionQuantum MeruitProfessional ConductNew York LawSettlement NegotiationsStructured Settlement
References
13
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 10, 2004

Claim of Mickens v. New York City Transit Authority

The claimant suffered a work-related injury in 1993 and subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. A stipulation agreement between the claimant and employer, which adjusted weekly awards and set future payments, was approved by a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge. The claimant appealed this decision to the Workers’ Compensation Board, asserting the stipulation's invalidity, inadequate legal representation, and excessive counsel fees. The Board upheld the WCLJ's decision and denied the claimant's request for reconsideration. The appellate court affirmed the Board's decisions, finding the stipulation binding and the counsel fee award within the Board's discretion, and no abuse of discretion in denying reconsideration.

Stipulation AgreementCounsel FeesBoard ReviewAppellate ReviewPsychological ImpairmentsWork-related InjuryDecision AffirmedDiscretionary PowersLegal RepresentationBenefit Adjustment
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Willis

The debtor, Trennis Earl Willis, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. An asset in his estate is a personal injury claim, for which he had a contingency fee contract with attorney Frank L. Supercinski. Supercinski sought approval for his fees ($20,000 plus expenses) from a $50,000 settlement of the personal injury claim and approval of a disbursement scheme. Both the Debtor and the Chapter 7 Trustee objected, arguing the contingency fee contract was executory and rejected by the estate. The Court, presided over by Judge Donald R. Sharp, found the contingency fee agreement to be executory and deemed rejected as not assumed by the Trustee. However, applying the common fund doctrine, the Court acknowledged Supercinski's entitlement to fees from the settlement proceeds with priority. Despite this, all of Supercinski's motions (for fees, settlement approval, and relief from stay) were denied due to procedural flaws, such as the settlement not being finalized or approved, and the lack of a settlement agreement copy. The Court clarified that the settlement check is property of the Debtor's estate and must be administered under bankruptcy rules, instructing Supercinski to file a proper application once the settlement is finalized and approved.

Chapter 7 BankruptcyContingency Fee AgreementAttorney's FeesExecutory ContractAutomatic Stay ReliefCommon Fund DoctrineQuantum MeruitTexas LawPersonal Injury SettlementBankruptcy Estate
References
29
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Roeglin v. Daves

The district court initially found a valid and enforceable Rule 11 agreement where Alfred and Sandra Daves settled claims against Scott Roeglin for injuries Alfred Daves sustained in an automobile collision. The Daveses appealed, asserting no such agreement existed, while Roeglin appealed the denial of attorney's fees. The dispute revolved around a series of letters exchanged between the Daveses, Universal Underwriters Insurance Company (Alfred Daves's worker's compensation carrier), and Roeglin, which Roeglin contended formed a binding Rule 11 agreement. The appellate court, after reviewing the correspondence, concluded that the letters did not satisfy the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for an agreement between the Daveses and Roeglin. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the Daveses' action against Roeglin, remanding that portion for further proceedings, and affirmed the denial of Roeglin's attorney's fees.

Rule 11 AgreementSettlement AgreementContract EnforcementAppellate ReviewAttorney's FeesSubrogation ClaimWorkers' CompensationAutomobile CollisionTexas Civil ProcedureStatute of Frauds
References
7
Case No. 01-01-00200-CV, 01-03-00025-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 08, 2007

Haden, Charles M., Jr., Individually and Charles McIntyre Haden, Jr. & Co. D/B/A Haden & Company v. David J. Sacks, P.C. D/B/A Sacks & Associates

This appellate opinion addresses a dispute over legal fees between a client, Charles McIntyre Haden, Jr., and his company (Appellants), and their former law firm, David J. Sacks, P.C. (Appellee). The central issue revolved around the terms of their fee agreement, specifically whether it was based on an hourly rate or a capped flat fee. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's take-nothing summary judgment on the client's counterclaims, which included allegations of DTPA violations, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty, due to a lack of demonstrable damages. However, the court reversed and remanded the trial court's summary judgments that had favored the law firm on its breach-of-contract claims and awarded attorney's fees, citing unresolved factual disputes regarding the nature of the fee agreement.

Attorney's Fees DisputeContract LawSummary Judgment ReversalAppellate ProcedureParol Evidence RuleLegal MalpracticeDeceptive Trade Practices ActFiduciary Duty BreachFraud ClaimsContract Ratification
References
48
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Local Union 670, United Rubber Workers

This memorandum addresses the defendant's application for attorneys' fees in a case where the plaintiff challenged an arbitration award concerning an employee's discharge. The arbiter had found the plaintiff violated a collective bargaining agreement regarding union representation during disciplinary actions. The court had previously granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, affirming the arbiter's decision. In this memorandum, the court rules that the defendant's application for attorneys' fees was timely filed. Furthermore, the court finds that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by initiating and continuing to litigate the suit on points previously decided or not legally distinguishable. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in litigating the merits, but not the hours spent petitioning for the fees themselves, with the final amount subject to an amended itemization.

Attorneys' FeesBad Faith LitigationLabor-Management Relations ActArbitration Award ChallengeCollective Bargaining AgreementTimeliness of MotionFederal Rules of Civil ProcedureJudicial DiscretionEmployee DisciplineUnion Representation
References
29
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Luna

Johnny Luna, an at-will employee, was terminated by Poly-America after filing a worker's compensation claim and subsequently sued for wrongful discharge and retaliation under the Texas Labor Code. Poly-America sought to compel arbitration based on an agreement Luna had signed. Luna challenged the arbitration agreement's substantive unconscionability, specifically pointing to provisions on fee-splitting, limited remedies (prohibiting punitive damages and reinstatement), limited discovery, and the inability to apply a 'good cause' standard. The court determined that while individual provisions might not be unconscionable, the cumulative effect of the high arbitration costs and the significant limitations on statutory remedies rendered the agreement as a whole substantively unconscionable. The court also rejected Poly-America's argument for severability, concluding the problematic provisions were integral to the agreement. As a result, the court conditionally granted Luna's petition for writ of mandamus, instructing the trial court to withdraw its order compelling arbitration.

Arbitration AgreementSubstantive UnconscionabilityMandamus ReliefEmployment LawWorker's Compensation ActWrongful DischargeRetaliation ClaimFee-Splitting ProvisionRemedy LimitationDiscovery Limitation
References
36
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Adkins v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.

This case addresses whether a Texas trial judge has the authority to change the terms of attorneys’ fee contracts between attorneys and their clients in mass tort litigation that is not a class action. The Appellants, consisting of 49 law firms led by Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, representing approximately 37,000 plaintiffs, challenged a trial court’s order that reduced their contingent fees and expenses from a settlement with Shell Oil Company and Hoechst Celanese Corporation regarding defective polybutylene plumbing systems. The appellate court reviewed general contract law, exceptions (fraud, incapacity), and the inapplicability of class action and common fund doctrines. It also considered whether the settlement agreement itself granted the trial judge such authority. The court concluded that, absent pleading and proof of barratry, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, incapacity, illegality, class action, or common fund doctrine applicability, a trial judge lacks the power to modify a fully-performed attorney fee contract. Therefore, the court reversed the portions of the appealed judgments dealing with the award of attorneys’ fees and remanded the cases for further proceedings.

Attorney's FeesContingency Fee ContractsContract LawAppellate ReviewMass Tort LitigationTrial Court AuthoritySettlement AgreementTexas LawClass Action InapplicabilityCommon Fund Doctrine Inapplicability
References
26
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