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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Swindell v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.

Plaintiff Edward LeRoy Swindell, a New York resident, sued Florida East Coast Railway for personal injuries due to asbestos exposure while working for the defendant in Florida between 1939 and 1952. The defendant, a Florida corporation with its headquarters in St. Augustine, Florida, moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction in New York. The court examined New York Civil Practice Law §§ 301 and 302, concluding that the defendant's contacts with New York did not constitute "doing business" or "transacting business" sufficiently related to the cause of action. The court also rejected the argument that the injury occurred in New York because emotional distress manifested there. Consequently, the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was granted, and the case was dismissed without prejudice to refiling in an appropriate forum.

Personal JurisdictionMotion to DismissLong-Arm StatuteNew York Civil Practice LawCPLR 301CPLR 302Doing BusinessTransacting BusinessTortious ActDue Process
References
32
Case No. ADJ8073837
Regular
Nov 17, 2015

Sean Love vs. Tampa Bay Buccaneers

This case concerns whether the Tampa Bay Buccaneers are exempt from California's workers' compensation laws for an injury sustained by a former player. The WCJ initially ruled against the Buccaneers, finding that Florida's reciprocity statute, which would allow for an exemption under Labor Code § 3600.5(b), was not in effect at the time of the player's work in California. The Appeals Board affirmed the WCJ's decision, holding that the conditions for exemption must exist at the time of injury and Florida's law cannot retroactively apply to alter California's jurisdiction. A dissenting opinion argued that the reciprocity statute's validity at the time of claim filing, not injury, should determine exemption, citing a prior Appeals Board case.

Labor Code 3600.5(b)extraterritorial provisionsreciprocity statuteFlorida Statute 440.094self-insuredcumulative injurytemporary employmentWorkers' Compensation Appeals BoardWCAB jurisdictionexclusive remedy
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In re the Arbitration between Tarpon Cove, Ltd. & Taylor Woodrow Blitman Property Corp. of Florida

Tarpon, a Florida property owner, entered a management and development agreement with Taylor, which included a New York arbitration clause. After Tarpon unilaterally terminated the agreement, a dispute arose over termination and reimbursement costs. Tarpon initiated an action in Florida, prompting Taylor to demand arbitration for both parties' claims. Special Term initially granted Tarpon's motion to stay arbitration, ruling the clause was nullified by termination. The appellate court reversed, holding that a unilateral termination does not extinguish a broad arbitration clause and that issues regarding the agreement's termination and alleged breaches are matters for arbitration. The court also ordered a stay of the related Florida action pending arbitration.

Arbitration AgreementContract TerminationStay of ArbitrationCompelling ArbitrationCross-MotionFlorida LitigationNew York LawUnilateral TerminationBreach of ContractAppellate Review
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 29, 1992

Mark v. Eshkar

This case involves a plaintiff, owner of Manhattan premises, and defendants Eshkar and Jules Schapiro, whose adjacent building shared a party wall. Following rehabilitation work on Schapiro's building in 1984, minor damage to the party wall occurred. In 1989, more significant structural cracks appeared, attributed to allegedly faulty foundation work supervised by Eshkar. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's negligence claim against Eshkar, deeming it barred by a three-year statute of limitations, which it held commenced in 1985 upon the issuance of the certificate of occupancy. The appellate court reversed this decision, ruling that the cause of action accrued in 1989 when the structural cracks became visible, aligning with the principle that the statute of limitations for damages resulting from loss of lateral support begins when such damages are sustained and become apparent.

Statute of LimitationsNegligenceReal PropertyParty WallConstruction DefectsAccrual of Cause of ActionLatent DefectsStructural DamageNew York LawAppellate Procedure
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Davis v. Isaacson, Robustelli, Fox, Fine, Greco & Fogelgaren, P. C.

Plaintiff Karl Davis sued attorney Bernard A. Kuttner for legal malpractice, alleging failure to pursue certain claims after a workplace injury in 1989. Kuttner moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the action was barred by the recently amended CPLR 214 (6), which shortened the statute of limitations for non-medical malpractice to three years and would have rendered Davis's claims, which accrued in 1991, time-barred by his 1997 filing against Kuttner. The court denied Kuttner's motion, ruling that applying the amended CPLR 214 (6) in this instance would unconstitutionally deprive the plaintiff of a reasonable time to bring suit, as the claims would have been immediately barred upon the amendment's effective date without legislative provision for a grace period. Consequently, the court held that the six-year statute of limitations previously in force applied, deeming Davis's claims timely.

Legal MalpracticeStatute of LimitationsCPLR 214 (6) AmendmentConstitutional LawDue ProcessRetroactivity of LawWorkers' Compensation ClaimNegligenceWorkplace InjuryMotion to Dismiss
References
27
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Ashmead v. Groper

The plaintiff appealed an order from the Supreme Court (Sullivan County), which dismissed their legal malpractice action against an attorney as barred by the Statute of Limitations. The plaintiff had initially retained the defendant attorney in 1981 for a workers' compensation claim, which closed in 1984 after an award for partial disability. In 1995, the plaintiff sued the attorney for negligence regarding the calculation of the average weekly wage. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, rejecting the plaintiff's argument of continuous representation, stating that a professional's failure to act does not constitute such. The court found that the Statute of Limitations expired, at the latest, six years after the workers' compensation case closed in May 1984.

Legal MalpracticeStatute of LimitationsContinuous Representation DoctrineWorkers' CompensationAttorney NegligenceAppellate ReviewDismissalAffirmationNew York LawCivil Procedure
References
8
Case No. CPL article 440 motion
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 01, 2011

People v. G.M.

Defendant G.M. moved to vacate six convictions—two for prostitution, two for criminal trespass, and two for drug possession—which occurred between September 1997 and January 1998. G.M. contended she was a victim of human trafficking and severe domestic abuse by her husband, D.S., who forced her into illegal activities under threat of violence. The New York State Legislature amended Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10 in August 2010, allowing sex trafficking victims to vacate prostitution-related convictions. The Queens County District Attorney's Office consented to G.M.'s motion for all six convictions, citing her truthful affidavit and the unique circumstances. On April 1, 2011, the court granted the motion, vacating all judgments of conviction and dismissing the accusatory instruments, recognizing G.M.'s status as a trafficking victim, which was also recognized by a federal agency that granted her a 'T Visa'.

Human TraffickingSex TraffickingVacatur of ConvictionsCriminal Procedure Law § 440.10Prostitution OffensesCriminal TrespassDrug PossessionDomestic ViolenceCoercionAbuse
References
14
Case No. 12cv3536, 12cv6285, 13cv3123
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 11, 2014

In re Bridge Construction Services of Florida, Inc.

Claimant Jose Ayala sustained injuries after falling from a barge on the Hudson River, alleging negligence by a tugboat. Petitioners Bridge Construction Services of Florida, Inc., Hughes Brothers, Inc., and Tutor Perini Corp., owners and charterers of the vessels, filed for exoneration or limitation of liability. Jose and Teresa Ayala filed claims for negligence and New York Labor Law violations. The court denied summary judgment for Hughes and Tutor Perini, citing material facts disputes regarding seaworthiness and negligence. Bridge's motion was partially granted, dismissing Teresa Ayala's loss of consortium claim, but denied regarding exoneration. New York Labor Law claims against TriState Electric Contracting, Inc. were dismissed without prejudice.

Admiralty LawMaritime LawLimitation of LiabilityExonerationJones ActSeaman StatusUnseaworthinessNegligenceSummary JudgmentBarge Accident
References
83
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
May 18, 1994

Claim of Boshart v. St. Francis Hospital

The claimant, a hospital employee, stopped working due to an aggravated preexisting back condition and filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Her claim was initially denied, but a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge found prima facie medical evidence for an occupational back condition. Upon appeal, the Workers' Compensation Board rejected the employer's contention that the claim was barred by Workers’ Compensation Law § 28, ruling the employer had waived this defense. The employer appealed this decision. The court affirmed the Board's decision, concluding that the employer failed to raise the Statute of Limitations defense at the first hearing where all parties were present, thereby waiving the right to assert it.

Workers' CompensationStatute of LimitationsWaiverOccupational DiseaseBack InjuryEmployer LiabilityAppellate ReviewProcedural DefenseInsurance ClaimBoard Decision
References
2
Case No. 17 NY3d 238
Regular Panel Decision

The People v. Jarrod Brown

Judge Read's dissenting opinion argues against the majority's interpretation of CPL 440.46, as amended by Chapter 62 of the Laws of 2011. The majority expanded resentencing eligibility to include parolees due to a name change from 'Department of Correctional Services' to 'Department of Corrections and Community Supervision'. Read contends that this amendment was merely a technical change reflecting an agency merger, not a substantive legislative intent to broaden resentencing relief, which should remain limited to incarcerated persons as per the original 2009 Drug Law Reform Act. The dissent emphasizes that statutory text should be interpreted within its context, highlighting that the 2011 amendment was part of an article VII budget bill for restructuring and technical corrections, not substantive law changes. Therefore, Read believes the legislature did not intend to expand the ameliorative sweep of the provision.

Resentencing EligibilityCPL 440.46Drug Law Reform ActParoleesIncarcerated PersonsStatutory InterpretationLegislative IntentChapter 62 Laws of 2011Technical AmendmentSubstantive Law
References
4
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