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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Gonzales v. Armac Industries, Ltd.

This case addresses a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: whether a defendant manufacturer's (Armac Industries, Ltd.) pretrial agreement with an injured plaintiff, admitting 2% liability and limiting enforcement of judgment, constitutes a 'release from liability' under General Obligations Law § 15-108 (c). The plaintiff was injured while employed by General Thermoforming Corporation (GTC), and Armac initiated a third-party action against GTC for contribution and indemnification. The Court held that the agreement did constitute a 'release from liability,' thereby forfeiting Armac's right to contribution from GTC. The decision emphasizes that such agreements undermine the quid pro quo system of § 15-108 and the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law, allowing indirect recovery from employers beyond statutory benefits.

Release from LiabilityGeneral Obligations Law § 15-108Workers' Compensation LawContributionPretrial AgreementTort LawEmployer ImmunityStatutory InterpretationThird-Party ActionExclusive Remedy
References
14
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Madaffari v. Wilmod Co.

Plaintiff Madaffari, an employee of Triangle, was injured in an accident involving defective scaffolding. He initiated an action against Ethen and Meral Celelei, the property owners, and Wilmod Company, Inc., responsible for anchoring the scaffold. Wilmod subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Triangle Aluminum Products Co., Inc., and Borneo Sumatra Trading Co., the supplier of the defective nails, filed a cross-complaint against Triangle. A tentative settlement was reached between Madaffari, Triangle, and Celelei, which involved a payment from Triangle's carrier to Madaffari and general releases for Triangle. However, Wilmod and Borneo intended to continue their actions against Triangle. Triangle moved for summary judgment based on General Obligations Law § 15-108, which governs the effect of releases on contribution among tortfeasors. The court, treating the tentative settlement as finalized, applied the principles of GOL § 15-108, noting that it logically extends to settlements between a plaintiff and a third-party defendant, especially given that Workers' Compensation Law initially barred Madaffari from suing Triangle directly. The court held that remaining tortfeasors are entitled to credit for the settling tortfeasor's equitable share, and a released tortfeasor is relieved from contribution liability. Therefore, Triangle's motion for summary judgment was converted into a motion for an order of discontinuance with prejudice and granted, conditional upon the finalization of the settlement. The court also clarified that while Triangle would not physically participate in the continued trial, its involvement could be presented to the jury for culpability apportionment.

Summary JudgmentThird-Party ComplaintCross-ComplaintGeneral Obligations Law § 15-108TortfeasorsContributionIndemnitySettlementDiscontinuance With PrejudiceApportionment of Culpability
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 13, 1992

Baca v. HRH Construction Corp.

The Supreme Court, New York County, affirmed an order dismissing a third-party plaintiff's claim for contribution. The court determined that a pre-verdict "high-low" agreement between the plaintiffs and the third-party plaintiff general contractor constituted a release under General Obligations Law § 15-108, thereby barring the contribution claim against the third-party defendant. It was also noted that the plaintiffs lacked standing to appeal the dismissal of the third-party claim. Furthermore, the court found that the third-party plaintiff's purported assignment of its contribution claim to the plaintiff was void, as no claim to assign existed given that its liability was limited to less than its equitable share by the settlement. The court also questioned whether such an assignment could circumvent the Workers' Compensation Law's exclusivity provisions.

High-low agreementContribution claimGeneral Obligations Law § 15-108ReleaseCPLR 5511Standing to appealWorkers' Compensation Law exclusivityEquitable shareAssignment of claimThird-party practice
References
7
Case No. 87 Civ. 8505 (RWS)
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Poling Transportation Corp.

The court addressed a motion by the Long Island Railroad and Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LIRR/MTA) to dismiss their indemnification claims and cross-claims against Poling Transportation Corp., the Motor Vessel Poling Bros. No. 7 (collectively, "Poling"), individual claimants David Theophilous, Antonio Coca, Sylvia Coca, and the "Ditmas Group" or "Porcelli Corporations." The LIRR/MTA sought indemnification, which is not barred by New York General Obligations Law § 15-108, unlike contribution claims. However, the court found that the LIRR/MTA failed to establish a right to either implied contractual or implied in law indemnification, nor could it rely on strict liability statutes like the New York Environmental Conservation Law or Navigation Law to transfer its duty of care. Consequently, the court granted the motion to dismiss the LIRR/MTA's indemnification claims, thereby resolving all claims against Poling, the Ditmas Group, and the individual claimants stemming from the underlying settlement. Additionally, the court denied subsequent motions to vacate its prior orders but granted a motion to modify certain language within those orders.

IndemnificationContributionJoint TortfeasorsSettlement AgreementGeneral Obligations LawImplied IndemnityStrict LiabilityFederal Court ProcedureAdmiralty JurisdictionPendent Jurisdiction
References
17
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 07, 2012

Edick v. General Electric Co.

Plaintiff was injured when he slipped on ice and fell at a construction site owned by General Electric Company, where LeChase Construction Services, LLC was the general contractor. He sued both defendants alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and 241 (6), and common-law negligence. Supreme Court dismissed the Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) claims but denied summary judgment for the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims. Defendants appealed this partial denial, arguing they neither created the condition nor had notice, and that the storm in progress rule applied. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, finding factual issues regarding defendants' notice and control, and rejecting the storm in progress rule defense.

Slip and FallConstruction AccidentWorkplace SafetyPremises LiabilitySummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewIce and SnowLabor LawGeneral Contractor LiabilityOwner Liability
References
13
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Johnson v. General Design and Development, Inc.

Jerry Johnson was severely injured in November 1991 when a drill bound, causing him to fall from a stepladder at a construction site. He and his spouse sued the general contractor, General Design and Development, Inc., alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and 241 (6), among other claims. General subsequently initiated a third-party action against subcontractors Omni Plumbing Company and Thomas P. Pleat Construction, Inc., seeking contribution and indemnification. Plaintiffs were granted partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) by the Supreme Court. The defendants appealed, contending the injuries were not elevation-related. The appellate court affirmed the Supreme Court's order, ruling that the stepladder was inadequate and the accident constituted an elevation-related risk under Labor Law § 240 (1), thus establishing a prima facie violation.

Construction AccidentLabor LawFall from HeightScaffolding LawSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewPersonal InjuryContractor LiabilitySubcontractor LiabilityIndemnification
References
11
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Swogger v. Waterman Steamship Corp.

The case addresses motions to dismiss third-party complaints filed by Sea-Land Service, Inc. and Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc. The underlying action concerned personal injuries and wrongful death of David D. Swogger due to asbestos exposure while working as a marine engineer. The third-party complaints sought indemnity and/or contribution from manufacturers of asbestos products, shipyards that installed them, and other shipowners, arguing their negligence created the unsafe conditions. The central legal question was whether federal admiralty law applied, which would allow these claims, or if New York's General Obligations Law § 15-108 barred them. The court determined that admiralty jurisdiction was established, satisfying both the 'locality' and 'maritime nexus' requirements by focusing on the injured party's maritime activities. Consequently, federal admiralty law governs, denying the third-party defendants' motions to dismiss.

Jones ActMaritime LawAdmiralty JurisdictionAsbestos ExposurePersonal InjuryWrongful DeathMesotheliomaIndemnificationContributionThird-Party Action
References
25
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Employers Casualty Co. v. Texas Attorney General

This case involves an appeal by Employers Casualty Company (Employers) against a trial court's order mandating the withholding of Michael Toliver's workers' compensation benefits to satisfy his child support obligations. Employers argued that the applicable law at the time of Toliver's injury in 1990, Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 8306, § 3(b), exempted such benefits from garnishment or withholding. The Texas Attorney General countered, arguing for the application of a newer statute, article 8308-4.08(b), or that legislative intent supported the withholding. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the law in effect at the time of injury governs the case, and therefore, Employers is not required to withhold the benefits. However, the court clarified that the benefits are still available for child support directly from Michael Toliver after he receives them.

Workers' Compensation BenefitsChild Support EnforcementWithholding OrderStatutory InterpretationRetroactivity of LawExemption from GarnishmentAppellate ReviewTexas LawInsurance LawDate of Injury Rule
References
14
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 13, 2000

Rosenberg v. Ben Krupinski General Contractors, Inc.

Robert Rosenberg, an employee of an alarm company, was allegedly injured after tripping over cardboard at a construction site. He and his wife sued Ben Krupinski General Contractors, Inc. (the general contractor) and Dave Mims Fifth Generation Painting Contractors (a subcontractor) under Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6). The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Mims but denied Krupinski's motion for similar relief. On appeal, the order was modified; Krupinski's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 claim was granted, as Krupinski established it had no authority to control the activity causing the injury. However, the motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim was properly denied due to triable issues of fact regarding whether the accident occurred in a passageway or work area and whether specific regulations (12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) or (2)) were violated, and whether Krupinski was still the general contractor at the time of the accident.

Personal InjuryConstruction AccidentGeneral Contractor LiabilitySummary JudgmentSafe Place to WorkAppellate DivisionTriable Issue of FactLabor Law CompliancePremises LiabilitySubcontractor
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Gonzalez v. Armac Industries, Ltd.

Marvin Gonzalez, a citizen of Honduras, sustained personal injuries while employed by General Thermoforming Corp. (GTC), operating machinery manufactured by Armac Industries. Following Gonzalez's complaint, defendant/third-party plaintiff Armac filed a third-party complaint against GTC for contribution and indemnification. GTC subsequently moved to dismiss or for summary judgment against Armac's claims. The court found that a stipulation between Gonzalez and Armac, which fixed Armac's liability at 2%, constituted a release under New York General Obligations Law § 15-108, thus barring Armac’s contribution claim against GTC. Consequently, GTC's motion regarding the contribution claim was granted, while its motion concerning the indemnification claim was denied due to insufficient evidence to show an absence of material fact.

Contribution ClaimIndemnification ClaimSummary JudgmentMotion to DismissThird-Party ClaimsGeneral Obligations Law § 15-108Workers' Compensation Law § 29Personal InjurySettlement StipulationLiquidating Agreement
References
11
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