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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 24-BC01B-0007
Regular Panel Decision
Oct 31, 2024

Synergy Global Outsourcing, LLC v. Hinduja Global Solutions, Inc., and HGS Healthcare, LLC

This case concerns a commercial dispute over unpaid commissions, initiated by Synergy Global Outsourcing, LLC against Hinduja Global Solutions, Inc. and HGS Healthcare, LLC. The plaintiff removed the action, originally filed in the 191st Judicial District Court of Dallas County in 2019, to the newly established First Business Court Division for Dallas County in October 2024. The defendants subsequently filed a motion to remand, contending that the Business Court's jurisdiction, as defined by H.B. 19, is restricted to civil actions commenced on or after September 1, 2024. The Business Court granted the remand motion, ruling that the plain text of H.B. 19, Section 8, indeed limits its authority to cases filed from September 1, 2024, onwards, thus preventing it from hearing the plaintiff's pre-existing case. The Relator (Synergy) argues this interpretation is a clear abuse of discretion, asserting that H.B. 19 is a procedural statute intended to apply to ongoing matters and that Section 8 merely signifies the court's operational commencement date. The Relator is pursuing mandamus relief, arguing that there is no adequate remedy by conventional appeal.

MandamusBusiness CourtJurisdiction DisputeStatutory InterpretationRetroactivityTexas LawCommercial LitigationRemand OrderAppellate ProcedureEffective Date of Statute
References
20
Case No. 08-23-00033-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 17, 2024

Mountain View Health & Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Creative Solutions in Healthcare, Inc., and Lidia Moya v. Mary Horton Keele

Appellee Mary Horton Keele sued Appellants Mountain View Health & Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Creative Solutions in Healthcare, Inc., and Lidia Moya (collectively, Premises Parties), alleging she slipped and fell on their premises as an employee. The Premises Parties moved to compel arbitration, citing an employer-employee arbitration agreement Keele had signed, which referred to her employer as "the facility" or "the company." The trial court denied the motion, leading to this appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Keele's admission of signing the agreement and her own pleadings identifying the Premises Parties as her employer bound her to arbitrate. The court reasoned that Keele could not dispute the agreement's authenticity or avoid arbitration by raising factual disputes about her employer’s correct legal name, given her admissions.

Arbitration AgreementEmployer-Employee DisputeSlip and FallPremises LiabilityMeeting of the MindsJudicial AdmissionsAppellate ReviewTexas LawContract InterpretationAuthenticity of Documents
References
27
Case No. 01-04-01088-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 23, 2005

Universal Computer Consulting, Ltd. Universal Computer Services, Inc. And Dealer Computer Services, Inc. v. Dealer Solutions, L.L.C., Dealer Solutions Holdings, Inc. ADP, Inc., Business Solutions, Inc., SMC Investment, Inc., Southwest Toyota, Inc., and SMC Luxury Cars, Inc.

This trade secrets case involves Appellants Universal Computer Systems, Inc. (UCS) and Appellees Dealer Solutions, L.L.C., Dealer Solutions Holdings, Inc., ADP, Inc., SMC Investment, Inc., Southwest Toyota, Inc., SMC Luxury Cars, Inc., and Business Solutions, Inc. (collectively DSI). The parties had a dispute regarding trade secret misappropriation and a breach of a license agreement, which they agreed to arbitrate. The trial court confirmed the arbitrators' decision, which UCS appealed, alleging improper discovery orders and 'gross mistakes' by the arbitrators. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's confirmation, finding that any error in the trial court's discovery order was ameliorated by the arbitrators' full consideration of evidence, and that UCS failed to demonstrate gross mistake in the arbitration decision.

Trade secretsArbitrationDiscovery sanctionsArbitration awardCopyright preemptionSoftware licensingConfidentiality agreementBreach of contractGross mistakeTexas General Arbitration Act
References
21
Case No. CA 13-01105
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 14, 2014

KALEIDA HEALTH v. UNIVERA HEALTHCARE

This case concerns an appeal by Utica Mutual Insurance Company from a judgment that denied its motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Kaleida Health and Univera Healthcare. The judgment declared Utica obligated to pay an outstanding hospital bill to Kaleida Health. Utica argued that collateral estoppel applied due to a Workers' Compensation Board determination, but the court found Kaleida Health and Univera Healthcare were not parties to that proceeding. Utica also contended the action was barred by arbitration, which was rejected as not compulsory. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, concluding Utica was responsible for the hospital bill as the patient's admission was a continuation of treatment for a work-related injury.

Workers' CompensationHospital BillCollateral EstoppelSummary JudgmentArbitrationPublic Health LawAppellate PracticeInsurance ObligationWork-Related InjuryHealth Care Provider
References
3
Case No. 13-09-00128-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 09, 2011

Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Bill Head D/B/A Bill Head Enterprises and Titeflex Corporation

The case involves an appeal by Petroleum Solutions, Inc. (PSI) against Bill Head d/b/a Bill Head Enterprises (Head) and Titeflex, Inc., regarding a jury verdict stemming from a significant diesel fuel leak at Head's truck stop. PSI challenged trial court sanctions for spoliation of evidence, and findings related to Head's claims of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and breach of contract, as well as Titeflex's indemnification claims. The appellate court affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of Head and Titeflex, finding sufficient evidence for PSI's breach of duties and product liability. However, the court reversed and remanded for a recalculation of prejudgment interest.

Diesel leakUnderground storage tankEnvironmental regulationsSpoliation of evidenceFiduciary dutyBreach of contractFraudIndemnificationProduct liabilityAttorney's fees
References
153
Case No. 05-18-00188-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 16, 2019

Global Supply Chain Solutions, LLC v. Riverwood Solutions, Inc., and Lori Austin

This case involves a dispute between Global Supply Chain Solutions, LLC (Global Supply) and Riverwood Solutions, Inc. (Riverwood) and Lori Austin. After failed merger talks, Global Supply sued Riverwood for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference, also seeking injunctive relief against Austin. Key issues included whether Austin was an employee or independent contractor, if Riverwood breached non-solicitation clauses, and the application of the 'inevitable disclosure' doctrine for trade secrets. The trial court granted summary judgment for Riverwood and Austin and struck Global Supply's expert witnesses. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding no reversible error in the summary judgment rulings or the striking of expert witnesses, and upheld the award of attorney's fees to Austin.

Breach of ContractTrade Secrets MisappropriationTortious InterferenceIndependent ContractorNon-Solicitation AgreementSummary JudgmentExpert Witness TestimonyInevitable Disclosure DoctrineDeclaratory JudgmentAttorney's Fees
References
30
Case No. 02-25-00220-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Oct 23, 2025

1 Solar Solution, LLC and Mohammad Ali Samana v. S&A Wholesale Inc., D.B.A. Trendy Energy Solutions and Trendy Communications

Appellee S&A Wholesale Inc., d/b/a Trendy Energy Solutions and Trendy Communications (Trendy), obtained a default judgment against Appellants 1 Solar Solution, LLC and Mohammad Ali Samana. Appellants argued that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set aside the default judgment, claiming they satisfied the Craddock factors. The trial court denied their motion. The appellate court reviewed the denial of the new-trial motion for abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the appellants' explanation for failing to answer did not negate conscious indifference.

Default JudgmentCraddock FactorsMotion for New TrialAbuse of DiscretionConscious IndifferenceAccident or MistakeAppellate ReviewTexas Civil ProcedureFailure to AppearLegal Representation
References
23
Case No. 07-12-00328-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 14, 2014

Janet Bontke, Individually and as Guardian of the Estate and Person of Nolan Bontke, a Ward v. Cargill Meat Logistics Solution, Inc., Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation and Tulia Feed Lot, Inc.

Janet Bontke, individually and as guardian of Nolan Bontke, appealed a trial court judgment denying recovery against Cargill Meat Logistics Solution, Inc., Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation, and Tulia Feed Lot, Inc. Nolan Bontke, an independent contractor, sustained injuries while loading a steer at Tulia Feed Lot when he was struck by an agitated animal. The appeal raised issues concerning references to insurance, the exclusion of a rebuttal expert witness, the classification of cattle handling as inherently dangerous, and the factual sufficiency of the jury's negligence findings. The appellate court overruled all of Bontke's issues and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

negligenceindependent contractorcattle handlinginherently dangerous activityevidence admissionexpert witness exclusionfactual sufficiencyappealTexaspersonal injury
References
26
Case No. 08-06-00153-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 27, 2008

David J. Quick v. Plastics Solutions of Texas, Inc., a Texas Corporation Plastics Solutions Molding, Inc., a Texas Corporation Kurt H. Ruppman, Sr., Individually and Fairfield Enterprises, Inc.

Appellant David J. Quick appealed a take-nothing judgment concerning contract claims against Plastic Solutions of Texas, Inc., Plastic Solutions Molding, Inc., Kurt H. Ruppman, Sr., and Fairfield Enterprises, Inc. Quick, a certified public accountant, sought royalties based on an agreement related to Ruppman's patented cryogenic technology. The trial court interpreted the "Royalty Revenue Agreement" to limit Quick's interest to licensing income derived from a specific heat-set/barrier blow molding technology process after January 23, 1997, and found no such income. The court also concluded that Quick's breach of contract claim was barred by failure of consideration and prior material breach due to his cessation of services. The Eighth District of Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on all issues, including the contract interpretation and the award of attorney's fees to Fairfield.

Contract lawRoyalty agreementBreach of contractDeclaratory judgmentFailure of considerationPrior material breachAttorney's feesAppellate reviewContract interpretationPatent licensing
References
47
Case No. 03-03-00704-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 21, 2005

Texas Mutual Insurance Company// Eckerd Corporation H.E. Butt Grocery Company Third-Party Solutions, Inc. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Apollo Enterprises, Inc. And Walgreen Company v. Eckerd Corporation H.E. Butt Grocery Company Third-Party Solutions, Inc. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Apollo Enterprises, Inc. And Walgreen Company//Cross-Appellee,Texas Mutual Insurance Company

This case involves cross-appeals concerning whether an insurance company must first exhaust administrative remedies under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act before filing a lawsuit for alleged overcharges by health care providers. Appellant Texas Mutual Insurance Company sued several pharmacies and billing companies for negligent misrepresentation and money had and received, claiming they over-billed for prescription drugs. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but granted partial summary judgment against Texas Mutual. The Court of Appeals, relying on prior precedent, determined that the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission holds exclusive jurisdiction over medical fee disputes within the Act's pervasive regulatory scheme. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's judgment, concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction as Texas Mutual had not exhausted its administrative remedies.

Workers' Compensation ActAdministrative RemediesExclusive JurisdictionMedical Fee DisputesPharmaceutical Fee GuidelineOverbillingNegligent MisrepresentationMoney Had and ReceivedStatutory InterpretationAppellate Review
References
10
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