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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 03-10-00709-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 31, 2011

Green Tree Servicing, LLC, as Authorized Servicing Agent for Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation v. Travis County

Green Tree Servicing, LLC appealed a post-answer default judgment concerning ad valorem taxes on mobile homes. The original suit was filed by Travis County and other entities against Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation, later substituted with Green Tree. Green Tree failed to appear at trial, resulting in a default judgment. Green Tree filed a motion for new trial, asserting its failure to appear was due to an accident or mistake (attorney transition) and that it had a meritorious defense, arguing that as a repossessing lienholder and not an owner, it was not liable for the taxes under Texas Tax Code Ann. § 32.07. The appellate court applied the Craddock test and found that Green Tree satisfied all three elements. The court adopted the interpretation that a repossessing lienholder is not considered an 'owner' under the tax code. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

Post-answer default judgmentAd valorem taxesMobile homesLienholder liabilityProperty ownershipMeritorious defenseCraddock testNew trialStatutory interpretationTexas Tax Code
References
22
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Volt Technical Services Corp. v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

Plaintiff Volt Technical Services Corp. applied for H-2 visas for nuclear start-up technicians, which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied, asserting the need was permanent, not temporary. After the denial was affirmed on appeal, Volt filed suit, alleging the INS's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court upheld the INS's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), which requires the employer's need for services to be temporary, not just the individual assignments. Finding that Volt demonstrated a recurring need for such technicians over several years, the court granted the INS's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Volt's.

Immigration LawH-2 visasNonimmigrant WorkersTemporary EmploymentImmigration and Nationality ActAdministrative Procedures ActDeclaratory Judgment ActAgency InterpretationJudicial ReviewNuclear Industry
References
5
Case No. 15-25-00012-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 17, 2025

State of Texas, Acting by and Through the Texas Facilities Commission, for and on Behalf of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission; The Texas Facilities Commission; Mike Novak, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Texas Facilities Commission; The Texas Health and Human Services Commission; And Rolland Niles in His Official Capacity as Deputy Executive Commissioner for the System Support Services Division of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. 8317 Cross Park, LLC

This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial-in-part of Appellants’ plea to the jurisdiction. Appellee filed an action against the State of Texas, TFC, HHSC, Executive Director Mike Novak of TFC, and Deputy Executive Commissioner for System Support Services Division of HHSC Rolland Niles alleging causes of action for breach of lease, ultra vires conduct related to the termination of the lease, and declaratory relief. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their plea because Chapter 114 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code does not waive sovereign immunity for the State of Texas, HHSC, or TFC for breach of lease claims, and the lease is not a contract for goods or services covered by Chapter 114. Furthermore, Appellants contend that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) does not waive sovereign immunity for Appellee's declaratory judgment claim as it does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of a statute, and Appellee has not alleged a cognizable ultra vires claim against the state officials. Appellants seek reversal of the partial denial of their plea to the jurisdiction and dismissal of Appellee's claims.

Sovereign ImmunityBreach of LeaseDeclaratory JudgmentUltra ViresTexas Civil Practices and Remedies CodeTexas Government CodeAppellate ProcedureJurisdictionState AgenciesContract Law
References
44
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Superior Snubbing Services, Inc. v. Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc.

Superior Snubbing Services, Inc. appealed a summary judgment granted in favor of Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc. The case originated from an injury sustained by a Superior employee, Daryll Faulk, while working under a Master Service Agreement between Superior and Mitchell Energy Corporation (now Devon Energy Operating, L.P.). Faulk sued Energy and others, leading to a settlement, after which Energy and Mitchell sought indemnity from Superior based on the contract. Superior argued that Energy's claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Texas Labor Code and the contract was unenforceable under the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that under Texas Labor Code section 417.004, third-party beneficiaries like Energy are not permissible indemnitees because the agreement was not directly with the 'third party'.

Workers' CompensationIndemnificationContractual LiabilityTexas Labor CodeOilfield Anti-Indemnity ActSummary JudgmentStatutory InterpretationThird-Party BeneficiaryAppellate ReviewReverse and Remand
References
12
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Americredit Financial Services, Inc. v. Oxford Management Services

AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. (AmeriCredit) commenced an action to confirm an arbitration award against Oxford Management Services (OMS). OMS cross-moved to vacate the award, alleging the arbitrator exceeded his powers by dismissing a counterclaim and manifestly disregarded the law. The arbitrator had dismissed OMS's counterclaim for spoilation of evidence. The Court affirmed the arbitrator's decision, finding he did not exceed his authority under the RSA by dismissing the counterclaim or by interpreting the contract terms regarding account termination. The Court also found no manifest disregard for the law, concluding the arbitrator's decision was rationally supported by the record. Consequently, AmeriCredit's motion to confirm the award was granted, and OMS's motion to vacate was denied.

Arbitration Award ConfirmationArbitration Award VacaturFederal Arbitration ActManifest Disregard of LawArbitrator PowersSpoilation of EvidenceContract InterpretationCollection Agency DisputeSummary ProceedingJudicial Review of Arbitration
References
41
Case No. 15-25-00013-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 07, 2025

State of Texas, the Texas Facilities Commission, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, Mike Novak, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the TFC, and Rolland Niles, in His Official Capacity as Deputy Executive Commissioner for the System Support Services Division of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Broadmoor Austin Associates, a Texas Joint Venture

Broadmoor Austin Associates leased office space to the Texas government, specifically the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC), through the Texas Facilities Commission (TFC). Rent has been unpaid for nearly two years due to alleged misconduct by state officials. Broadmoor asserts that sovereign immunity does not bar its claims for breach of contract, citing Chapter 114's express waiver for contracts involving construction and related services. Additionally, Broadmoor brings ultra vires claims against TFC Executive Director Mike Novak and HHSC Deputy Executive Commissioner Roland Niles, alleging their actions were beyond legal authority or a failure to perform ministerial duties. Broadmoor seeks prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to ensure these officials comply with state law, specifically regarding the availability of appropriated funds for the lease.

Sovereign ImmunityBreach of ContractUltra Vires DoctrineState AgenciesGovernment ContractsLease AgreementsLegislative AppropriationsExecutive AuthorityJudicial ReviewTexas Facilities Commission
References
69
Case No. 09-20-00185-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 10, 2020

in Re FW Services, Inc. D/B/A Pacesetter Personnel Services

FW Services, Inc., operating as Pacesetter Personnel Services, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction and abate a personal injury suit. The suit was filed by Pacesetter's employee, Anthony Snowden, who alleged negligence against Pacesetter and a co-employee, Joshua Dancurtis Franklin. Pacesetter argued that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy and required abatement until the workers' compensation proceedings before the DWC concluded. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion by not abating the negligence suit while the DWC had active jurisdiction over the workers' compensation claim. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandamus was conditionally granted.

MandamusAbatementWorkers' CompensationExclusive RemedyPlea to JurisdictionPersonal InjuryScope of EmploymentTrial Court DiscretionAppellate ReviewOriginal Proceeding
References
2
Case No. 13-25-00001-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 05, 2025

In Re Baseline Energy Services, LP and Baseline Services, LLC v. the State of Texas

Billy Tom Martin initiated an employment dispute in Hidalgo County against Baseline Energy Services, LP and Baseline Services LLC, alleging various forms of discrimination and workers' compensation retaliation. The defendant entities, referred to as relators, filed a motion to transfer venue to Tarrant County, asserting mandatory venue provisions for libel and injunctive relief, and challenging Martin's residency claim. The trial court denied the relators' motion without their counsel present, leading to this petition for writ of mandamus. The appellate court determined that Martin failed to provide prima facie proof for venue in Hidalgo County and that mandatory venue for the defamation claim resided in Tarrant County, where relators were domiciled. Consequently, the Court of Appeals conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate its order and transfer the case to Tarrant County.

MandamusVenue TransferEmployment LawDiscriminationRetaliationLibelInjunctive ReliefTexas Civil Practice and Remedies CodeHidalgo CountyTarrant County
References
47
Case No. 11-24-00054-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 12, 2026

Lone Star Well Service LLC v. RMTDC Operations D/B/A Total Energy Services, LLC and Daniel Ramirez

This appeal concerns the application of the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (TOAIA) to an oilfield indemnity agreement. Lone Star Well Service LLC appealed a judgment that obligated it to defend and indemnify RMTDC Operations d/b/a Total Energy Services, LLC and Daniel Ramirez. The appellate court affirmed that Total and Ramirez are third-party beneficiaries to Lone Star's Master Services Agreement with Parsley Energy Operations, LLC, and thus are covered by the mutual, insurance-backed indemnity obligations. However, the court reversed the judgment in part, remanding the case to the trial court to determine the specific amount and limitation of Lone Star's indemnity obligation.

Oilfield Anti-Indemnity ActIndemnity AgreementThird-Party BeneficiaryContractual InterpretationMutual Indemnity ObligationInsurance CoverageAppellate ReviewDeclaratory JudgmentAttorney's FeesRipeness Doctrine
References
47
Case No. 05-0202
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 24, 2007

Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc. v. Superior Snubbing Services, Inc.

Daryll Faulk, an employee of Superior Snubbing Services, Inc., was injured and subsequently sued Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc., among others. Energy later settled with Faulk and sought indemnity from Superior, based on an indemnity provision in Superior's contract with Mitchell Energy Corporation. The dissenting opinion addresses whether Texas Labor Code section 417.004 allows Energy to claim indemnity from Superior when no direct written indemnity agreement existed between them. Justice Johnson, in dissent, argues for a literal interpretation of the statute, stating that it requires a direct contractual agreement between the employer and the third party for indemnity liability. The dissent asserts that this interpretation aligns with legislative intent, particularly the 1989 workers' compensation reforms aimed at reducing employer costs and preserving employer immunity from common-law claims. It further contends that the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (TOAIA) does not negate this workers' compensation provision. The dissenting opinion concludes by stating it would affirm the court of appeals' judgment, thereby denying Energy's indemnity claim against Superior.

Workers' CompensationIndemnity AgreementsStatutory InterpretationThird-Party LiabilityTexas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity ActEmployer ImmunityLegislative IntentContract LawDissenting OpinionSupreme Court of Texas
References
17
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