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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. M2003-00178-COA-R3-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 21, 2004

Judy S. Parnell v. APCOM, Inc.

The case involves Judy S. Parnell's claims of breach of contract and Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA) violations against her former employer, APCOM, Inc., and other defendants, following her termination. While the Court of Appeals of Tennessee initially found the trial court erred in dismissing the THRA claim as time-barred under the savings statute, it ultimately affirmed the dismissal of all claims. Parnell failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the THRA, as she was not replaced by someone outside her protected class. Additionally, the appellate court upheld the trial court's finding that no enforceable contract existed for her promotion, and her promissory estoppel claim lacked substantial economic detriment from reliance. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims is affirmed.

DiscriminationEmployment LawBreach of ContractPromissory EstoppelTennessee Human Rights ActSavings StatuteStatute of LimitationsSummary JudgmentPrima Facie CaseAge Discrimination
References
34
Case No. 03-14-00819-CV
Regular Panel Decision

Judy Weirich v. IESI Corporation and Southside Wrecker, Inc.

This case involves an appeal from a summary judgment in a 'road hazard' case. Appellant Judy Weirich alleges property damage and bodily injury when a wheel detached from an IESI Corporation garbage truck, being towed by Southside Wrecker, Inc., and struck her vehicle. The 424th Judicial District Court of Blanco County, Texas, granted no-evidence summary judgment for IESI Corporation on November 12, 2014, and for Southside Wrecker, Inc. on December 8, 2014. IESI Corporation, as appellee, argues that Weirich's affidavit, her sole summary judgment evidence, was conclusory and speculative, failing to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding duty, breach, or proximate cause for negligence or gross negligence. IESI contends that the appellate court has jurisdiction and that the trial court's striking of Weirich's affidavit statements and the subsequent granting of summary judgment were correct and should be affirmed.

Summary Judgment AppealRoad HazardNegligenceGross NegligenceProximate CauseAffidavit EvidenceSufficiency of EvidenceAppellate JurisdictionNo-Evidence MotionTexas Law
References
22
Case No. 2018-01-0756
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 23, 2019

Judy, Kevin v. Covenant Transport, Inc.

Kevin Judy, an employee, filed a Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD) against Covenant Transport, Inc., and New Hampshire Insurance Company, alleging a bilateral wrist injury. Covenant Transport, Inc. moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Judy's PBD was filed more than one year after their last payment for his claimed work injury, thus exceeding the statute of limitations. The Court found that Covenant last paid medical expenses on September 1, 2017, and Mr. Judy filed his PBD on October 23, 2018, which is more than one year later. The Court determined that Mr. Judy failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the expiration of the limitations period. Therefore, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Covenant Transport, Inc. and dismissed Mr. Judy's claim with prejudice to its refiling.

Summary JudgmentStatute of LimitationsPetition for Benefit DeterminationWorkers' Compensation ClaimLast Payment DateUntimely FilingClaim DismissalBilateral Wrist InjuryEmployer DefenseMedical Expenses
References
1
Case No. 04-24-00386-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 26, 2025

In Re Texas Mutual Insurance Company, Judy Bond, and Allstate County Mutual Insurance v. the State of Texas

Edward Santos filed a lawsuit against Texas Mutual Insurance Company, Judy Bond, and Allstate County Mutual Insurance, alleging liability for his injuries being compensated through workers' compensation benefits, thereby limiting liability under other coverages. Texas Mutual and Bond challenged the trial court's denial of their pleas to the jurisdiction, arguing that the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation (the Division) had exclusive jurisdiction over Santos's claims. The Fourth Court of Appeals found that Santos's claims against Texas Mutual and Bond, predicated on the improper investigation, handling, or settlement of his workers' compensation claim, fell within the Division's exclusive jurisdiction, and he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Consequently, the Court conditionally granted the petition for a writ of mandamus for Texas Mutual and Bond, directing the trial court to dismiss claims against them. However, the Court denied Allstate's petition, as Santos's claims against Allstate involved a liability claim against a non-workers' compensation carrier, which did not abrogate the Division's exclusive jurisdiction by re-litigating the course and scope of employment question.

MandamusWorkers' CompensationExclusive JurisdictionAdministrative RemediesPlea to the JurisdictionInsurance CodeDeceptive Trade Practices ActFraudConspiracyEmployer Liability
References
25
Case No. 2023-03-3926
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 25, 2024

Williams, Judy v. Tennessee Farmers Cooperative Risk Management d/b/a Smoky Mountain Farmers Cooperative

This interlocutory appeal addresses a legal question concerning the application of the Social Security offset in Tennessee workers' compensation cases. Judy Williams, an employee, suffered a work-related arm injury while already receiving Social Security retirement benefits. The employer, Tennessee Farmers Cooperative Risk Management, sought to apply a statutory offset which would reduce Williams' weekly workers' compensation rate below the mandated minimum. The trial court determined that despite the offset provision, the employer must still pay the minimum weekly benefit. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the trial court's decision, modifying only the finding regarding vocational disability stipulation, concluding that permanent disability benefits cannot be reduced below the statutory minimum weekly benefit by the Social Security offset, and remanded the case.

Workers' Compensation LawSocial Security OffsetMinimum Weekly BenefitPermanent Total DisabilityStatutory ConstructionInterlocutory AppealSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewEmployer ContributionsHumerus Fracture
References
13
Case No. Rutherford Circuit No. 31613; Appeal No. 01A01-9709-CV-00531
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 02, 1998

Allen E. Hasty, Judy Darlene Hasty v. Thomas R. Throneberry, Ind., D/B/A Throneberry Properties and Sharon Clutter

Plaintiffs Allen E. Hasty and Judy Darlene Hasty sued Thomas R. Throneberry for wrongful eviction, outrageous conduct, and defamation. Hasty, a maintenance worker for Throneberry, was fired and subsequently evicted from an apartment provided as part of his compensation. Throneberry terminated electricity and changed locks, forcing Hasty out. Hasty claimed these actions, combined with a prior work-related car accident, caused Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and major depression, for which he had already received worker's compensation benefits. The trial court dismissed defamation and outrageous conduct claims but allowed the wrongful eviction claim and later permitted amendment to include intentional infliction of emotional distress. A jury awarded Hasty $500 for property loss and $10,000 for mental damages, attributing 55% of the latter to Throneberry's actions, resulting in a total judgment of $6,000. Throneberry appealed, arguing the relationship was employer-employee, not landlord-tenant, precluding wrongful eviction, and that PTSD recovery was barred by worker's compensation exclusivity and lack of medical certainty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that even if it was an employer-employee relationship, Throneberry had a duty to refrain from intentional, willful, or wanton conduct causing injury or loss, which Hasty's complaint alleged and the jury found. The court also ruled that worker's compensation exclusivity does not apply if the defendant intended to cause injury, which was alleged. Finally, Dr. Singh's testimony was found sufficient regarding causation, and apportionment of damages was a jury matter.

Wrongful EvictionIntentional Infliction of Emotional DistressEmployer-Employee RelationshipLandlord-Tenant DisputeWorkers' Compensation ExclusivityProximate CausationMedical Expert TestimonyPost-Traumatic Stress DisorderMajor DepressionComparative Fault
References
13
Case No. 01-15-00260-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 17, 2015

Joan DeYoung, Stephen DeYoung, M.D., and David DeYoung v. William L. Maynard, Individually and as of the Estate of Judy Page Maynard, and Maynard Properties, L.P.

The DeYoungs, who held ownership interests in Russell, Page & Partners, sued Judy Page Maynard, William L. Maynard, and Maynard Properties, L.P., alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of loyalty and care, conversion, and breach of contract. The lawsuit stemmed from the alleged transfer of partnership property to William L. Maynard and Maynard Properties, L.P., without adequate notice or compensation to the other partners. The trial court initially granted the Maynards' no-evidence motion for summary judgment, which was subsequently designated as a final judgment. As appellants, the DeYoungs argue on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by granting more relief than requested, failing to specify the elements of claims lacking evidence, improperly shifting the burden of proof on self-dealing, and disregarding competent evidence presented by the DeYoungs. They seek a reversal of the trial court's final judgment and a remand for trial on all asserted causes of action.

Summary JudgmentBreach of Fiduciary DutyDuty of Loyalty and CareConversionBreach of ContractReal Estate PartnershipProperty TransferSelf-DealingProcedural ErrorAppellate Procedure
References
30
Case No. ADJ1329489
Regular
Sep 06, 2011

CHAVA COHEN vs. SHERIDAN ASSISTED LIVING, INC., STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND

This case concerns vocational consultant Judie Fogel's request for reconsideration of a prior Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) decision. The WCAB previously rescinded an order for defendants to pay Fogel $1,700.00 for "medical legal expense for issues relating to the Ogilvie case," finding her testimony deficient and thus non-recoverable costs. Fogel argued her testimony addressed more than just Ogilvie issues, including average weekly wages, and that it was not necessary for her to independently calculate wage loss. The WCAB denied reconsideration, reiterating that Fogel was retained specifically for Ogilvie issues and her testimony remained deficient, citing precedent.

Vocational consultantReconsiderationOpinion and OrderMedical legal expenseOgilvie caseWage lossAverage weekly wagesPermanent disability ratingReimbursementEn banc decisions
References
4
Case No. M2011-00011-WC-R3-WC
Regular Panel Decision

Judy Kilburn v. Granite State Insurance Company

In this workers' compensation case, Charles Kilburn sustained work-related injuries and subsequently died due to an overdose of oxycodone combined with alcohol. His employer appealed a chancery court decision that found his death compensable. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, concluding that Mr. Kilburn's failure to adhere to prescribed medication dosages and his consumption of alcohol constituted an independent intervening cause of death, thereby severing the causal link to his work injury. The court weighed expert medical testimony regarding pain, anxiety, and addiction, and found the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding of compensability.

Workers' CompensationOverdoseOxycodone ToxicityAlcohol ConsumptionIndependent Intervening CauseCausationMedical Expert TestimonyAppellate ReviewPain ManagementNegligence
References
20
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Mullenix v. Eastman Chemical Co.

Plaintiff Judy Mullenix sued her former employer, Eastman Chemical Company, alleging discriminatory termination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) after a workplace injury left her with physical restrictions. The court denied Eastman's motion to strike Mullenix's affidavit. On Eastman's motion for summary judgment, the court denied summary judgment on Mullenix's claims of being "actually disabled" and "qualified for her position with reasonable accommodation," citing genuine issues of material fact regarding essential job functions and the reasonableness of requested assistance from Utility Operators. However, the court granted summary judgment to Eastman on the claims that Mullenix was "regarded as disabled" and for retaliation, finding no mistaken perception of disability and no causal link for retaliation.

ADA lawsuitEmployment discriminationWorkplace injuryPhysical restrictionsReasonable accommodationSummary judgment motionAffidavitRetaliation claimFederal Rules of Civil ProcedureSixth Circuit Court of Appeals
References
46
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