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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Austin v. Calhoon

Anderson Austin, a long-standing member of The National Marine Engineer’s Beneficial Association (MEBA), filed a suit against Jesse M. Calhoon, Chairman of the MEBA Pension Trust, seeking a disability pension. Austin, who had suffered from a duodenal ulcer since 1961, applied for the pension in 1967, but his application was rejected by the Board of Trustees in 1971 based on a medical judgment. Calhoon moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Austin's claim involved a uniquely private medical judgment rather than an issue of contract interpretation or union interests, thus falling outside the scope of Section 301 jurisdiction.

Labor Management Relations ActSection 301 LMRAPension BenefitsDisability PensionSubject Matter JurisdictionMotion to DismissCollective Bargaining AgreementMedical JudgmentIndividual RightsUnion Interests
References
7
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Keith Staulcup

This case involves an appeal by Keith Staulcup and entities associated with him (Staulcup defendants) against the Commissioners of the State Insurance Fund (SIF). The SIF sought to recover unpaid workers' compensation insurance premiums and damages for statutory and common-law fraud, alleging that Staulcup made material misrepresentations in the insurance application. The Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the SIF. On appeal, the court dismissed the appeal from the order, modified the judgment, and affirmed it as modified. The appellate court found a triable issue of fact regarding mutual mistake concerning the first cause of action for unpaid premiums, thus denying summary judgment on that specific claim. However, it upheld the summary judgment for the second and third causes of action related to fraud, concluding that Staulcup knowingly omitted crucial information.

Workers' CompensationInsurance PolicyUnpaid PremiumsSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewCorporate EntityPersonal LiabilityMutual MistakeStatutory FraudCommon-Law Fraud
References
12
Case No. 532151
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 09, 2021

In the Matter of the Claim of Keith Whitney

Claimant, Keith G. Whitney, established a workers' compensation claim for various injuries from a December 2013 slip and fall, leading to a recognized need for 24/7 home health aide services. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed a WCLJ decision finding claimant permanently totally disabled and entitled to ongoing home health aide services, rejecting the employer's arguments regarding apportionment with unrelated multiple sclerosis and the cessation of need after October 2017. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the finding of entitlement to ongoing home health aide services, noting the issue was conclusively decided. However, the Court modified the decision by reversing the award of reimbursement, remitting the matter to the Board to determine the rate and amount of reimbursement for services provided after October 6, 2017, and to address the employer's request for substantiation of services.

Workers' CompensationHome Health AideReimbursementPermanent Total DisabilityCausally-Related InjuryApportionmentJudicial ReviewAppellate PracticeStatutory InterpretationMedical Expenses
References
4
Case No. CA 12-01901
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 14, 2013

CUSTER, KEITH J. v. JORDAN, JONATHAN

Plaintiff Keith J. Custer sustained injuries after falling from a stepladder placed on scaffolding while installing siding on a single-family home. He initiated a Labor Law and common-law negligence action against Jonathan Jordan and Randy Ewings. The property was under a contract of sale between Ewings (seller) and Jordan (buyer), but Ewings retained title at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court initially granted Ewings' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim, and denied Custer's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the lower court's decision, finding that Ewings was an 'owner' for the purposes of Labor Law § 240 (1) because he retained title and derived commercial benefit, thus not qualifying for the homeowner exemption. The court further determined that Custer had met his burden for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) as he was engaged in protected activity, not furnished with requisite safety devices, and the absence of such devices was a proximate cause of his injuries. The claim against Ewings under Labor Law § 240 (1) was reinstated, and Custer's cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability was granted.

Labor Law 240(1)Owner LiabilityHomeowner ExemptionSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewConstruction AccidentFall from HeightScaffoldingStepladderWorker Injury
References
30
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance v. Austin

Plaintiff John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company sued defendant Barbara L. Austin under the Labor Management Relations Act and New York law, alleging violation of a Covenant Not to Compete, breach of contract, and tortious interference with business. Austin, a former employee, allegedly retained confidential John Hancock records and used them to induce former clients to cancel their policies after joining a competitor. Austin moved for summary judgment, asserting the covenant was unenforceable. The court, applying New York law based on federal common law principles, determined that the restrictive covenant was reasonable in scope, time, and purpose, aiming to protect John Hancock's legitimate interest in confidential customer information rather than broadly restraining competition. Therefore, the court denied Austin's motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact regarding Austin's actions and potential damages necessitate a trial.

Covenant Not to CompeteCollective Bargaining AgreementBreach of ContractTortious InterferenceSummary Judgment MotionFederal Common LawChoice of LawConfidential Customer InformationTrade SecretsRestrictive Covenants
References
35
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Keith v. Scruggs

Plaintiff William Bradford Keith sued Earl Scruggs and Peer International Corporation, alleging breach of an oral agreement from 1963 regarding a banjo instruction book and record album. Keith claimed he co-authored the works and was promised a share of profits and royalties, which he did not receive after Peer purchased the rights from Scruggs and published the works. He predicated federal jurisdiction on the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, seeking co-ownership of federal copyrights. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the claims do not 'arise under' copyright laws, a contention the court agreed with. The court ruled that actions to establish title do not arise under copyright laws, and the essence of Keith's claims was breach of contract or common law principles, thus belonging in state court, and consequently, the motion to dismiss was granted without prejudice.

Copyright LawFederal JurisdictionSubject Matter JurisdictionBreach of ContractOral AgreementCo-ownership of CopyrightLiterary PropertyMusic PublishingMotion to DismissCopyright Act of 1909
References
9
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Austin v. Delligatti

The petitioner, Leonard B. Austin, a Democratic candidate for Supervisor of the Town of Oyster Bay, initiated a proceeding under CPLR article 4 against 'the respondents', alleging false and fraudulent campaign conduct. Austin contended that various campaign signs and literature using the word 'return' in connection with Angelo Delligatti were misleading, as Delligatti was not the incumbent. Austin sought an order for the removal of these materials, prevention of further distribution, and monetary damages for corrective advertising. The court, presided over by Justice Vincent R. Balletta, Jr., dismissed the petition, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court's powers in election matters are limited by Election Law Article 16 and that an aggrieved party must first exhaust administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the State Board of Elections under the Fair Campaign Code (9 NYCRR 6201.1 et seq.). The court also clarified that it possesses no inherent equitable powers in election cases and should not intervene in policing campaign literature, even when Election Day is imminent.

Election LawFair Campaign CodeJudicial JurisdictionAdministrative ExhaustionCampaign MisrepresentationsPolitical AdvertisingFirst Amendment RightsEquitable ReliefSummary ProceedingsNew York State Elections
References
22
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Keith v. Black Diamond Advisors, Inc.

Marvin Keith ("Plaintiff") initiated a multi-count action against Black Diamond Advisors, Inc., Pace Holdings, LLC, Steven Deckoff, and James Walker III ("Defendants"), alleging various claims including breach of contract, fraud, and violations of federal securities laws. Keith asserted subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship and a federal question. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing a lack of complete diversity among the parties and the inapplicability of federal securities laws to the dispute. The court ruled that complete diversity was absent because Pace, a New York LLC, is treated as an unincorporated entity whose citizenship is determined by all its members, including the Plaintiff. Furthermore, the court found that Keith's membership interests in Pace and his acquired Eagle interests did not constitute "securities" under federal law, as he retained a degree of control inconsistent with being a passive investor. Consequently, Keith's federal securities fraud claims were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Securities FraudSubject Matter JurisdictionDiversity JurisdictionLimited Liability CompanyInvestment ContractSecurities Exchange Act of 1934Rule 10b-5Federal Question JurisdictionState Law ClaimsComplete Diversity
References
40
Case No. CA 12-01554
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 26, 2013

SMITH, PAUL J. v. NESTLE PURINA PETCARE COMPANY

Paul J. Smith, a plaintiff, sued Nestle Purina Petcare Company (Nestle) for injuries sustained after slipping and falling in a grain silo during a construction project. Nestle then initiated a third-party action against E.E. Austin & Son, Inc. (Austin), Smith's employer. The Supreme Court denied motions for summary judgment from Nestle and Austin. On appeal, the Appellate Division modified the order, granting summary judgment to Nestle and Austin on Labor Law § 240 (1) and most of § 241 (6) claims, finding the injury unrelated to ladder use and certain regulations inapplicable. However, the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim based on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (2), the Labor Law § 200/common-law negligence claims, and the contractual indemnification claim between Nestle and Austin due to unresolved factual issues regarding Nestle's negligence.

Labor LawWorkplace InjuryConstruction AccidentSummary JudgmentContractual IndemnificationAppellate DivisionPremises LiabilityNegligenceSlip and FallGrain Silo
References
24
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Smith v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co.

Plaintiff, an employee of E.E. Austin & Son, Inc., sustained injuries after slipping and falling on accumulated grain dust and a hose while working on a construction project at a grain silo owned by Nestle Purina Petcare Company. Plaintiff commenced an action against Nestle Purina Petcare Company, alleging Labor Law violations and common-law negligence. Nestle, in turn, filed a third-party action against Austin for contractual indemnification. The Supreme Court denied motions for summary judgment from both Nestle and Austin, leading to this appeal and cross-appeal. The appellate court modified the lower court's order, granting summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim and partially dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim (except for the part based on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (2)). However, the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment regarding the Labor Law § 200 claim, common-law negligence, and contractual indemnification, citing triable issues of fact.

Labor LawCommon-law negligenceSummary judgmentContractual indemnificationGrain silo accidentConstruction project injuryTripping hazardPremises liabilitySupervisory controlIndemnity provision
References
27
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