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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

State, Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Reynolds-Land, Inc.

This is a summary judgment case where the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation (Department) sought indemnity from Reynolds-Land, Inc. (Reynolds-Land) based on a written agreement. An employee of Reynolds-Land, Grover Hicks, was injured and received workers' compensation benefits from Texas Employers’ Insurance Association (TEIA). Hicks then sued the Department for negligence, and TEIA intervened for subrogation. The Department settled with Hicks and TEIA, paying $25,000 to TEIA for its subrogation interest. The Department then filed a third-party action against Reynolds-Land for indemnity for this $25,000 payment. Reynolds-Land moved for summary judgment, arguing the indemnity agreement only covered its own negligence and not the Department's, and that the 'express negligence doctrine' from Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Const. Co. was not met. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against the Department, ruling that the indemnity clause lacked the specificity required by the express negligence doctrine to cover the Department's own alleged negligence.

Indemnity AgreementSummary JudgmentExpress Negligence DoctrineWorkers' CompensationSubrogationContractual InterpretationThird-Party ActionEmployer LiabilityAppellate ReviewTexas Law
References
1
Case No. 06-21-00083-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 29, 2022

Sugar Land Urban Air, LLC, UATP Management, LLC, Zoya Enterprises, Ltd., and UA Holdings, LLC v. Hamza Lakhani

Hamza Lakhani, an appellee, initiated a personal injury lawsuit against Sugar Land Urban Air, LLC and several other entities (appellants) after suffering injuries at an adventure park. The appellants sought to compel arbitration based on a release signed by Lakhani. The trial court denied this motion. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial for UATP, Zoya, and UA, concluding no valid arbitration agreement existed between them and Lakhani. However, the court found the arbitration agreement enforceable against Sugar Land Urban Air, LLC, but severed a provision that prohibited the award of punitive or exemplary damages, deeming it unconscionable. The case was subsequently reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to compel arbitration for Lakhani's claims against Sugar Land Urban Air, LLC, consistent with the modified agreement.

ArbitrationPersonal InjuryContract LawUnconscionabilityPunitive DamagesExemplary DamagesSeverability ClauseFederal Arbitration Act (FAA)Gross NegligenceAppellate Decision
References
42
Case No. 04-24-00757-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 04, 2026

Luckenbach Ranch, LLC and Firefly Partners, LLC D/B/A Firefly Partners Land, LLC v. Troy Bowling and Kim Bowling

This case involves an appeal by Luckenbach Ranch, LLC and Firefly Partners, LLC from a final judgment recognizing and defining a road easement in favor of Troy Bowling and Kim Bowling. The dispute originated from a 2019 private road maintenance agreement between Wendy Williams (seller of a portion of land to the Bowlings and later the remainder to Luckenbach) and the Bowlings. The appellants argued that the agreement violated the statute of frauds due to an insufficient description of the easement and that the scope of the easement was too narrow. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the agreement sufficiently identified the servient estate for the express easement and that the language 'access and maintain road entry for easement purposes' was sufficient to grant a road easement. The court also addressed the relocation of the easement's entrance, noting it was declared in the final judgment following a bench trial where Luckenbach stipulated to the move.

Easement LawStatute of FraudsExpress EasementEasement by EstoppelEstoppel by DeedProperty LawReal EstateSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewRoad Easement
References
16
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Merrill Lynch Realty Associates, Inc. v. Burr

Merrill Lynch Realty Carll Burr, Inc. (MLRCB) and Merrill Lynch Realty Associates, Inc. (MLRA) sued Carll S. Burr III and other defendants over the use of the 'Burr' name in real estate. The dispute originated from a 1980 acquisition agreement and a subsequent employment contract with restrictive covenants. A previous settlement in 1984 also restricted Carll S. Burr III's use of the name. After MLRCB ceased using the 'Carll Burr' name, Carll S. Burr III established 'Carll Burr Realty'. The plaintiffs sought specific performance of the 1984 stipulation, damages, and a permanent injunction. The appellate court found that the lower court improvidently granted a preliminary injunction, citing sharply disputed facts regarding an alleged oral agreement to modify the contract and the plaintiffs' potential abandonment of the 'Burr' name. Additionally, the plaintiffs' sale of their real estate business undermined claims of irreparable injury, making preliminary injunctive relief unwarranted.

Preliminary InjunctionRestrictive CovenantsNon-compete ClauseOral ModificationContract DisputeTrade NameBusiness SaleIrreparable HarmBalancing of EquitiesDisputed Facts
References
8
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
May 15, 2006

Land Master Montg I, LLC v. Town of Montgomery

In this case, petitioners Land Master and Roswind Farmland Corp. challenged the Town of Montgomery's new Comprehensive Plan and Local Laws 4 and 5, arguing they constituted unlawful exclusionary zoning and violated the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The court, presided over by Judge Joseph G. Owen, granted the petitioners' motion regarding these claims, declaring the local laws null and void. The decision highlighted the Town's failure to adequately consider local and regional affordable housing needs and to undertake a thorough environmental review. While some of the petitioners' other claims were dismissed, they were awarded attorneys' fees. The court ordered the reinstatement of petitioners' land use applications under the prior zoning laws.

Zoning LawExclusionary ZoningAffordable HousingState Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)Comprehensive PlanLocal LegislationLand Use PlanningMulti-Family HousingTraffic ImpactJudicial Review
References
19
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Barker v. Peconic Landing at Southold, Inc.

Plaintiff Chris J. Barker sued his employer, Peconic Landing at Southold, Inc., and three individual employees, alleging employment discrimination and retaliation under federal and New York State law. Plaintiff, who suffers from hearing loss and a rotator cuff injury, claims he was discriminated against based on his disabilities and retaliated against for reporting alleged misconduct, including drug use and theft, at the facility. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the New York whistleblower statute (Section 740) and that initiating a Section 740 claim waives other state and federal discrimination claims. The court denied the motion, finding that the whistleblower claim did not waive the discrimination claims and that the allegations regarding drug use and theft were sufficient at this stage to state a plausible claim under Section 740.

Employment DiscriminationRetaliationDisability DiscriminationWhistleblower ProtectionAmericans with Disabilities ActNew York Human Rights LawNew York Labor LawMotion to DismissPlausibility StandardPublic Health and Safety
References
23
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Witkowski v. Brian, Fooshee & Yonge Properties

This appeal concerns former low-income tenants and eligible individuals from the River Woods apartment complex in Austin, Texas (appellants), who sued the property owners, Brian, Fooshee and Yonge Properties (BFY) and individuals Patrick Brian, Jefferson Fooshee, and George Yonge, along with proposed purchaser Embrey Partners, Ltd. (Embrey) (appellees). Appellants alleged that appellees improperly misrepresented the property's condition to the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to secure the release of low-income housing restrictions, leading to their eviction. The district court granted summary judgment for the appellees, finding that the appellants lacked standing as third-party beneficiaries under both the federal Affordable Housing Disposition Program (AHDP) and the Land Use Restriction Agreement (LURA). The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that neither the statute nor the contract explicitly provided the appellants with the specific cause of action asserted. Additionally, the court upheld the denial of appellants' motion for leave to file a fifth amended petition, citing the timing after two summary judgments and the appellants' prior knowledge of the facts.

Low-income housingSummary judgmentThird-party beneficiaryStandingContract enforcementStatutory interpretationFraud claimsEvictionLand Use Restriction AgreementAffordable Housing Disposition Program
References
22
Case No. 15-25-00055-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 24, 2025

Frisco Summit, LP and Frisco Summit, LP Derivatively and on Behalf of Frisco Multifamily Land Partners, LP v. Frisco Multifamily Land GP, LLC, Carleton Development, Ltd., GH Southwest II, Inc., Frisco Summit I, LP, Frisco Summit I GP, LLC, Salt River Capital, Inc.,Frisco Summit II, LP, Frisco Summit II GP, LLC, Printice L. Gary, Jeffrey D. Fulenchek, and Neal R. Hildebrand

This case concerns a dispute over a multi-family housing development agreement. Appellants, Frisco Summit, LP, sued Appellees, Frisco Multifamily Land GP, LLC et al., for breaches of fiduciary duty, contract, and sought declaratory relief. The trial court granted partial summary judgment and, following a bench trial, issued a take-nothing judgment. Appellants contend the court erred in its summary judgment on tort claims and misapplied contract interpretation regarding timely development and integration of agreements, also failing to provide adequate findings for its decision on the Joint Venture Agreement.

Joint VentureMulti-family Housing DevelopmentBreach of Fiduciary DutyContract LawReal Estate LitigationEconomic Loss RuleSummary Judgment AppealPartnership AgreementAppellate ProcedureTexas Law
References
71
Case No. 03-96-00283-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 05, 1997

Marshall Land v. AT & S Transportation, Inc.

Marshall Land sued his employer, AT & S Transportation, Inc., claiming a failure to provide a safe work environment after sustaining a back injury. AT & S, a nonsubscriber to the workers' compensation system, filed a counterclaim for sanctions under Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court awarded AT & S $48,000 in attorney's fees as sanctions against Land, finding his pleadings groundless, brought in bad faith, and false, and that Land committed fraud. Land appealed, arguing the sanctions order was defective for not stating particulars of good cause and that the court abused its discretion. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Land waived the complaint regarding lack of particularity by not objecting at trial and that the partial record provided was insufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion regarding the sanctions.

SanctionsRule 13Appellate ProcedureAbuse of DiscretionSufficiency of EvidenceWaiverGood CauseAttorney's FeesCivil ProcedureEmployer Liability
References
16
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

United States v. 11.355 Acres of Land

The United States initiated condemnation proceedings on September 8, 1943, to acquire 11.355 acres in Grand Prairie, Dallas County, Texas, for national defense housing under various war powers acts and executive orders. Landowners L. J. Goodson, J. W. Singleton, and C. W. B. Long challenged the taking, arguing a lack of housing shortage, non-public use, and violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming the land was for private benefit and not essential for the war effort. Judge Atwell determined that providing housing for war plant workers constituted a legitimate 'public use' vital for war prosecution, dismissing arguments about alternative lands or private benefit. The court affirmed the government's right to condemn the property, with just compensation to be determined later. Consequently, the motion to set aside the taking and for restraint was refused.

CondemnationEminent DomainPublic UseWar Powers ActNational DefenseHousing ShortageFifth AmendmentDue ProcessProperty RightsDallas County
References
14
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