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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Legal Aid Society v. Association of Legal Aid Attorneys

The Legal Aid Society sought a preliminary injunction against the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys and its officers to prevent the disciplining of striking union members who crossed picket lines. The plaintiff also claimed tortious interference and a civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) on behalf of itself, non-striking attorneys, and indigent clients. The District Court denied the injunction, finding several impediments to success on the merits. These included the NLRB's primary jurisdiction, the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibitions, and the plaintiff's lack of standing for third-party claims. Furthermore, the court determined that the conspiracy allegations under Section 1985(3) were conclusory and lacked substantial merit.

Labor DisputePreliminary InjunctionUnion DisciplinePicket LinesNational Labor Relations Act (NLRA)Norris-LaGuardia ActStanding (Law)Conspiracy (Law)Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3))Tortious Interference
References
32
Case No. M2004-1043-COA-R3-JV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 21, 2006

State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. D.H. - Dissenting

The dissenting opinion by Judge Clement, Jr. addresses an appeal concerning the denial of appointed counsel for D. H. and Mary Ellen H. in a dependent and neglect proceeding. While acknowledging the importance of a parent's right to counsel, the judge dissents from the majority's decision, believing the facts support affirming the trial court. He argues that the parents demonstrated irresponsibility and lack of diligence in seeking legal representation, including inadequate financial disclosures and delaying their request for counsel until the day of trial. The dissent concludes that the trial court judges did not abuse their discretion in denying appointed counsel, as the parents' hardship was a direct consequence of their own actions.

Indigent counselParental rightsAbuse of discretionAppellate reviewChild support obligationAffidavit of indigencyDue inquiryTrial court discretionLack of diligenceDependent and neglect proceedings
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 08, 2000

McNulty v. City of New York

This dissenting opinion addresses the legal duty of physicians and hospitals to non-patients in a medical malpractice case. Plaintiff Mary Ann McNulty sued several doctors and hospitals after contracting meningococcal meningitis from her friend, Robin Reda, following alleged misinformation and failure to warn about prophylactic treatment. The dissent argues that expanding a physician's duty beyond the established physician-patient relationship to a non-patient friend creates an unmanageable and potentially limitless scope of liability, citing precedent that narrowly defines such duties even for immediate family members. It contends that the hospitals' voluntary undertaking to contact at-risk individuals did not create a legal duty of care to Ms. McNulty. Therefore, the dissenting judge would dismiss all claims against the physicians and hospitals involved.

Medical MalpracticeMedical NegligenceDuty of CarePhysician-Patient RelationshipContagious DiseaseMeningitisSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewThird-Party LiabilityForeseeability
References
24
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 05, 1998

Gulf Coast Alloy Welding, Inc. v. Legal Security Life Insurance Co.

This dissenting opinion concerns an appeal where Gulf Coast Alloy Welding, Inc. (Gulf Coast), an employer, sued Legal Security Life Insurance Co. (LSLI), its insurer, after LSLI refused to reinstate a lapsed workplace accident insurance policy. Gulf Coast alleged various state law claims, including breach of contract and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for LSLI, ruling the state law claims were preempted by ERISA, a decision affirmed by the appellate court. Justice Cohen dissents, arguing strongly for ERISA preemption in this case, emphasizing that the suit involves two ERISA entities and directly relates to the administration of an ERISA plan. He cites precedent such as Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux to support his view that state law claims seeking policy benefits are preempted.

ERISA PreemptionWrongful DischargeEmployee Welfare Benefit PlanState Law ClaimsFederal PreemptionSummary JudgmentBreach of ContractNegligent MisrepresentationFraudTexas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
References
15
Case No. E2004-01216-COA-R3-PT
Regular Panel Decision

State v. David H.

The dissenting opinion by Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr. addresses the denial of appointed counsel in dependent and neglect proceedings involving parents David H. and Mary Ellen H. While concurring with the majority's legal principles on the right to counsel, the dissent argues that the parents' irresponsible actions and omissions justified the trial court's decisions to deny appointed counsel. The trial court, presided over by Judge Harris and Judge Davies, found the parents not indigent based on their income and lack of diligence in seeking legal representation. The dissenting judge concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and would have affirmed its decisions to deny the requests for appointed counsel.

dependent neglectindigencyright to counselaffidavit of indigencyabuse of discretionchild support obligationappellate reviewtrial court discretionprocedural due processattorney appointment
References
6
Case No. 03-10-00472-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 10, 2012

City of Austin v. Ronnie Esparza

The opinion by Justice David Puryear serves as a concurring and dissenting statement to the majority's decision in a case involving the City of Austin and Ronnie Esparza. Justice Puryear concurs with the majority's handling of the first appellate issue but expresses strong disagreement with the remainder of the opinion. His dissent focuses on the perceived legal and factual insufficiency of evidence supporting the jury's finding that Esparza was disabled due to a work-related injury. Puryear argues that Esparza failed to adequately demonstrate a reduction in earning capacity at pre-injury wages, a key component of the Texas Labor Code's definition of "disability," beyond merely testifying about pain. He concludes that the evidence presented did not meet the required legal standard to affirm the jury's disability determination.

DisabilityWorkers' CompensationLegal SufficiencyFactual SufficiencyEarning CapacityPre-injury WageTexas Labor CodeAppellate ReviewJury VerdictBurden of Proof
References
23
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Downing v. Burns

The dissenting opinion by Justice KEM THOMPSON FROST challenges the majority's decision to reverse a trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on a defamation claim. The dissent argues that there was insufficient evidence to support defamation damages under the per quod jury charge, emphasizing that appellate review must adhere to the legal theory presented to the jury. It further asserts that if the JNOV on defamation was indeed erroneous, the proper remedy under appellate rules would be to render judgment on the jury's original verdict of $42,770, rather than remanding for a new trial. Additionally, the dissent agrees with the reversal and remand of a tortious-interference claim for a new trial.

defamationtortious interferencejudgment notwithstanding the verdictJNOVappellate procedurejury chargedamagesper seper quodlegal sufficiency
References
9
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 01, 1983

Dowling v. Consolidated Carriers Corp.

This dissenting opinion addresses a case where a truck driver lost control due to a stuck accelerator and crashed into two illegally parked buses on the shoulder of the Long Island Expressway, injuring a passenger. The dissent argues against the majority's finding of a triable issue regarding proximate cause, asserting that the buses' improper parking merely provided a condition for the accident, and the sole proximate cause was the truck driver's negligence. Citing several legal precedents, the opinion supports the Trial Term's decision to grant summary judgment, dismissing the complaint against the bus defendants. The dissent emphasizes that the accident, given the circumstances, was not reasonably foreseeable from the buses' position.

Proximate CauseSuperseding CauseIntervening CauseSummary JudgmentNegligence LawTraffic AccidentVehicle Law ViolationForeseeability DoctrineDissenting OpinionPersonal Injury Claim
References
13
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

People v. Joseph

Justice Manzanet-Daniels dissents in part regarding a conviction for second-degree burglary. The dissent argues that the basement, which was entirely sealed off and inaccessible from the residences above, should not qualify as a 'dwelling' under the burglary statute, referencing legal precedents set in Quinn v People and People v McCray. The core argument is that the increased penalty for dwelling burglary is meant to prevent 'midnight terror' and 'danger to human life,' which do not apply when the burglarized area is remote and inaccessible from living quarters. The dissent emphasizes that the critical factor for determining a 'dwelling' is the close contiguity and accessibility between residential and nonresidential elements, not necessarily the building's size. Therefore, the conviction for second-degree burglary should be reversed.

BurglarySecond Degree BurglaryDwellingAccessibilityInaccessibilityLiving QuartersStatutory InterpretationCriminal LawProperty CrimeDissenting Opinion
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In re the Arbitration between State of New York Office of Mental Health & New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Ass'n

Judge Mugglin dissents from the majority's decision, which concluded that the arbitrator committed misconduct by excluding pertinent evidence, specifically respondent Taras Neznanyj’s convictions, leading to an irrational factual conclusion. The dissenting judge argues that prejudicial arbitral misconduct was not a basis urged by the petitioner for vacating the award, and an arbitrator only exceeds their power if the award violates public policy, is irrational, or exceeds a specific limitation. The judge contends that the arbitrator acted within their broad powers by choosing not to consider the criminal convictions, as they were not the basis for the original charges, and instead conducted a de novo review, hearing testimony from multiple witnesses. Furthermore, the dissent asserts that arbitrators are not legally required to give collateral estoppel effect to criminal convictions, thus the failure to admit certificates of conviction, when underlying evidence was heard, does not constitute prejudicial misconduct or render the award irrational.

ArbitrationArbitrator MisconductCollateral EstoppelCPLR 7511Vacating Arbitration AwardDe Novo ReviewEvidence ExclusionCriminal ConvictionsAppellate DissentScope of Arbitrator's Power
References
6
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