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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Continental Casualty Co. v. Employers Insurance

Plaintiff insurance companies, Continental Insurance Co. and American Casualty Co. (CNA), initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that they have no duty to indemnify Robert A. Keasbey Co. (Keasbey) for asbestos-related claims, arguing that all claims fall under exhausted products hazard/completed operations coverage. The defendant class of asbestos claimants sought coverage under a new 'operations' theory not subject to aggregate limits. The trial court ruled in favor of the claimants, but the appellate court reversed. The appellate court found that equitable affirmative defenses like laches applied against the claimants, who stood in Keasbey’s shoes. It further determined that coverage is triggered by 'injury-in-fact' rather than mere exposure to asbestos, and that the aggregate limits of the primary and excess policies were exhausted, thus absolving CNA of further indemnity obligations.

AsbestosInsurance Coverage DisputeDeclaratory JudgmentProducts HazardCompleted OperationsOperations CoverageAggregate LimitsExcess InsuranceBodily InjuryInjury-in-Fact
References
29
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Yacono v. Buck Kreighs Co.

Waterman Steamship Co., Inc. appealed an order from the Supreme Court, Kings County, which granted Buck Kreighs Co., Inc.'s motion for summary judgment dismissing Waterman's cross-claim for indemnity and contribution. The underlying action involved a longshoreman's personal injury aboard a Waterman vessel due to alleged negligence by Kreighs. Applying Federal maritime negligence law, the Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of Waterman's cross-claims for common law contribution and indemnification, finding the plaintiff's prior dismissal against Kreighs on the merits was dispositive. The court also considered Waterman's claim for implied contractual indemnification under the Ryan doctrine but concluded that Waterman failed to raise a triable issue of fact, as it did not demonstrate that its potential liability was based on a non-fault premise. Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision to dismiss Waterman's cross-claims was affirmed.

Personal InjuryMaritime LawAdmiralty LawIndemnity ClaimsContribution ClaimsSummary Judgment AppealLongshoremen InjuriesRyan DoctrineWorkmanlike PerformanceFederal Maritime Negligence Law
References
20
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 29, 1988

Richiusa v. Kahn Lumber & Millwork Co.

Cologero Richiusa suffered personal injuries at Flushing Truck Repair Co. and subsequently received workers' compensation benefits as an employee of Kahn Lumber & Millwork Co., Inc. Richiusa then initiated a negligence action against both Flushing Truck and Kahn Lumber. The Supreme Court denied both defendants' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the order was reversed, with the appellate court concluding that the workers' compensation award served as an exclusive remedy against Kahn and that Richiusa was a special employee of Flushing Truck, thereby barring the action against both defendants. The complaint was dismissed.

Personal InjuryWorkers' CompensationSummary JudgmentSpecial EmployerGeneral EmployerExclusive RemedyAppellate ReviewNegligenceEmployment StatusStatutory Interpretation
References
4
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 07, 1990

Michalak v. Consolidated Edison Co.

In a third-party action, Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Con Edison) sought common-law and contractual indemnification from Akron Wrecking Co., Inc. (Akron), an employer whose employee, Michalak, initiated a personal injury lawsuit against Con Edison. Akron, the third-party defendant, moved for summary judgment to dismiss Con Edison's third-party complaint. The Supreme Court initially granted Akron's motion, dismissing the complaint entirely without prejudice to contractual indemnification. On appeal, the order was modified. The Appellate Division held that Con Edison, by requiring Akron to name it as an additional insured on primary and excess liability policies, waived its right to common-law indemnification up to the aggregate limits of those policies. Consequently, Akron's motion for summary judgment was granted only to the extent of dismissing claims for common-law indemnification, with the motion otherwise denied.

IndemnificationCommon-law IndemnificationContractual IndemnificationSummary JudgmentAppellate ReviewInsurance CoverageAdditional InsuredWaiver of IndemnityThird-Party ComplaintPersonal Injury Claim
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 13, 1978

Waters v. Patent Scaffold Co.

This personal injury action arises from Charles Waters' fall from a scaffolding I-beam in 1970, allegedly unbolted by a co-worker. Waters was employed by I. Rosen & Sons, Inc., a masonry subcontractor. The defendants included the general contractor-owner and Patent Scaffold Co., which leased and initially installed the scaffolding. The court determined that Patent Scaffold Co. was an independent supplier, not a contractor, and thus not liable under Labor Law § 240, nor for common-law negligence or strict liability, as the alleged duties devolved upon the subcontractor. The Supreme Court's order partially granting summary judgment to Patent Scaffold Co. was modified to grant summary judgment on all causes of action, and as modified, affirmed.

Personal InjuryScaffolding AccidentLabor Law § 240Summary JudgmentContractor LiabilityLessor LiabilitySubcontractor ResponsibilityConstruction Site SafetyDuty to SuperviseStrict Liability
References
1
Case No. 2018 NY Slip Op 03854 [161 AD3d 1188]
Regular Panel Decision
May 30, 2018

Owens v. Jea Bus Co., Inc.

The plaintiff, a school bus matron, sustained injuries in a collision and subsequently filed for workers' compensation benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board determined that Jea Bus Co., Inc. was her employer, and she began receiving benefits from their insurer. The plaintiff then commenced a personal injury action against Jea Bus Co., Inc., and Tebaldo A. Sibilia, the bus driver and a Smart Pick, Inc. employee. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law. The Supreme Court denied this motion, finding triable issues of fact. The Appellate Division modified the order, granting summary judgment to Jea Bus Co., Inc., on the grounds of workers' compensation exclusivity, as the plaintiff had accepted benefits from them. However, the court denied summary judgment for Sibilia, finding he failed to establish prima facie that he was a special employee of Jea Bus Co., Inc., and thus not entitled to co-employee immunity.

Personal InjuryWorkers' Compensation ExclusivitySummary JudgmentAppellate PracticeCo-Employee ImmunitySpecial Employee StatusGrave InjuryWorkers' Compensation Board JurisdictionEmployer LiabilityContribution and Indemnification
References
32
Case No. 2016 NY Slip Op 07119 [144 AD3d 407]
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 01, 2016

Antoniak v. P.S. Marcato El. Co., Inc.

The Appellate Division, First Department, modified an order from the Supreme Court, New York County, concerning a personal injury case involving Ryszard Antoniak against P.S. Marcato Elevator Co., Inc. and 371 Seventh Avenue Co., LLC. Defendant 371 Seventh Avenue Co., LLC had moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint and cross claims, and for contractual indemnification against P.S. Marcato Elevator Co., Inc. The lower court denied this motion. The Appellate Division found that 371 had demonstrated prima facie that it was the plaintiff's employer and that the contractual indemnity provision between 371 and PS Marcato was triggered. Consequently, the appellate court dismissed the complaint and all cross claims against 371 and granted 371 conditional contractual indemnification against PS Marcato, while otherwise affirming the original order. The indemnification was conditional because 371 did not conclusively prove it was entirely free from negligence.

Summary JudgmentContractual IndemnificationEmployer-Employee RelationshipElevator AccidentAppellate ReviewPrima Facie ShowingNegligenceCorporate StructureTrade NameIndemnity Provision
References
5
Case No. Index No. 303087/12, 83924/12, 83996/12, 83739/13, 84015/15, 84057/15, 84072/15 Appeal No. 16728 Case No. 2020-04517
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 29, 2022

Rucinski v. More Restoration Co., Inc.

Plaintiff Zbigniew Rucinski, an employee of subcontractor Skylights By George Co., Inc., sustained a traumatic brain injury while working at a property owned by Kraus Management Inc. and managed by Franklin Kite Housing Development Fund Corporation. The defendants, Kraus Management and Franklin Kite, moved for summary judgment for contractual indemnification against Skylights and opposed Skylights's motion to dismiss common-law indemnification and contribution claims. The Supreme Court conditionally granted defendants' motion for contractual indemnification but granted Skylights's motion to dismiss the common-law claims. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. It found that conflicting expert opinions on whether Rucinski suffered a 'grave injury' under Workers' Compensation Law § 11 created a triable issue of fact, thus precluding summary judgment for Skylights on the common-law claims. Furthermore, the Appellate Division determined that the defendants were entitled to unconditional summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claim against Skylights, as the contract did not require a finding of Skylights's negligence.

Appellate DivisionSummary JudgmentContractual IndemnificationCommon-Law IndemnificationContribution ClaimsWorkers' Compensation Law § 11Grave InjuryExpert WitnessTraumatic Brain InjurySubcontractor Liability
References
5
Case No. 2024 NY Slip Op 03999 [229 AD3d 1307]
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 26, 2024

Bates v. Gannett Co., Inc.

Plaintiffs, including Richard L. Bates, Francis L. Goodsell et al., and Ballard Tackett et al., appealed an order from the Supreme Court, Monroe County, which had granted defendant Gannett Co., Inc.'s motion to stay their Child Victims Act (CVA) actions and refer the claims to the Workers' Compensation Board. The plaintiffs are seeking damages for sexual abuse by a supervisor during their employment in the 1980s. The Supreme Court had also held the plaintiffs' cross-motions to amend their complaints in abeyance. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed this order, holding that questions concerning the CVA's revival of time-barred workers' compensation claims and the limitation of plaintiffs to such benefits are matters of pure statutory interpretation and law, falling within the court's jurisdiction, not the Workers' Compensation Board's primary jurisdiction. The Appellate Division denied the defendant's motion and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings on these legal questions and to rule on the plaintiffs' cross-motions to amend their complaints.

Child Victims ActSexual AbuseWorkers' CompensationScope of EmploymentPrimary JurisdictionStatutory InterpretationAppellate ReviewRemittalPleading AmendmentCourt Jurisdiction
References
11
Case No. 2018 NY Slip Op 07390
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 01, 2018

Burhmaster v. CRM Rental Mgt., Inc.

Timothy Burhmaster, a roofer, sustained injuries after falling from a roof while performing emergency repairs. He initiated an action alleging negligence and Labor Law violations against CRM Rental Management, Inc., Colonial Square entities, and Mercer Construction Company LLC. The Supreme Court granted Burhmaster partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) due to the absence of safety devices, and also granted Mercer's motion for conditional contractual indemnification against its subcontractor, Robert Young Jr. Young appealed, and Mercer cross-appealed. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the Supreme Court's order, confirming that the lack of safety equipment was a proximate cause of Burhmaster's injuries and that the parties' conduct constituted a waiver of the contractual requirement for written change orders, thus upholding Mercer's indemnification claim.

Labor Law § 240(1)Construction Site AccidentRoofing FallWorker SafetyPersonal InjurySummary JudgmentContractual IndemnitySubcontractor DisputeWaiver of Contract TermsAppellate Review
References
18
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