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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Telsat v. Entertainment & Sports Programming Network

This case involves an action by Fort Wayne Telsat (Telsat) against ESPN, Inc. (ESPN) alleging violations of federal antitrust laws, unfair competition, and interference with prospective business relations. ESPN moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court granted ESPN's motion to dismiss Telsat's claims regarding conspiracy to monopolize, monopolization of certain local markets, and unreasonable restraint of trade. However, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the claims for monopolization of the market for subscription television, attempted monopolization, and the pendent state law claims. Leave to replead was granted to Telsat.

Antitrust LawSherman ActMonopolizationAttempted MonopolizationConspiracy to MonopolizeUnreasonable Restraint of TradeMotion to DismissFederal Civil ProcedureRule 12(b)(6)Subscription Television
References
33
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Bulkferts Inc. v. Salatin Inc.

The plaintiff, Bulkferts, Inc., sued Salatin and Franco Ferri, Inc., alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize the fertilizer market under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or for summary judgment. The court, presided over by District Judge Robert L. Carter, denied summary judgment for the Sherman Act count (count one), finding factual questions regarding the independence of actors and the attempt to monopolize. However, counts two and three, alleging RICO violations, were dismissed because the plaintiff failed to show that defendants were engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity related to obtaining an interest in or operating an enterprise. The court also discussed the Noerr-Pennington doctrine but deferred its application due to factual questions of intent.

Antitrust LawSherman ActRICO ActConspiracyMonopolizationSummary Judgment MotionMotion to DismissNoerr-Pennington DoctrineForeign RelationsPersonal Jurisdiction
References
19
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

JARMATT TRUCK LEAS. CORP. v. Brooklyn Pie Co., Inc.

Plaintiffs, Jarmatt Truck Leasing Corporation, sought relief under the Sherman Antitrust Act against defendants Brooklyn Pie Company, Inc., Mrs. Smith’s Frozen Foods Co., and Benchmark Baking Corporation. Jarmatt alleged financial harm from their failure to acquire Brooklyn Pie's assets, including exclusive distribution rights for Mrs. Smith’s pies, claiming the defendants conspired to stifle competition and monopolize the market. The Court addressed the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court ultimately granted the dismissal, reasoning that the complaint failed to allege injury to competition, only to a competitor, and lacked essential elements for claims under both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, such as defining a relevant market or demonstrating an intent to monopolize. Additionally, the Court noted the absence of complete diversity for non-antitrust claims, preventing federal jurisdiction over those matters.

AntitrustSherman ActDismissalMonopolyCompetitionDistribution RightsAsset AcquisitionPleading StandardsFederal CourtMotion to Dismiss
References
11
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Twin City Bakery Workers & Welfare Fund v. Astra Aktiebolag

Plaintiffs allege that defendants monopolized and attempted to monopolize the market for the gastric acid inhibiting drug Prilosec through "sham" litigation, violating Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and various state laws. The core allegation is that defendants listed numerous later-obtained patents in the Orange Book, knowing they would not proscribe generic versions, solely to trigger automatic 30-month stays on generic drug approvals by initiating infringement lawsuits. Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which provides antitrust immunity for attempts to influence governmental action. The court, presided over by District Judge Rakoff, found that because claims of infringement for four of the six asserted patents had proceeded beyond summary judgment and two to trial, the litigation was not objectively baseless and thus enjoyed Noerr-Pennington immunity. Allegations of fraud in obtaining or listing patents were dismissed due to lack of particularity as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). The court also determined that merely listing the patents did not cause the monopoly extension; rather, it was the subsequent infringement lawsuits. Consequently, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing the federal claims with prejudice and the state-law claims without prejudice due to a lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

Antitrust LawSherman ActNoerr-Pennington DoctrineSham LitigationPatent InfringementFDA RegulationsOrange BookGeneric Drug ApprovalMonopolizationMotion to Dismiss
References
19
Case No. 25-BC03A-0001
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 23, 2025

In Re Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc. (d/B/A storEDGE); SitelinkSoftware, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; And Property First Group, LP v. the State of Texas

SafeLease, a Texas-based startup, provides low-cost tenant insurance plans for self-storage facilities. To administer policies, SafeLease requires access to facility management software (FMS) systems used by its partners. Defendants (Storable, RedNova, SiteLink, Easy Storage, Bader Co., Property First Group) are affiliated companies that also offer FMS (storEDGE, SiteLink, Easy Storage Solutions) and compete directly with SafeLease in the tenant insurance market. Defendants hold a dominant market share (over 75%) in the FMS market. Defendants, after years of allowing SafeLease "authorized user" access to customer accounts on their FMS systems, abruptly blocked SafeLease's access in December 2024 and amplified these blocks in January 2025 after a temporary restraining order expired. SafeLease alleges that Defendants are leveraging their FMS monopoly to cripple SafeLease, force customers to switch to higher-cost insurance, and monopolize the tenant insurance market. They claim this anticompetitive conduct causes irreparable harm to SafeLease, its customers (over 275,000 tenants affected), and the industry. The case involves claims of attempted monopolization under the Texas Antitrust Act, tortious interference with existing contracts, and tortious interference with prospective business relations. SafeLease seeks injunctive relief to restore its access and prevent further harm.

AntitrustMonopolizationTortious InterferenceBusiness CourtSelf-Storage IndustryTenant InsuranceFacility Management Software (FMS)Trade SecretsDiscovery DisputeProtective Order
References
58
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Cohen v. Primerica Corp.

Plaintiff's agency with National Benefit Life Insurance Company was terminated, leading to an antitrust lawsuit alleging violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well as state law claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the court granted. The court found no concerted action under Sherman Act § 1 due to the corporate structure and dismissed the Clayton Act § 7 claim as inapplicable to this case. Furthermore, the Sherman Act § 2 monopolization claim failed as the defendant's 19% market share was insufficient to establish monopoly power. Consequently, the pendent state law claims for Donnelly Act violation and breach of contract were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Antitrust LawSherman ActClayton ActMonopolyAttempted MonopolizationSummary JudgmentCorporate StructureWholly-Owned SubsidiaryMarket SharePendent Jurisdiction
References
27
Case No. 3-91-003-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 19, 1993

Texas Commissioner of Insurance Georgia D. Flint, Permanent Receiver of Standard Financial Indemnity Corporation v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Employers Insurance of Wausau, a Mutual Company, the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, Houston General Insurance Company, CIGNA Insurance Company of Texas, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company

Standard Financial Indemnity Corporation (SFIC) appealed the Travis County district court's judgment dismissing its suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. SFIC alleged antitrust and tortious interference claims, arguing that the Workers' Compensation Assigned Risk Pool and its members conspired to monopolize the market and unfairly treated its servicing company application. The Hidalgo County district court transferred venue to Travis County, a decision SFIC contested. The Court of Appeals found that SFIC had pleaded valid common law causes of action not solely governed by statutory procedures and that the venue transfer based on forum non conveniens was unauthorized under Texas law. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to return it to Hidalgo County for further proceedings.

AntitrustTortious InterferenceSubject Matter JurisdictionVenue TransferForum Non ConveniensWorkers' Compensation Assigned Risk PoolTexas Free Enterprise and Antitrust ActStatutory InterpretationAppellate ReviewDistrict Court
References
19
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Westchester Radiological Associates, P.C. v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc.

Plaintiffs, a group of hospital-based radiologists, sued Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and the New York Donnelly Act. The radiologists claimed unlawful restraint of trade, monopolization, and price fixing due to Empire's policy preventing direct billing for professional radiological services. Empire moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing failure to state a claim under Section 1, lack of standing for Section 2 claims, and consequently, dismissal of the pendent state law claim. The court denied Empire's motion in its entirety, determining that Empire acted as an intervening "third force" in a non-exempt relationship and that the radiologists had direct standing due to the precisely intended nature of their alleged injuries.

Antitrust LawSherman ActDonnelly ActMonopolyPrice FixingHealth InsuranceRadiologyBlue Cross Blue ShieldLegal StandingMotion to Dismiss
References
27
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Merced Irrigation District v. Barclays Bank PLC

Merced Irrigation District sued Barclays Bank PLC, alleging market manipulation in electricity index prices, violating federal antitrust laws (Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2), California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and New York's unjust enrichment law. Barclays moved to dismiss the complaint. The court found Merced had standing and that fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations. The motion was granted for the Section 1 Sherman Act claim due to a lack of alleged concerted action, and for the unjust enrichment claim due to the absence of a direct relationship between the parties. However, the motion was denied for the Section 2 Sherman Act monopolization claim and the UCL claim, allowing those to proceed. Merced was given leave to amend the dismissed claims.

Antitrust LawMarket ManipulationElectricity MarketsSherman Act Section 1Sherman Act Section 2California Unfair Competition LawUnjust EnrichmentMotion to DismissStatute of LimitationsFraudulent Concealment
References
85
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Cool Wind Ventilation Corp. v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass'n, Local Union No. 28

Plaintiff Cool Wind Ventilation Corp. filed an antitrust lawsuit against a labor union, its officials, multi-employer bargaining entities, and individual companies. The complaint alleged a conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize the sheet metal and duct work industry in New York City, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties, along with violations of the National Labor Relations Act and state law claims for tortious interference with contract. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion to dismiss the Labor Act claims against all defendants except the Union, but denied all other motions to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently stated claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The court deferred ruling on state law preemption pending further factual development.

AntitrustSherman ActLabor ActTrade RestraintMonopolizationGroup BoycottRule of ReasonPer Se IllegalCollective BargainingLabor Union
References
34
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