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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 12-02-00174-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 28, 2004

Jayanti Patel v. City of Everman, Tom Killebrew, and Metro Code Analysis, L.L.P.

Jayanti Patel appealed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the City of Everman and Tom Killebrew d/b/a Metro Code Analysis. Patel had sued the City and Killebrew for an unlawful taking of his properties without just compensation, procedural due process violations, trespass, and conversion, stemming from the demolition of his apartment buildings due to alleged code violations. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment regarding Patel's consent to the demolition of fifteen properties, his due process claim, and his trespass and conversion claims due to res judicata. However, the court reversed and remanded the summary judgment on Patel's takings claim concerning four specific properties (403 Lee Street, 410 Race Street, 405 King Street, and 403 King Street) where the defense of consent was not applicable and a fact issue existed regarding nuisance.

Property DemolitionInverse CondemnationSummary JudgmentTexas ConstitutionDue Process ClaimTrespass ClaimConversion ClaimRes JudicataNuisance DefenseAppellate Review
References
53
Case No. 03-02-00747-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 06, 2003

United Services Automobile Association and USAA Life Insurance Company v. Carole Keeton Strayhorn, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas

This appeal concerns a tax refund sought by United Services Automobile Association (USAA) for sales and use taxes paid between 1994 and 1999. USAA argued that repealed sections of the Texas Insurance Code (former articles 4.10 and 4.11) contained "no other tax" language, which they interpreted as exempting them from all state taxes not expressly provided for in the insurance code at that time. The district court denied USAA's claim and granted the Comptroller's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the insurance code provisions did not exempt USAA from sales and use taxes. The Court of Appeals, reviewing statutory interpretation and legislative history, determined that the tax exemption in the insurance code was narrowly intended to replace occupational and franchise taxes existing in 1907 when the law was first enacted, and did not apply to sales and use taxes, which were created much later in 1961. The court concluded that the exemptions were specific to a system of occupation taxes and did not cover general applicability taxes like sales and use taxes, thus affirming the district court's judgment.

Tax RefundSales TaxUse TaxInsurance CodeStatutory InterpretationLegislative IntentGross Receipts TaxOccupation TaxFranchise TaxTax Exemption
References
41
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Strayhorn

This case concerns an appeal by USAA for a tax refund of sales and use taxes paid from 1994 to 1999. USAA argued that repealed sections of the Texas Insurance Code, specifically former articles 4.10 and 4.11, which contained a 'no other tax' clause, exempted them from all state taxes not expressly provided in the insurance code. The Comptroller contended that this language only applied to occupation and franchise taxes. The district court ruled in favor of the Comptroller, and the appellate court affirmed this judgment, determining that the tax exemptions in the former insurance code articles were narrowly intended to replace general occupation and franchise taxes and did not extend to later-enacted taxes of general applicability like sales and use taxes, which did not exist at the time the exemption was originally granted in 1907.

Tax exemptionStatutory interpretationSales and use taxInsurance lawLegislative intentGross receipts taxOccupation taxFranchise taxTexas taxationAppellate review
References
15
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 28, 2008

New York Committee for Occupational Safety & Health v. Bloomberg

Petitioner NYCOSH requested workers' compensation records from the New York City Mayor's office and Law Department via a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request, seeking raw data on workplace injuries as mandated by Administrative Code § 12-127. Both agencies denied the request, providing only an annual report and claiming the raw data was not maintained in a single responsive record and would be burdensome to produce. NYCOSH initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding, which the Supreme Court dismissed. The Appellate Division reversed, ruling that the Supreme Court applied an incorrect standard of review. It further found the City's claim of statutory exemption under Workers' Compensation Law § 110-a invalid but noted the personal privacy exemption under Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (b), requiring redaction. The court ordered a hearing to determine if retrieving electronic records constituted 'simple manipulation' or new record creation, and if producing hard copies would impose an undue burden, thereby reinstating the petition in part.

Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)Public RecordsWorkers' Compensation RecordsData PrivacyUndue BurdenElectronic Records DisclosureGovernment TransparencyCPLR Article 78 ProceedingNew York Appellate DivisionAgency Records
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Live Oak Brewing Co.

The Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission appealed a trial court's judgment declaring Section 102.75(a)(7) of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code unconstitutional. This statute prohibits manufacturers from accepting payment for the assignment of territorial distribution rights. Appellees, several craft breweries, argued the statute violated their economic liberty interest under the Texas Constitution's due course of law clause by restricting their ability to sell territorial rights and hindering business expansion. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the appellees failed to demonstrate the statute deprived them of occupational freedom or was unconstitutionally oppressive. The court affirmed the constitutionality of the statute, stating it operates within the legitimate framework of the state's three-tier alcoholic beverage regulatory system and is part of a broader legislative compromise.

Economic regulationDue course of lawTexas ConstitutionThree-tier systemAlcoholic beverage industryCraft beerDistribution rightsFacial challengeAs-applied challengeStatutory interpretation
References
21
Case No. 13-08-00351-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 31, 2009

Mitch Burkhart and Christine Burkhart v. Sedgwick Claim Management Services, Inc. and Concentra Integrated Services, and rgv/nueces Rehabilitation D/B/A Innovative Physical and Occupational Therapy

Mitch Burkhart sustained a foot and ankle injury while training for his employer, Verizon Communications. Verizon's workers' compensation claims were administered by Sedgwick Claim Management Services, Inc., who, along with Concentra Integrated Services, arranged a Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) for Burkhart with RGV/Nueces Rehabilitation d/b/a Innovative Physical and Occupational Therapy. The Burkharts alleged that the FCE aggravated Mitch's injury, causing permanent damage. They sued Sedgwick, Concentra, and Innovative, claiming negligence, civil conspiracy, assault, fraud, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court dismissed the case against Innovative for an inadequate expert report and granted summary judgment to Sedgwick and Concentra, citing the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Mitch's aggravation injury was an 'extension injury' covered by the exclusive remedy provision of the TWCA.

Workers' CompensationFunctional Capacity EvaluationExclusive RemedyAggravation InjurySummary JudgmentMedical Expert ReportHealth Care LiabilityCivil ConspiracyBreach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair DealingTexas Court of Appeals
References
23
Case No. ADJ9074552; ADJ9074553
Regular
Jul 01, 2014

VINCENT HERNANDEZ vs. COUNTY OF MONTEREY, INTERCARE HOLDINGS INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board dismissed the applicant's Petition for Removal regarding the selection of an Occupational Medicine QME panel. The Board adopted the WCJ's report, which found that the defendant's request for an Occupational Medicine QME panel complied with Labor Code Section 4062.2. The report reasoned that Title 8 California Code of Regulations Section 31.1(b)'s requirement for supporting documentation for specialty changes does not invalidate a request if not provided. Additionally, the Board found the applicant's arguments regarding an unfair advantage and the WCJ's interpretation of Section 31.1 to be misplaced.

Workers' Compensation Appeals BoardPetition for RemovalWCJQME panelOccupational MedicineTitle 8 California Code of Regulations Section 31.1Labor Code Section 4062.2Treating PhysicianPhysical Medicine and RehabilitationMedical Unit
References
1
Case No. 03-21-00239-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 25, 2023

Star Houston, Inc.// Cross-Appellant,Volvo Cars of North America, LLC N/K/A Volvo Car USA, LLC v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC N/K/A Volvo Car USA, LLC, and Board of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles// Star Houston, Inc., and Board of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles

Star Houston, Inc. and Volvo Car USA, LLC appealed a Final Order of the Motor Vehicle Board. The administrative proceeding involved Star protesting Volvo's termination of its franchise and alleging violations of Occupations Code chapter 2301 by Volvo's Dealer Incentive Programs. Star and Volvo petitioned for judicial review, which was subsequently removed to the Court of Appeals. The court rejected the Board's standing challenge against Volvo's cross-appeal. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's conclusions that Volvo's CSI and SSI programs violated Occupations Code sections 2301.467(a)(1) and 2301.468, upholding that they required adherence to unreasonable sales/service standards and treated dealers unfairly. Additionally, the court rejected Star's claims that other incentive programs violated various statutory provisions. Ultimately, the Motor Vehicle Board's Final Order was affirmed.

Texas Court of AppealsMotor Vehicle BoardFranchise TerminationDealer Incentive ProgramsOccupations CodeAdministrative LawJudicial ReviewStandingSubstantial Evidence RuleCustomer Satisfaction Index (CSI)
References
38
Case No. 03-17-00534-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 02, 2018

Denise Stroup, as Legal Guardian of D. L. S., an Incapacitated Person v. MRM Management, Inc.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment in a personal injury car-crash case involving an incapacitated person, Douglas Lee Stroup (Appellant). Appellant sued Penny Harrington Taylor for negligence and MRM Management, Inc. (Appellee) for vicarious liability, alleging Taylor, a licensed real estate salesperson, was acting for MRM. Appellee's motion for summary judgment was granted, asserting Taylor was an independent contractor, thus negating vicarious liability. Appellant argues that the independent contractor agreement is void under the Texas Occupation Code, which assigns liability to brokers for their salespersons' tortious conduct. Furthermore, Appellant contends that MRM should be estopped from relying on the agreement, and that factual disputes exist regarding Taylor's employment status, joint-enterprise liability, and statutory vicarious liability under the Texas Occupations Code. Appellant seeks to reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment, arguing sufficient evidence was presented to raise genuine issues of material fact for trial.

Personal InjuryCar CrashVicarious LiabilityIndependent ContractorReal Estate AgentReal Estate BrokerTexas Occupations CodeRespondeat SuperiorJoint EnterpriseSummary Judgment Appeal
References
22
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Vazquez v. Orange County Rehabilitation Center

Plaintiff's ward was allegedly sexually assaulted by defendant Lewis while engaged in piecework at a sheltered workshop operated by Occupations. Defendants Occupations and Lewis asserted workers' compensation coverage as affirmative defenses. The court held that claims occurring before July 22, 1989, when Mental Hygiene Law § 33.09 (c) excluded sheltered workshop participants from workers' compensation, are not subject to the defense. For claims after July 22, 1989, when the law was amended to allow coverage if elected, the issue of workers' compensation coverage is referred to the Workers' Compensation Board. Defendant Orange County Department of Mental Health's motion for summary judgment was granted due to lack of evidence linking them to the incident or supervision of Occupations.

sexual assaultsheltered workshopworkers' compensationsummary judgmentaffirmative defensestatutory constructionjurisdictionMental Hygiene Lawamendmentnegligence
References
11
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