CompFox Logo
AboutWorkflowFeaturesPricingCase LawInsights

Updated Daily

Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Bretts v. Lincoln Plaza Associates, Inc.

This case concerns an appeal by defendants Johnny's Pizza and Lincoln Plaza Associates, Inc., from an order denying their motions for summary judgment in a personal injury action. The injured plaintiff allegedly tripped over a single-step riser on premises owned by Lincoln Plaza Associates and leased by Johnny's Pizza. The defendants contended the step was an open and obvious, non-inherently dangerous condition. The Supreme Court initially denied their motions, but the appellate court reversed. The appellate court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that they successfully established the step was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous, and the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact.

Personal InjurySummary JudgmentPremises LiabilityOpen and Obvious ConditionNegligenceSlip and FallAppellate ReviewLandowner DutyHazardous ConditionDuty to Warn
References
7
Case No. 2022 NY Slip Op 03497 [206 AD3d 620]
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 01, 2022

Everett v. CMI Servs. Corp.

The plaintiff, Ron Everett, sustained personal injuries after slipping and falling on accumulated water and feces in an employee break room at his workplace. Defendants, including CMI Services Corp., Omni New York, LLC, and Plaza Residences, LLP, moved for summary judgment, asserting defenses such as inherent job hazard, open and obvious condition, and employer protection under Workers' Compensation Law § 11. The Supreme Court denied their motion. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was not engaged in his cleaning duties at the time of the fall, the dangerous condition was not proven to be non-inherently dangerous despite being open and obvious (due to hidden feces), and the defendants failed to establish an alter ego or special employer relationship to invoke Workers' Compensation Law immunity. The court concluded that the defendants did not demonstrate a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Personal InjurySlip and FallSummary Judgment MotionCommon-Law NegligenceOpen and Obvious ConditionInherent Job HazardWorkers' Compensation Law § 11Alter Ego DoctrineSpecial EmployerAppellate Review
References
25
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 18, 2002

In Re the Complaint of Kirby Inland Marine, L.P.

Charles Herman, a tankerman, allegedly sustained significant injuries after falling into a hopper on Kirby Inland Marine, L.P.'s vessel, the T/B HOLLYWOOD CHEM 134. Herman and his wife, Mary Jane, initiated a state court action alleging negligence and unseaworthiness. Kirby responded by filing a federal action under the Limitation of Vessel Owners Liability Act. Kirby subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that the vessel's open-hopper design, even if considered a defect, was open and obvious, and the Hermans failed to demonstrate that their only alternatives were unduly impracticable. The Court granted Kirby's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Hermans did not establish the necessary exception to the open and obvious defect rule. Consequently, the Hermans' motion to dismiss Kirby's limitation petition was denied as no dangerous condition attributable to Kirby's privity or knowledge was proven.

Limitation of Vessel Owners Liability ActLongshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation ActSummary JudgmentVessel NegligenceUnseaworthinessOpen and Obvious HazardTurnover DutyFederal Rules of Civil ProcedureMaritime LawPersonal Injury
References
14
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Kellar v. Inductotherm Corp.

Plaintiffs James D. Kellar, a foundry worker, and his wife, filed a products liability action against the manufacturer of a channel furnace. Kellar was injured when he was struck by scrap metal, became dazed, and fell into an unguarded pit surrounding the furnace at Vestal Manufacturing Company, his employer. The furnace was sold to Vestal in 1971, and Vestal installed it with platforms, creating the pit. Vestal also attached a rear deck from the defendant, which partially covered the pit when the furnace was horizontal. Plaintiffs argued the furnace was defective and unreasonably dangerous due to the lack of a guard for the pit and a failure to warn. The defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that the defect was in Vestal's installation, not their product, and that the danger was obvious. The court, applying Tennessee law, granted the defendant's motion, ruling that liability under Section 402A only applies if the manufacturer's product itself is defective and causes harm, and that the open pit was created by Vestal, not the defendant. Furthermore, the court found the danger of the unguarded pit was obvious to the plaintiff.

products liabilityfoundry accidentunguarded pitmanufacturing defectfailure to warnobvious dangerjudgment notwithstanding the verdictcomponent part liabilityemployer liabilityworker injury
References
13
Case No. 14-17-00699-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 30, 2018

Bryon Dean Jordan v. Texas Children's Hospital

Bryon Dean Jordan, an appellant, sued Texas Children's Hospital after sustaining injuries from a slip and fall on a wooden ramp on the hospital's premises, allegedly due to slippery algae. Jordan, a delivery driver, claimed the hospital failed to warn of or remedy the unreasonably dangerous condition. The hospital sought summary judgment, arguing the condition was open and obvious or known to Jordan, thereby negating its duty under premises liability law. The trial court granted summary judgment for the hospital, which the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court found that the hospital had successfully demonstrated the condition was open and obvious, and Jordan failed to provide sufficient controverting evidence to raise a material fact issue.

premises liabilityslip and fallsummary judgment reviewopen and obvious dangerlandowner dutyinvitee statusalgae hazardappellate affirmationnegligence claimHouston Courts
References
18
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Cohen v. Shopwell, Inc.

Plaintiff tripped over a renovation worker's leg in a supermarket aisle while renovation was underway. The path was obstructed by workers lying prone, with their legs extending across the aisle. The plaintiff had successfully navigated past them in one direction and over two workers on his return, but tripped when a third worker raised his leg. The IAS court initially granted summary judgment to the defendants, citing the plaintiff's admitted awareness of the hazard. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, ruling that it is a question for the jury whether the defendants created an unreasonably dangerous condition by conducting renovations in an open aisle. The court also clarified that the focus should be on whether the defendants were negligent in creating or permitting the condition, rather than a failure to warn, as the danger was open and obvious to the plaintiff. Comparative fault on the part of the plaintiff is still a factor for the jury to consider.

Personal InjuryNegligencePremises LiabilitySummary JudgmentOpen and Obvious DangerComparative FaultRenovation AccidentTrip and FallDuty to WarnJury Question
References
14
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Hite v. Maritime Overseas Corporation

Mr. Hite, a ship repairman, sued Maritime Overseas Corporation under diversity of citizenship for injuries sustained on May 2, 1973, while working aboard the SS OVERSEAS JOYCE in Port Neches, Texas. He received an electric shock from a defective drop cord, causing him to fall. Both Mr. Hite and a witness knew of the cord's defective condition prior to the accident. The defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972 apply land-based negligence concepts, and vessel owners are not liable for open and obvious dangers known to independent contractors. The plaintiff contended that maritime negligence concepts should apply, asserting a nondelegable duty for the vessel owner to provide a safe workplace and inspect equipment. The Court, interpreting the 1972 Amendments, found that Congress intended land-based negligence concepts to apply, with exceptions for comparative negligence and assumption of risk. The Court concluded that the defective drop cord was an open and obvious condition, and thus the defendant owed no duty to warn the plaintiff. Therefore, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was granted, and the plaintiff's cause of action was dismissed with prejudice.

Maritime LawLongshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation ActShip Repairman InjuryVessel Owner NegligenceLand-Based Negligence ConceptsOpen and Obvious DangerDirected VerdictAssumption of RiskComparative NegligenceDuty to Warn
References
68
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 05, 1963

Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc.

The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed a wrongful death action brought by Natalie Halepeska and her children against Callihan Interests, Inc., following the death of Dennis L. Halepeska in a gas well blowout. The trial court initially ruled for the plaintiffs, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, applying the "no duty" and "volenti non fit injuria" doctrines based on a standard that Halepeska "should have known" the danger. The Supreme Court clarified that these doctrines require actual knowledge and appreciation of the danger, or that the danger be so open and obvious that knowledge is legally charged. Finding the lower courts erred in their application of the "should have known" standard and noting the jury found Halepeska lacked full knowledge and appreciation, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration of the evidentiary sufficiency.

Wrongful DeathNegligenceContributory NegligencePremises LiabilityVolenti Non Fit InjuriaAssumed RiskGas Well BlowoutIndependent ContractorBusiness InviteeTexas Law
References
37
Case No. 746 F.3d 191
Regular Panel Decision

Randy Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P.

The Texas Supreme Court addressed a certified question from the Fifth Circuit concerning an employee's ability to recover against a nonsubscribing employer for injuries sustained from a known premises defect that their job duties required them to remedy. The Court clarified that, generally, an employer's premises-liability duty does not obligate them to warn or protect employees from unreasonably dangerous conditions that are open and obvious or already known to the employee. This general rule applies even for nonsubscribing employers, despite the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act's (TWCA) waiver of defenses like contributory negligence and assumption of risk. However, two exceptions exist: dangers from foreseeable third-party criminal activity and situations where the employee must necessarily use the dangerous premises and cannot adequately mitigate the risk. In these exceptional cases, the employer retains a duty to make the premises safe, and the TWCA prevents them from using the employee's awareness of the risk as a defense. The Court also affirmed that a separate 'necessary-instrumentalities' claim, based on an employer's failure to provide safe equipment, is distinct from a premises-liability claim and does not require contemporaneous negligent activity.

Premises LiabilityEmployer DutyNonsubscribing EmployerTexas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA)Open and Obvious HazardKnown DangerCertified QuestionNegligenceAssumption of RiskContributory Negligence
References
52
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Chaney v. Starbucks Corp.

Plaintiff John Chaney sued Starbucks for negligence after falling over an electrical charger in a Bronx café. Chaney had noticed the charger upon entering but tripped on it when leaving. Starbucks moved for summary judgment, arguing the charger was an open and obvious condition and not inherently dangerous, thus precluding a duty of care. The court agreed, finding that the white charger contrasted with the orange floor, and Chaney had admitted seeing it and could have avoided it. Furthermore, the court held that chargers in customer seating areas are not inherently dangerous, especially when alternative paths are available. Consequently, the court granted Starbucks's motion for summary judgment, closing the case.

NegligencePremises LiabilitySummary JudgmentOpen and Obvious ConditionInherently DangerousDuty of CareSlip and FallCustomer InjuryElectrical ChargerComparative Negligence
References
49
Showing 1-10 of 1,254 results

Ready to streamline your practice?

Apply these legal strategies instantly. CompFox helps you find decisions, analyze reports, and draft pleadings in minutes.

CompFox Logo

The AI standard for workers' compensation professionals. Faster research, deeper analysis, better outcomes.

Product

  • Platform
  • Workflow
  • Features
  • Pricing

Solutions

  • Defense Firms
  • Applicants' Attorneys
  • Insurance carriers
  • Medical Providers

Company

  • About
  • Insights
  • Case Law

Legal

  • Privacy
  • Terms
  • Trust
  • Cookies
  • Subscription

© 2026 CompFox Inc. All rights reserved.

Systems Operational