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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 13-10-00126-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 26, 2011

Department of Aging and Disability Services, a Texas State Agency v. Deborah K. Powell

The Department of Aging and Disability Services appealed the trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction in Deborah K. Powell's workers' compensation retaliation case. Powell, a former food-service worker, alleged she was terminated in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim after an on-the-job injury. The Department argued that its sovereign immunity had not been clearly and unambiguously waived, citing Texas Government Code Ann. § 311.034. The appellate court reviewed the plea to the jurisdiction de novo and relied on the Texas Supreme Court's precedent in Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez, which held that the State Applications Act (SAA) contained a waiver of sovereign immunity for such claims. The court found that legislative intent to waive immunity for workers' compensation retaliation claims remained clear and unambiguous despite the later enactment of § 311.034. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the Department's plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that the Department, as a state agency, is not immune from claims of workers' compensation retaliation.

Sovereign immunityPlea to the jurisdictionWorkers' compensation retaliationState Applications ActGovernmental immunity waiverLegislative intentAppellate reviewTexas Labor CodeTexas Government CodeInterlocutory appeal
References
8
Case No. 17-0345
Regular Panel Decision
May 03, 2019

Patricia Mosley v. Texas Health and Human Services Commission and Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

Patricia Mosley challenged her placement on the Employee Misconduct Registry by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. She sought judicial review without filing a motion for rehearing, relying on a misleading agency letter and regulation. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed that a motion for rehearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite for judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act. However, the court also ruled that the agency's affirmative misrepresentation regarding the appeal process violated Mosley's due process rights, preventing her from exhausting administrative remedies. The case was remanded to the Health and Human Services Commission to allow Mosley to file a motion for rehearing, thereby restoring her opportunity for judicial review.

Administrative LawJudicial ReviewDue ProcessMotion for RehearingEmployee Misconduct RegistryTexas Health and Human Services CommissionTexas Department of Family and Protective ServicesJurisdictional PrerequisiteStatutory InterpretationAgency Misrepresentation
References
43
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home & Service Agency

Georgette Speer and the Texas Commission on Human Rights (Commission) appealed a judgment favoring Presbyterian Children’s Home & Service Agency (PCHSA). Speer, who is Jewish, was denied a senior adoption worker position at PCHSA, which cited a policy of hiring only Christians. The plaintiffs alleged employment discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. The trial court found PCHSA to be a religious corporation, exempt under section 5.06(1) of the Act, and ruled in its favor. The appellate court affirmed this decision, agreeing that PCHSA qualified as a religious corporation and that the senior adoption worker role involved religious activities, making the discrimination lawful. Additionally, the court upheld the trial court's discretion in not awarding attorney's fees to PCHSA, concluding that the plaintiffs' claim was not frivolous.

Employment DiscriminationReligious ExemptionTexas Commission on Human Rights ActNonprofit OrganizationReligious CorporationFreedom of ReligionDiscrimination based on ReligionAppellate ReviewFactual InsufficiencyLegal Insufficiency
References
24
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Bonded Waterproofing Services, Inc. v. Anderson-Bernard Agency, Inc.

This case involves Bonded Waterproofing Services, Inc. suing its insurance broker, Anderson-Bernard Agency, Inc. and Thomas Bernard (A-B and Bernard), and its insurer, National Indemnity Company (NIC), after NIC disclaimed coverage for a worker's injury. Bonded alleged that A-B and Bernard misrepresented coverage, breached contract, and were negligent in failing to obtain adequate insurance, and that NIC was vicariously liable. The Supreme Court denied motions to dismiss by A-B and Bernard and a summary judgment motion by NIC. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of A-B and Bernard's motions, finding that Bonded sufficiently stated causes of action for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract, and that the negligence claim was not time-barred. However, the court found that NIC's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, as A-B and Bernard were not its agents.

Insurance Coverage DisputeBroker NegligenceBreach of ContractNegligent MisrepresentationSummary Judgment MotionVicarious LiabilityAgency RelationshipStatute of LimitationsConflict of LawsNew York Law
References
26
Case No. 13-14-00113-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 30, 2015

Texas Health and Human Services Commission and the Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services v. Jose P. Baldonado

The case involves an appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction by the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) and the Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services (DADS). Appellee Jose P. Baldonado sued for age discrimination and retaliation under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) after being denied a position by HHSC and subsequently terminated by DADS. Appellants argued a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting Baldonado failed to establish a prima facie case for both claims and did not exhaust administrative remedies against DADS. The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that Baldonado raised sufficient fact questions regarding his qualifications, the causal link for retaliation, and the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court highlighted DADS's status as an agency within HHSC and its participation in the administrative complaint process as evidence of proper notice.

Employment DiscriminationAge DiscriminationRetaliationPlea to JurisdictionTCHRAPrima Facie CaseAdministrative RemediesSovereign ImmunityInterlocutory AppealTexas Court of Appeals
References
25
Case No. 03-10-00709-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 31, 2011

Green Tree Servicing, LLC, as Authorized Servicing Agent for Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation v. Travis County

Green Tree Servicing, LLC appealed a post-answer default judgment concerning ad valorem taxes on mobile homes. The original suit was filed by Travis County and other entities against Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation, later substituted with Green Tree. Green Tree failed to appear at trial, resulting in a default judgment. Green Tree filed a motion for new trial, asserting its failure to appear was due to an accident or mistake (attorney transition) and that it had a meritorious defense, arguing that as a repossessing lienholder and not an owner, it was not liable for the taxes under Texas Tax Code Ann. § 32.07. The appellate court applied the Craddock test and found that Green Tree satisfied all three elements. The court adopted the interpretation that a repossessing lienholder is not considered an 'owner' under the tax code. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

Post-answer default judgmentAd valorem taxesMobile homesLienholder liabilityProperty ownershipMeritorious defenseCraddock testNew trialStatutory interpretationTexas Tax Code
References
22
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Volt Technical Services Corp. v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

Plaintiff Volt Technical Services Corp. applied for H-2 visas for nuclear start-up technicians, which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied, asserting the need was permanent, not temporary. After the denial was affirmed on appeal, Volt filed suit, alleging the INS's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court upheld the INS's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), which requires the employer's need for services to be temporary, not just the individual assignments. Finding that Volt demonstrated a recurring need for such technicians over several years, the court granted the INS's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Volt's.

Immigration LawH-2 visasNonimmigrant WorkersTemporary EmploymentImmigration and Nationality ActAdministrative Procedures ActDeclaratory Judgment ActAgency InterpretationJudicial ReviewNuclear Industry
References
5
Case No. 15-25-00012-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 17, 2025

State of Texas, Acting by and Through the Texas Facilities Commission, for and on Behalf of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission; The Texas Facilities Commission; Mike Novak, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Texas Facilities Commission; The Texas Health and Human Services Commission; And Rolland Niles in His Official Capacity as Deputy Executive Commissioner for the System Support Services Division of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. 8317 Cross Park, LLC

This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial-in-part of Appellants’ plea to the jurisdiction. Appellee filed an action against the State of Texas, TFC, HHSC, Executive Director Mike Novak of TFC, and Deputy Executive Commissioner for System Support Services Division of HHSC Rolland Niles alleging causes of action for breach of lease, ultra vires conduct related to the termination of the lease, and declaratory relief. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their plea because Chapter 114 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code does not waive sovereign immunity for the State of Texas, HHSC, or TFC for breach of lease claims, and the lease is not a contract for goods or services covered by Chapter 114. Furthermore, Appellants contend that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) does not waive sovereign immunity for Appellee's declaratory judgment claim as it does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of a statute, and Appellee has not alleged a cognizable ultra vires claim against the state officials. Appellants seek reversal of the partial denial of their plea to the jurisdiction and dismissal of Appellee's claims.

Sovereign ImmunityBreach of LeaseDeclaratory JudgmentUltra ViresTexas Civil Practices and Remedies CodeTexas Government CodeAppellate ProcedureJurisdictionState AgenciesContract Law
References
44
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Superior Snubbing Services, Inc. v. Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc.

Superior Snubbing Services, Inc. appealed a summary judgment granted in favor of Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc. The case originated from an injury sustained by a Superior employee, Daryll Faulk, while working under a Master Service Agreement between Superior and Mitchell Energy Corporation (now Devon Energy Operating, L.P.). Faulk sued Energy and others, leading to a settlement, after which Energy and Mitchell sought indemnity from Superior based on the contract. Superior argued that Energy's claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Texas Labor Code and the contract was unenforceable under the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that under Texas Labor Code section 417.004, third-party beneficiaries like Energy are not permissible indemnitees because the agreement was not directly with the 'third party'.

Workers' CompensationIndemnificationContractual LiabilityTexas Labor CodeOilfield Anti-Indemnity ActSummary JudgmentStatutory InterpretationThird-Party BeneficiaryAppellate ReviewReverse and Remand
References
12
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 09, 1994

Juman v. Louise Wise Services

This case involves an appeal concerning an order that granted plaintiffs' motion to compel disclosure from a defendant adoption agency. The plaintiffs, adoptive parents, sued the agency for alleged fraud and misrepresentation during their son's 1966 adoption, claiming the agency withheld crucial psychiatric, psychological, and medical history of the natural mother. The IAS Court determined the complaint established a 'wrongful adoption' cause of action, a novel tort in New York, and ordered the agency to provide records and interrogatory answers for an in camera inspection. The appellate court unanimously affirmed this decision, finding the lower court properly exercised its discretion in overseeing discovery to safeguard natural parents and in compelling disclosure under Social Services Law § 373-a and Domestic Relations Law § 114, given the adopted son's extensive history of psychological disorders.

Wrongful adoption tortAdoption fraudDisclosure of birth parent historyIn camera reviewDiscovery compulsionPsychiatric historyChild mental healthSocial Services LawDomestic Relations LawCPLR 4508 (a)
References
13
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