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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 2019-02-0551
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 12, 2021

Maples, David ( McClain, Codi) v. Professional Personnel Services

This case involves Codi McClain, son of deceased employee David Maples, seeking death benefits from Professional Personnel Services and American Zurich. Mr. Maples died on December 16, 2017, after a work-related fall. Although funeral expenses were voluntarily paid by Professional Personnel, the claim for death benefits was later denied by American Zurich. McClain filed a Petition for Benefit Determination on November 18, 2019, almost two years after Mr. Maples's death. Professional Personnel Services filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that McClain failed to file within the one-year statute of limitations. The Court determined that McClain's reason for the late filing (difficulty hiring an attorney) was insufficient to toll the statute. Consequently, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment, dismissing McClain's claim with prejudice.

Summary JudgmentStatute of LimitationsDeath BenefitsTimeliness of FilingWorkers' Compensation ClaimMotion to DismissLegal ProcedureAppellate RightsCourt of Workers’ Compensation ClaimsPrejudice Dismissal
References
1
Case No. M1999-00342-COA-R3-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 26, 2000

Professional Engineering Services v. City of Red Boiling Springs, TN

This case involves a dispute between Professional Engineering Services (PES) and the City of Red Boiling Springs (City) regarding a contract for engineering services for a new water treatment facility. PES sued the City for breach of contract, alleging that the City contracted with PES for preliminary and design work but later breached the agreement. The City contended that no valid contract existed due to PES's failure to obtain required approvals. The trial court initially found in favor of PES, awarding damages for breach of contract and, alternatively, for quantum meruit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's finding of a valid contract, determining the agreements were ultra vires. However, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's alternative holding that PES was entitled to recover in quantum meruit for the valuable services provided to the City.

Contract LawBreach of ContractQuantum MeruitMunicipal LawUltra ViresEquitable RemediesAppellate ProcedureLocal Government AuthorityEngineering ServicesWater Treatment Facility
References
9
Case No. 2017-08-0203; State File No. 78680-2016
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 13, 2018

Williamson, Rosalind v. Professional Care Services

Rosalind Williamson, an employee, sought workers' compensation benefits for shoulder and hand injuries sustained from a fall at her workplace, Professional Care Services. The trial court initially denied benefits after an expedited hearing due to insufficient medical proof of causation, and her appeal was dismissed as untimely. Subsequently, the employer was granted summary judgment as the employee failed to provide a causation opinion or adequately respond to the motion. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the trial court's decision, citing the employee's lack of medical evidence and procedural non-compliance. The Board also deemed the appeal frivolous but opted not to impose attorney's fees or costs.

Workers' Compensation AppealsSummary Judgment GrantMedical Causation EvidenceShoulder Injury ClaimHand Injury ClaimExpedited Hearing DenialUntimely Appeal DismissalFrivolous Appeal FindingNo Attorney's Fees AwardedTennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 56
References
8
Case No. 2022-08-0687
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 18, 2025

McCool, Martha v. Professional Care Services

Martha McCool, a psychiatric nurse practitioner for Professional Care Services, was injured in 2019 after being attacked by a patient, leading to multiple surgeries and PTSD. A 2023 settlement agreement allowed for future medical expenses. In 2024, her authorized treating physician, Dr. Dan Shell, recommended reconstructive surgery. The employer authorized the surgery but denied McCool's request for a second surgical opinion. The trial court initially ordered the employer to authorize the second opinion and awarded attorney's fees, but later denied the fees. The Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the order compelling the employer to authorize and pay for a second opinion, interpreting the relevant statute to mean an employee is entitled to a second opinion when surgery is recommended, regardless of whether the treating physician ordered it. The Board also reversed the denial of attorney's fees, modifying the trial court's judgment to award McCool's attorney $10,150.00.

Second OpinionSurgical RecommendationAttorney's FeesMedical ExpensesWorkers' Compensation LawStatutory InterpretationCompensable InjuryEmployer ObligationsEmployee RightsAppellate Review
References
15
Case No. 02 Civ. 8428(DC)
Regular Panel Decision

Professional Sound Services, Inc. v. Guzzi

Plaintiff Professional Sound Services, Inc. (PSS) sued Gotham Sound and Communications, Inc., Roland J. Guzzi, and Peter Schneider, alleging product disparagement and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, along with several state law claims. PSS contended that Guzzi made disparaging statements about PSS to its customers and that Gotham's use of the letter "S" in its inventory codes constituted trademark infringement of PSS's purported "S" mark. The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Lanham Act claims. The court found that PSS failed to demonstrate widespread dissemination for its disparagement claim and that its "S" mark lacked inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning necessary for trademark protection. Consequently, the court dismissed the federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.

Lanham ActProduct DisparagementFalse Designation of OriginTrademark InfringementSummary JudgmentCommercial SpeechDistinctivenessSecondary MeaningLikelihood of ConfusionPolaroid Factors
References
46
Case No. 2015-02-0387
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 09, 2017

Hensley, Jeffrey Chad Hensley (Deceased) v. Professional Personnel Services

Mr. Jeffrey Chad Hensley suffered a fatal work-related injury. His surviving spouse, Tabitha Hensley, and minor child, Kaydence Hensley, both filed petitions for death benefits. The Workers' Compensation Judge denied Tabitha Hensley's claim, finding she was voluntarily living apart from the deceased at the time of his death and was not financially dependent. However, Kaydence Hensley, who was nine years old at the time of the hearing, was found to be wholly dependent on her deceased father. The court ordered Professional Personnel Services to pay Kaydence Hensley accrued and ongoing weekly death benefits, managed by her court-appointed custodians, with a portion allocated for attorney fees.

Death BenefitsWorkers' CompensationDependency BenefitsSurviving SpouseMinor ChildVoluntary SeparationCustody OrderAttorney FeesCompensation HearingTennessee Law
References
2
Case No. 03-10-00709-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 31, 2011

Green Tree Servicing, LLC, as Authorized Servicing Agent for Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation v. Travis County

Green Tree Servicing, LLC appealed a post-answer default judgment concerning ad valorem taxes on mobile homes. The original suit was filed by Travis County and other entities against Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation, later substituted with Green Tree. Green Tree failed to appear at trial, resulting in a default judgment. Green Tree filed a motion for new trial, asserting its failure to appear was due to an accident or mistake (attorney transition) and that it had a meritorious defense, arguing that as a repossessing lienholder and not an owner, it was not liable for the taxes under Texas Tax Code Ann. § 32.07. The appellate court applied the Craddock test and found that Green Tree satisfied all three elements. The court adopted the interpretation that a repossessing lienholder is not considered an 'owner' under the tax code. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

Post-answer default judgmentAd valorem taxesMobile homesLienholder liabilityProperty ownershipMeritorious defenseCraddock testNew trialStatutory interpretationTexas Tax Code
References
22
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Volt Technical Services Corp. v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

Plaintiff Volt Technical Services Corp. applied for H-2 visas for nuclear start-up technicians, which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied, asserting the need was permanent, not temporary. After the denial was affirmed on appeal, Volt filed suit, alleging the INS's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court upheld the INS's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), which requires the employer's need for services to be temporary, not just the individual assignments. Finding that Volt demonstrated a recurring need for such technicians over several years, the court granted the INS's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Volt's.

Immigration LawH-2 visasNonimmigrant WorkersTemporary EmploymentImmigration and Nationality ActAdministrative Procedures ActDeclaratory Judgment ActAgency InterpretationJudicial ReviewNuclear Industry
References
5
Case No. 15-25-00012-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 17, 2025

State of Texas, Acting by and Through the Texas Facilities Commission, for and on Behalf of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission; The Texas Facilities Commission; Mike Novak, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Texas Facilities Commission; The Texas Health and Human Services Commission; And Rolland Niles in His Official Capacity as Deputy Executive Commissioner for the System Support Services Division of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. 8317 Cross Park, LLC

This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial-in-part of Appellants’ plea to the jurisdiction. Appellee filed an action against the State of Texas, TFC, HHSC, Executive Director Mike Novak of TFC, and Deputy Executive Commissioner for System Support Services Division of HHSC Rolland Niles alleging causes of action for breach of lease, ultra vires conduct related to the termination of the lease, and declaratory relief. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their plea because Chapter 114 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code does not waive sovereign immunity for the State of Texas, HHSC, or TFC for breach of lease claims, and the lease is not a contract for goods or services covered by Chapter 114. Furthermore, Appellants contend that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) does not waive sovereign immunity for Appellee's declaratory judgment claim as it does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of a statute, and Appellee has not alleged a cognizable ultra vires claim against the state officials. Appellants seek reversal of the partial denial of their plea to the jurisdiction and dismissal of Appellee's claims.

Sovereign ImmunityBreach of LeaseDeclaratory JudgmentUltra ViresTexas Civil Practices and Remedies CodeTexas Government CodeAppellate ProcedureJurisdictionState AgenciesContract Law
References
44
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Superior Snubbing Services, Inc. v. Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc.

Superior Snubbing Services, Inc. appealed a summary judgment granted in favor of Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc. The case originated from an injury sustained by a Superior employee, Daryll Faulk, while working under a Master Service Agreement between Superior and Mitchell Energy Corporation (now Devon Energy Operating, L.P.). Faulk sued Energy and others, leading to a settlement, after which Energy and Mitchell sought indemnity from Superior based on the contract. Superior argued that Energy's claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Texas Labor Code and the contract was unenforceable under the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that under Texas Labor Code section 417.004, third-party beneficiaries like Energy are not permissible indemnitees because the agreement was not directly with the 'third party'.

Workers' CompensationIndemnificationContractual LiabilityTexas Labor CodeOilfield Anti-Indemnity ActSummary JudgmentStatutory InterpretationThird-Party BeneficiaryAppellate ReviewReverse and Remand
References
12
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