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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 03-19-00469-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 20, 2021

Andrew Sansom Heinz Stefan Roesch Bee Spring, Ltd. Hays County And City of Kyle v. Texas Railroad Commission

A group of landowners and governmental entities (appellants) sought to enjoin the construction and operation of a natural gas pipeline owned by Permian Highway Pipeline, LLC, and Kinder Morgan Texas Pipeline, LLC. They appealed a district court's decision that sustained a plea to the jurisdiction by the Texas Railroad Commission and granted summary judgment to the Pipeline Entities. The appellants challenged the Commission's Rule 70 under the Administrative Procedure Act for failing to establish pipeline routing standards and sought declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment, finding the APA claim improperly targeted the absence of a rule rather than its validity, and the UDJA claim lacked a viable legal theory. The court also rejected the appellants' constitutional arguments regarding due course of law, special privileges, and legislative delegation concerning the pipeline entities' eminent domain powers.

Eminent DomainNatural Gas PipelineTexas Railroad CommissionAdministrative Procedure ActDeclaratory JudgmentConstitutional ChallengeSovereign ImmunityLegislative DelegationDue Course of LawSeparation of Powers
References
36
Case No. 03-12-00247-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 27, 2015

Roland Oil Company v. Railroad Commission of Texas

This administrative appeal concerns the Railroad Commission of Texas's final order cancelling an extension of time for Roland Oil Company to plug inactive wells. The Commission found Roland lacked a good-faith claim to operate its lease due to a 15-month cessation of production. Roland argued that the cessation was excused by a force majeure event (a Commission severance order) and that its repair and testing activities constituted "Unit Operations" sufficient to maintain the lease. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the Commission's decision. The appellate court concluded that the force majeure clause in the Unit Agreement required events beyond Roland's reasonable control, which the severance order was not, as it resulted from Roland's own non-compliance. Additionally, the court found that "Unit Operations" specifically refers to activities contributing to the production of oil and gas, which Roland's work on inactive wells did not.

Oil and Gas LawAdministrative LawTexas Court of AppealsRailroad Commission of TexasInactive WellsPlugging RequirementsForce Majeure ClauseUnit AgreementContract InterpretationSubstantial Evidence Standard
References
34
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Danciger Oil & Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission

The Danciger Oil & Refining Company sought to enjoin an order by the Texas Railroad Commission limiting oil production in the Panhandle district, claiming the orders were void. The company's temporary injunction, which had been granted, was subsequently dissolved, leading to this appeal. The court considered seven grounds of attack, including claims that the commission lacked statutory authority, used an unauthorized standard of "market demand," and violated the Fourteenth Amendment or burdened interstate commerce. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding the commission's orders valid under its broad powers to prevent waste of natural resources, and that using market demand was permissible when it directly related to preventing physical waste.

Oil & Gas LawRegulatory ComplianceWaste PreventionProration OrdersMarket DemandConstitutional LawDue ProcessInterstate CommerceAdministrative AgenciesTexas
References
18
Case No. 03-04-00731-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 21, 2006

CenterPoint Energy Entex v. Railroad Commission of Texas, Victor Carrillo, Elizabeth A. Jones, Michael Williams, City of Tyler and State of Texas

This case from the Texas Court of Appeals addresses whether the Texas Railroad Commission (the Commission) has the authority to conduct a retroactive prudence review of gas charges flowed through a purchased gas adjustment (PGA) clause and to order refunds. The court concluded that the Commission possesses this authority, finding it does not violate the filed rate doctrine or the rule against retroactive ratemaking. Additionally, the court examined whether such a review qualifies as a 'ratemaking proceeding' for the purpose of municipal expense reimbursement. It determined that a prudence review is not a ratemaking proceeding, thereby reversing the district court's decision regarding expense reimbursement for the City of Tyler.

Gas Utility RegulationPurchased Gas Adjustment (PGA)Retroactive Prudence ReviewRatemaking ProceedingsExpense ReimbursementFiled Rate DoctrineRetroactive RatemakingTexas Utility CodeAdministrative Agency PowersRegulatory Oversight
References
67
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Centerpoint Energy Entex v. Railroad Commission

This opinion addresses an appeal brought by CenterPoint Energy Entex concerning the Texas Railroad Commission's authority to conduct retroactive prudence reviews of gas charges passed through a purchased gas adjustment (PGA) clause and to order refunds. Entex also challenged whether such a review constitutes a 'ratemaking proceeding,' which would entitle the City of Tyler to expense reimbursement. The court affirmed the Commission's authority to conduct retroactive prudence reviews and order refunds, concluding it does not violate the filed rate doctrine or the rule against retroactive ratemaking. However, the court reversed the district court's decision regarding expense reimbursement, ruling that a prudence review is not a 'ratemaking proceeding' for the purpose of municipal expense recovery.

Utility RegulationGas UtilityPurchased Gas Adjustment ClausePGA ClauseRetroactive Prudence ReviewRatemaking ProceedingExpense ReimbursementTexas Railroad CommissionFiled Rate DoctrineRetroactive Ratemaking
References
69
Case No. 12-0102
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 17, 2014

Texas Coast Utilities Coalition v. Railroad Commission of Texas and Centerpoint Energy Resources Corp. D/B/A Centerpoint Energy Entex and Centerpoint Energy Texas Gas

The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals' decision, ruling that the Railroad Commission of Texas possessed the statutory authority to adopt a gas utility rate schedule incorporating an automatic annual adjustment clause, known as a Cost of Service Adjustment (COSA) clause. The Court determined that the Gas Utility Regulatory Act (GURA) expressly grants the Commission the power to establish "rates," which encompasses practices affecting compensation and charges. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the COSA clause adheres to GURA's mandates concerning procedural requirements and respects municipal jurisdiction, dismissing arguments that it allows for unauthorized rate changes or usurps municipal authority. The decision emphasizes that once a rate is approved through a proper proceeding, it does not require re-approval with each application.

Gas Utility RegulationRate ScheduleAutomatic AdjustmentsCOSA ClauseRailroad Commission of TexasGURAStatutory AuthorityRegulatory LagMunicipal JurisdictionPublic Utility Commission
References
28
Case No. 03-03-00428-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Sep 23, 2005

Cities of Corpus Christi, Appellants//AEP Texas Central Company Public Utility Commission of Texas And Constellation New Energy, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas and AEP Texas Central Company, Appellees//Public Utility Commission of Texas Cities of Corpus Christi Office of Public Utility Counsel And Constellation NewEnergy, Inc.

This dissenting opinion addresses an appeal regarding the Public Utility Commission's authority to order AEP Texas Central Company to refund excess earnings from accelerated recovery of stranded costs. The dissenting Justice agrees with the majority on affirming the Commission's decisions concerning member account balances and demand charges. However, the dissent strongly contends that the Commission possessed the authority to mandate these refunds prior to 2004, arguing the statutory scheme was ambiguous and the Commission's action was a reasonable interpretation consistent with its duties to promote fair competition and prevent overrecovery. The dissent highlights that the majority's interpretation may lead to absurd results by limiting the Commission's ability to correct overrecovery while allowing it to address underrecovery.

Electricity DeregulationStranded CostsUtility RegulationPublic Utility CommissionRegulatory AuthorityExcess EarningsRefundsCompetitive MarketTexas Utility CodeAdministrative Law
References
12
Case No. 03-03-00435-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 29, 2004

Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Richard Reynolds, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission/East Side Surgical Center Clinic for Special Surgery And Surgical and Diagnostic Center, L.P. v. East Side Surgical Center Clinic for Special Surgery/Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Richard Reynolds, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission

This case involves the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission's failure to establish fee guidelines for ambulatory surgical centers under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. East Side Surgical Center, Clinic for Special Surgery, and intervenor Surgical and Diagnostic Center, L.P. (collectively "East Side") sued the Commission to invalidate certain default rules that applied when specific guidelines were absent. The district court declared one rule (133.304(i)) invalid and enjoined its enforcement, citing unlawful delegation of authority. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's judgment regarding the rule's invalidity and dissolved the injunction, citing a Texas Supreme Court decision finding no unlawful delegation. The court affirmed that East Side was not entitled to its usual and customary fee in the absence of specific guidelines.

Workers' CompensationAdministrative LawDelegation of AuthorityRulemakingAmbulatory Surgical CentersJudicial ReviewInsurance CarrierFee GuidelinesFair and Reasonable RatesStatutory Interpretation
References
38
Case No. 15-25-00013-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 07, 2025

State of Texas, the Texas Facilities Commission, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, Mike Novak, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the TFC, and Rolland Niles, in His Official Capacity as Deputy Executive Commissioner for the System Support Services Division of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Broadmoor Austin Associates, a Texas Joint Venture

Broadmoor Austin Associates leased office space to the Texas government, specifically the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC), through the Texas Facilities Commission (TFC). Rent has been unpaid for nearly two years due to alleged misconduct by state officials. Broadmoor asserts that sovereign immunity does not bar its claims for breach of contract, citing Chapter 114's express waiver for contracts involving construction and related services. Additionally, Broadmoor brings ultra vires claims against TFC Executive Director Mike Novak and HHSC Deputy Executive Commissioner Roland Niles, alleging their actions were beyond legal authority or a failure to perform ministerial duties. Broadmoor seeks prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to ensure these officials comply with state law, specifically regarding the availability of appropriated funds for the lease.

Sovereign ImmunityBreach of ContractUltra Vires DoctrineState AgenciesGovernment ContractsLease AgreementsLegislative AppropriationsExecutive AuthorityJudicial ReviewTexas Facilities Commission
References
69
Case No. 03-14-00340-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 08, 2015

CPS Energy, Time Warner Cable Texas LLC, and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company D/B/A AT&T// Public Utility Commission of Texas v. Public Utility Commission of Texas// Cross-Appellee, CPS Energy, Time Warner Cable Texas LLC and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company D/B/A AT&T

This brief argues that the Public Utility Commission (Commission) erroneously issued an advisory opinion concerning amendments to federal regulations (47 C.F.R. 1.1409(e)) that took effect after the relevant billing period of 2005-2010. CPS Energy contends that these findings were premature, advisory, and beyond the Commission's jurisdictional scope. Additionally, CPS Energy asserts that the Commission's interpretation of Utilities Code § 54.204(c) constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of power to a federal agency. The brief urges the Third Court of Appeals to reverse the Commission's contested findings (Findings of Fact 84-87 and Conclusions of Law 26 and 27) and remand the case for an order consistent with the court's opinion.

JurisdictionAdvisory OpinionPole Attachment RatesFederal Communications CommissionPublic Utility CommissionAdministrative LawStatutory InterpretationUnconstitutional DelegationRipenessAppellate Procedure
References
84
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