Hollis v. Marriott Hotel
The court granted the motion for reargument. Upon reargument, the motion for leave to appeal was denied. Additionally, the motion seeking poor person relief was dismissed as academic.
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The court granted the motion for reargument. Upon reargument, the motion for leave to appeal was denied. Additionally, the motion seeking poor person relief was dismissed as academic.
The court addressed a motion filed for the reargument of an earlier motion for leave to appeal. This request for reargument was subsequently denied by the court. It was specifically noted in the decision that Judge Rivera did not participate in the deliberation or ruling on this particular matter, indicating a recusal or non-involvement in the proceedings. The original motion for leave to appeal was referenced as 20 NY3d 915 (2012).
Plaintiffs' decedent was killed in an accident while a passenger in an automobile driven by his coemployee and owned by his employer. Workers' compensation proceedings were initiated and remained unresolved. Plaintiffs commenced a separate action for negligence and wrongful death. The Supreme Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint based on the Statute of Limitations, and subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion for reargument or renewal. On appeal, the court reversed the summary judgment, deeming it premature given the ongoing workers' compensation case and the potential applicability of the exclusivity of workers' compensation. The appeal from the order denying reargument/renewal was dismissed as academic. A dissenting opinion argued that the Statute of Limitations should have been addressed, finding it had run for the co-employee but not the employer.
In this Family Court Act article 8 family offense proceeding, the petitioner filed a supplemental petition alleging the respondent willfully violated a modified order of protection on two separate occasions in March 1994. The court found these violations and civilly committed the respondent to consecutive terms of incarceration totaling ten months. The respondent moved for reargument, citing the appellate authority of Matter of Vitti v Vitti, which held that Family Court Act article 8 prohibits consecutive commitments exceeding a total of six months. The presiding judge, Guy P. De Phillips, disagreed with the Vitti ruling, asserting that legislative history and public policy regarding domestic violence support the imposition of consecutive civil commitments for distinct violations, even if the cumulative term exceeds six months, provided they are separate offenses for Sixth Amendment purposes. Consequently, the court denied the respondent's motion for reargument, affirming its authority to impose such consecutive sentences.
Angel Saldivar was injured in a scaffold collapse while working for JMK Construction Management, Inc., leading him and his wife to sue Lawrence Development Realty, LLC (LDR) for personal injuries, alleging a Labor Law § 240 (1) violation. Initially, the Supreme Court denied their summary judgment motion and granted LDR's cross-motion, which contended an alter ego defense under Workers’ Compensation Law. However, upon reargument, the court reversed its decision, granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on liability and denying LDR's cross-motion. LDR appealed this reargument order, but the appellate court affirmed, concluding that LDR was not an alter ego of JMK. The appellate court further held that the scaffold's collapse established LDR's liability under Labor Law § 240 (1), as it failed to provide proper protection to the injured plaintiff.
The court denied a motion for reargument and/or clarification regarding its decision from October 6, 1983. The original decision, cited as 97 AD2d 571, clearly indicated that the claimant was not entitled to reinstatement or back wages subsequent to January 6, 1978. The court explicitly stated that nothing in its prior decision could be interpreted as directing further proceedings on the issue of the claimant's entitlement to such reinstatement or back wages after that date.
The petitioner appealed an order from the Supreme Court, New York County, concerning a claim for accident-related disability. The Supreme Court had initially granted a hearing to the petitioner but, upon reargument, adhered to this determination. This appellate court unanimously modified the Supreme Court's order, ultimately dismissing the petitioner's claim and reinstating the determination of the Board of Trustees of the New York City Employees’ Retirement System. The Board's medical board had concluded that the petitioner's disability was unrelated to her initial accident, citing a significant time lapse between the injury and subsequent surgery, and no lost work time. The appellate court found substantial evidence supporting the medical board's findings and ruled against providing the petitioner a second opportunity to present her case, emphasizing that Workers' Compensation Board findings are not binding on the retirement system.
Plaintiff Carby Bruce was injured after falling from an A-frame ladder while performing renovation work at a warehouse owned by defendant 182 Main St. Realty Corp. He asserted claims under Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), 241 (6) and common-law negligence. Defendant sought summary judgment arguing lack of knowledge or control over the work. The court modified an earlier order, denying summary judgment for Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) claims due to issues of fact regarding who hired plaintiff and the ladder's stability. However, the court reversed a prior decision upon reargument, granting summary judgment to the defendant for common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims, finding no dangerous condition or direction/control of work by the defendant.
This case involves a plaintiff worker who fell from a ladder. The Supreme Court, New York County, initially entered a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of defendants on Labor Law § 240 (1) liability. The Appellate Division modified this judgment, granting plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict and directing judgment in favor of plaintiffs on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1). The court found that the jury's rejection of the accident report meant there was insufficient evidence to conclude the ladder provided proper protection. Additionally, the indemnification claims against second third-party defendant Sage Electrical Contracting, Inc. were reinstated, and the matter was remanded for a trial on damages and apportionment of fault. An earlier decision by this Court from June 26, 2008, was recalled and vacated upon reargument, with a new decision and order substituted.
This appellate court order concerns a personal injury action under Labor Law. Defendants AMF (project owner/general contractor) filed a third-party action against Canadian Arctic (purported employer). A workers' compensation judge found the plaintiff was employed by nonparty Mt. Moriah, not Canadian Arctic. The motion court initially denied Canadian Arctic's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint based on collateral estoppel. Canadian Arctic then successfully moved to reargue, presenting new evidence from another case, leading the motion court to vacate its prior decision, apply collateral estoppel, and dismiss AMF's third-party complaint. The appellate court reversed this decision, ruling that the reargument motion was improperly granted due to new arguments in reply papers. Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that even if the arguments were considered, collateral estoppel was inapplicable because there was no identity of issues between the compensation proceeding and the third-party action, and AMF did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the employer status in the compensation proceeding.
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