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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Foreman ex rel. Fromme v. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford

John H. Foreman died in a work-related accident. His wife, Denise Foreman, and their children received workers' compensation benefits from Security Insurance Company of Hartford. Following a third-party wrongful death settlement, Denise Foreman argued that she and some children became 'ineligible' for further benefits, proposing that the stepchildren, Brandon and Clayton Fromme, should receive the full redistributed compensation payments. The court examined the statutory definition of 'eligible' under the Texas Labor Code. It concluded that eligibility is determined by marital status, age, or dependency at the time of the worker's death, not by the actual receipt of benefits or an advance from a third-party settlement. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment, stating that beneficiaries remain eligible even if their future benefits are covered by a third-party recovery.

Workers' CompensationDeath BenefitsStatutory InterpretationEligibilitySubrogationThird-Party SettlementDouble RecoveryTexas Labor CodeAppellate ReviewBeneficiary Rights
References
20
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Receiver for Citizen's National Assurance Co. v. Hatley

Johnny Ray Hatley was injured in a work-related truck accident and settled a third-party claim for $85,000, from which the Receiver for Citizen’s National Assurance Company received $16,000. Hatley then pursued workers' compensation benefits, and a jury found him totally and permanently incapacitated. The trial court awarded Hatley approximately $78,000 in benefits, rejecting the Receiver's argument that the third-party settlement should offset the workers' compensation recovery under former article 8307, section 6a. The Receiver appealed, contending the statutory offset was mandatory and the release had no legal effect or lacked consideration. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding that the release explicitly waived the Receiver's statutory rights and was supported by valid consideration, thereby precluding the application of the offset.

Workers' CompensationThird-Party SettlementStatutory OffsetRelease of ClaimsContract InterpretationConsiderationTexas LawSubrogation RightsReimbursement RightsAppellate Review
References
7
Case No. 3-92-298-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 07, 1993

Receiver for Citizen's National Assurance Company, an Impaired Company v. Johnny Ray Hatley

This case involves an appeal by the Receiver for Citizen's National Assurance Company (appellant) against Johnny Ray Hatley (appellee) regarding workers' compensation benefits. Hatley was injured in a truck accident and received a third-party settlement, part of which went to the Receiver. The Receiver had signed a release of all claims and rights but argued that the settlement should be treated as an advance against future workers' compensation benefits under former article 8307, section 6a of the workers' compensation law, contending the release was not legally effective or lacked consideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Hatley, ruling that the release constituted a specific waiver by the Receiver of its statutory rights and was supported by valid consideration.

Workers' Compensation LawThird-Party LiabilitySettlement AgreementStatutory OffsetContractual ReleaseConsideration in ContractsSubrogation WaiverReimbursement RightsAppellate ReviewTravis County District Court
References
7
Case No. 03-99-00293-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 10, 2000

Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association v. Jack M. Webb, as Special Deputy Receiver of Employers Casualty Co. Jack M. Webb, as Special Deputy Receiver of Employers National Insurance Co.

This case involves an appeal from a summary judgment concerning the claims priority scheme within the Texas Insurance Code's liquidation statute. The appellant, Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (TPCIGA), challenged the classification of its claims for defense costs incurred in defending liability and workers' compensation claims under policies of insolvent insurers. TPCIGA argued these costs should receive Class 1 priority as claims-handling expenses, while appellees contended they were Class 2 payments of policyholder claims. The court concluded that, prior to a 1995 amendment to the statute, such defense costs were properly classified as Class 2 claims. Therefore, the district court's judgment classifying them as Class 2 was affirmed.

Insurance LawClaims PriorityLiquidation StatuteTexas Insurance CodeGuaranty ActPolicyholder ClaimsDefense CostsStatutory InterpretationSummary JudgmentReceivership
References
22
Case No. 92 Civ. 4884 (RJW)
Regular Panel Decision

PEOPLE OF STATE OF NY BY ABRAMS v. Foreman

Plaintiffs, the People of the State of New York, moved for civil contempt against Joseph Foreman, Patrick Mahoney, and Robert Sehenck for violating a Preliminary Injunction issued on July 13, 1992, in People v. Operation Rescue Nat’l. The injunction prohibited presenting a fetus to Governor Bill Clinton. Defendants Foreman and Sehenck, along with Harley David Belew, discussed plans to present a fetus ("Baby Nathan") to Governor Clinton during the Democratic National Convention. Despite being aware of the injunction, Foreman and Sehenck facilitated Belew's actions by providing lodging and failing to dissuade him. The Court found Foreman and Sehenck in civil contempt, concluding they aided and abetted the violation. The decision highlighted their clear noncompliance, lack of reasonable diligence, and willful disregard for the judicial decree, and held them liable for liquidated damages as stipulated by the injunction.

Civil ContemptPreliminary InjunctionAiding and AbettingFetus PresentationAbortion ProtestJudicial Decree ViolationDemocratic National ConventionWillful DisobedienceLiquidated DamagesCourt Order Enforcement
References
11
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Schaff v. Hendrich

E. P. Hendrich, an employee of C. E. Sehaff, the receiver for the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas and the Wichita Falls & Northwestern Railway Company of Texas, sued for personal injuries. Hendrich, a foreman of a tank gang, slipped on wet cinders in a roundhouse pit while working on an engine tank and injured his breast. The pit's drainpipe was obstructed, leading to a slippery condition that Hendrich had previously reported to his foreman, Mr. Varley, who gave an equivocal response. The defense argued that Hendrich assumed the risks of his injury, especially since he was engaged in interstate commerce, and that Varley's response did not constitute a promise to remedy the unsafe condition. The court concluded that Varley's statement 'Well, I will see' was insufficient to support a promise to remedy, and since no such promise was pleaded or submitted to the jury, the exception to the common-law rule of assumed risk did not apply. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Hendrich was reversed, and judgment was rendered in favor of the appellant (receiver).

Assumed RiskInterstate CommerceFederal Employers' Liability ActRailway AccidentPersonal InjuryNegligenceSlippery ConditionRoundhouse PitForeman NotificationPromise to Remedy
References
10
Case No. 03-07-00552-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 26, 2009

Rehabworks, LLC v. Michael F. Flanagan, as Receiver for Century Care of America, Inc.

Rehabworks, LLC, a therapy service provider, sued Century Care of America, Inc. for unpaid services and obtained a judgment. When Michael F. Flanagan was appointed as receiver for Century Care during a foreclosure action, Rehabworks intervened, asserting several claims to recover payment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Flanagan, finding him protected by derived judicial immunity for actions taken as receiver. On appeal, Rehabworks challenged this ruling, arguing against the applicability of immunity for implied-contract claims and citing legislative authorization for suits against receivers. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Flanagan's actions were within his authority as an arm of the court, thus entitling him to derived judicial immunity.

Derived Judicial ImmunityReceiver ImmunitySummary Judgment AppealForeclosure ProceedingsImplied Contract ClaimsQuantum MeruitMoney Had and ReceivedAppellate Court DecisionTexas Civil PracticeCourt-Appointed Officer Authority
References
15
Case No. 03-97-00055-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Oct 02, 1997

Brookshire Grocery Company v. Elton Bomer, as Permanent Receiver of Texas Employers Insurance Association

Brookshire Grocery Company challenged a judgment favoring Elton Bomer, Permanent Receiver of Texas Employers Insurance Association (TEIA). The trial court deemed a 'side agreement' between Brookshire and TEIA void, as it aimed to secure an illegal dividend for a workers' compensation policy, ordering Brookshire to pay $270,057. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the side agreement invalid, illegal, and void due to violations of statutory and regulatory requirements, including a failure to file with the State Board of Insurance and an attempt to retroactively alter premium factors to indirectly provide a prohibited dividend. The court further ruled the Receiver was not bound by the side agreement's terms and dismissed Brookshire's statute of limitations defense, asserting the cause of action accrued when the Receiver demanded payment in 1993. This decision underscores the necessity of regulatory adherence in insurance contracts and forbids agreements that bypass stipulated premium rates.

Insurance PolicySide AgreementRetroactive PremiumStatutory ViolationRegulatory ComplianceContract LawPublic PolicyStatute of LimitationsAppeals CourtTexas Law
References
9
Case No. 03-08-00481-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 10, 2009

Resolution Oversight Corporation as Special Receiver of Financial Insurance Company of America v. Arturo Garza

Resolution Oversight Corporation, acting as the special receiver for Financial Insurance Company of America (FIC), sought to enforce FIC's subrogation rights against funds paid by Home State County Mutual Insurance Company to Arturo Garza. Garza, an injured employee, had received workers' compensation benefits from FIC following an automobile accident and subsequently settled a claim with Home State, the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier for his employer, Texas Towing. The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Garza, denying FIC's subrogation interest in the UIM proceeds. On appeal, the court reversed this decision, affirming FIC's valid subrogation lien and rejecting the 'made whole' doctrine for statutory subrogation. The appellate court further determined that Garza was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees from FIC's recovery, remanding the case for their determination.

Workers' CompensationSubrogation rightsUninsured/Underinsured Motorist (UIM) benefitsSummary JudgmentStatutory ConstructionAttorney's FeesInsurer Receivership ActTexas Labor CodeContractual LiabilityThird-party action
References
27
Case No. 03-97-00567-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 30, 1998

Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. James A. Howard, Special Deputy Receiver of Texas Employers' Insurance Association and Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association

Memorial Medical Center of East Texas appealed a summary judgment granted in favor of James A. Howard, Special Deputy Receiver of Texas Employers' Insurance Association, and Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association. Memorial sought a declaration that the appellees were obligated to reimburse defense costs incurred in a separate suit brought by its employees. The trial court granted the appellees' motions for summary judgment without specifying the grounds. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that both the Receiver and the Association were statutorily precluded from defending Memorial or reimbursing its defense costs under relevant provisions of the Texas Insurance Code.

Summary judgmentInsurance CodeDuty to defendReimbursementImpaired insurerReceivershipGuaranty AssociationAppellate reviewStatutory interpretationWorkers' compensation insurance
References
11
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