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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Brunetti v. Cape Canaveral Shipping Co., SA

Peter Brunetti, a longshoreman, sued Cape Canaveral Shipping Company, S.A., a shipowner, for personal injuries. Canaveral moved for summary judgment, arguing the suit was barred under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) Section 33(b) because Brunetti had accepted compensation under a Memorandum of Informal Conference, which Canaveral contended operated as an assignment of his rights. The court, reexamining prior Second Circuit decisions in light of the Supreme Court's Pallas Shipping Agency Ltd. v. Duris (1983) and the Third Circuit's Costa v. Danais Shipping Co. (1983), determined that a Memorandum of Informal Conference, absent a formal compensation order, does not constitute an "award in a compensation order" sufficient to trigger the assignment provisions of LHWCA Section 33(b). Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was denied.

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Actassignment of claimscompensation ordersinformal conferencesummary judgment motionfederal statutory interpretationpersonal injury claimsthird-party liabilitymaritime lawworker compensation benefits
References
14
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Dominguez v. Cove Ships, Inc.

The plaintiff, a longshoreman, sought damages for injuries on the defendant's ship. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act barred the suit because the plaintiff served the actual ship owner more than six months after accepting a compensation award. However, the plaintiff had commenced an action against a believed owner before the award, and was delayed in identifying the true owner due to the agent's failure to comply with discovery. The court held that the Act should not bar the plaintiff's action, citing principles of waiver or estoppel, and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, emphasizing the Act's purpose was not to prevent diligent longshoremen from pursuing third-party claims.

LongshoremenHarbor Workers' Compensation ActThird-Party ActionStatute of LimitationsWaiverEstoppelDiscoveryShip OwnerAgent LiabilityPersonal Injury
References
9
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Dun Shipping Ltd. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.

Dun Shipping Ltd. filed a complaint to compel Hovensa L.L.C and Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation to arbitrate a maritime claim for contribution to costs incurred in refloating the M/T Knock Dun. Defendants petitioned to stay arbitration and for a declaratory judgment that the claim is not arbitrable, while Plaintiff petitioned to compel arbitration. Magistrate Judge Kevin N. Fox recommended granting Defendants' petition and denying Plaintiff's petition, finding Dun Shipping not a principal to the Voyage Charter Party and no need for discovery regarding Hovensa's notice of the Charter Party. The District Court, after a de novo review, found a contested factual record regarding Dun Shipping's status as a party to the Charter Party and Hovensa's knowledge and acquiescence to its terms. Therefore, the Court granted limited discovery to both Plaintiff and Defendants on these respective issues and referred the matter back to Magistrate Fox for further proceedings based on the outcome of the discovery.

ArbitrationDiscoveryMaritime LawCharter PartyBill of LadingContract InterpretationAgency LawVessel GroundingGeneral Average ClaimFederal Arbitration Act
References
26
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 05, 1998

Greenidge v. Mundo Shipping Corp.

Plaintiffs Kathleen Greenidge and Wal-wyn Greenidge sued Mundo Shipping Corporation in New York State court for conversion and gross negligence after their automobile, entrusted to Mundo for shipment to the West Indies, was not returned. Mundo removed the action to federal court in the Eastern District of New York, asserting admiralty and federal question jurisdiction based on a bill of lading that allegedly incorporated the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). The Greenidges moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that their claims were state law claims. The court found that neither admiralty nor federal question jurisdiction was established, concluding that COGSA does not completely preempt state law and that federal defenses do not create federal jurisdiction. Consequently, the court granted the Greenidges' motion to remand the case to the Supreme Court, Queens County, and dismissed Mundo's cross-motion for partial summary judgment without prejudice. The court also granted the Greenidges reasonable costs and expenses for the improvident removal.

Removal JurisdictionAdmiralty JurisdictionFederal Question JurisdictionCarriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)Saving to Suitors ClauseComplete PreemptionWell-Pleaded Complaint RuleArtful PleadingState Court RemandConversion Claim
References
19
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Kaisha

Culver, an injured employee, and his insurer initiated a lawsuit against the owner of the ship Jufuku Maru and the ship itself, seeking damages under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The court confirmed that the ship and its owner could be sued as third parties, rejecting the argument that the ship should be considered a statutory employer. However, on the merits, the court determined that the injury was not proximately caused by any negligence of the ship, such as a defective winch or missing bolts for a beam. Instead, the injury resulted directly from the culpably negligent and dangerous work methods voluntarily adopted by Culver's employer and the specific negligence of the gangwayman in operating the winch. Consequently, the claim against the ship was denied, as the ship was wholly exonerated from liability for Culver's injuries.

Longshoremen's ActHarbor Workers' CompensationThird-Party LiabilityShip Owner LiabilityStevedore NegligenceProximate CauseStatutory EmployeeAssigned Cause of ActionMaritime LawPersonal Injury
References
8
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Strachan Shipping Co. v. Calbeck

Strachan Shipping Company and its insurer, Texas Employers’ Insurance Association, sought judicial review to set aside a compensation order issued by Deputy Commissioner Calbeck on August 19, 1958. This order awarded compensation to the widow and children of Matthew Gee, who died from lung cancer on October 4, 1957, allegedly due to an accidental injury sustained at work on March 5, 1957. The central issue was whether substantial evidence supported the commissioner's finding that the fertilizer incident caused Gee's disability and death. After reviewing the extensive medical testimony, the court found insufficient evidence to establish a causal link between the fertilizer exposure and Gee's cancer or its acceleration. Consequently, the district court reversed the commissioner's decision, enjoining and setting aside the compensation award.

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' ActSubstantial EvidenceMedical CausationLung Cancer DisabilityOccupational ExposurePre-existing ConditionAdministrative Law ReviewJudicial ScrutinyAppellate StandardsExpert Medical Opinion
References
10
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Bellomo v. United Arab Shipping Co.(SAG)

Plaintiff Filippo Bellomo, a longshore worker, filed a lawsuit under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act against United Arab Shipping Company. He claimed injuries to his right shoulder and elbow after falling on a sheet of ice hidden beneath snow on the deck of the M/V ALWATTYAH, owned by the defendant. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no dangerous condition at the time of turnover or that any ice was an obvious hazard. The Court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the ice was present at turnover and if it constituted a latent hazard that the shipowner knew or should have known about.

Longshore and Harbor Workers ActSummary Judgment MotionShipowner NegligenceDuty of CareLatent HazardMaritime Personal InjurySlip and FallMaterial Fact DisputeFederal Court ProcedureStevedoring Operations
References
23
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Strachan Shipping Company v. Shea

This case concerns an appeal from a compensation benefits award made by Deputy Commissioner R. J. Shea to Lester Nehring under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Plaintiffs, Strachan Shipping Company and Texas Employers’ Insurance Association, sought to set aside the award, arguing that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel should apply. These doctrines were asserted because a jury in a previous personal injury suit (Nehring v. Empresa Lineas Marítimas Argentinas) had found that Nehring did not sustain the injury for which he later sought compensation. The court affirmed the Commissioner's decision, holding that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were inapplicable due to differing standards of proof between judicial proceedings and administrative hearings under the Longshoremen's Act.

Longshoremen’s ActWorkers' CompensationAdministrative LawRes JudicataCollateral EstoppelStandard of ProofJudicial ReviewCompensation BenefitsFederal CourtMaritime Law
References
26
Case No. 59-354
Regular Panel Decision

Houston Ship Channel Stevedoring Co. v. Sheppeard

This case involves a proceeding in admiralty initiated by the Houston Ship Channel Stevedoring Company (libelant) to challenge a compensation award made by Deputy Commissioner G. Sheppeard. The award was in favor of William Bauer, an employee injured while working for the libelant, and covered compensation and medical expenses. The libelant argued it was a subcontractor and therefore not liable under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. However, District Judge Kennerly affirmed the deputy commissioner's award, ruling that the libelant was liable regardless of its contractor status. The court found the award to be in accordance with the law and saw no reason to remand the case for further proceedings.

Admiralty LawWorkers' Compensation ActEmployer LiabilitySubcontractor ResponsibilityAdministrative Award ReviewFederal JurisdictionMaritime InjuryInsurance InsolvencyDeputy Commissioner DecisionLongshoremen's Compensation
References
4
Case No. 09-13-00237-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 18, 2014

Irika Shipping S.A. and Prosperity Management S.A. v. Quinton Henderson

Longshoreman Quinton Henderson sued Irika Shipping S.A. and Prosperity Management S.A. for negligence under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) after a slip and fall injury on a vessel. A jury found all parties negligent, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. The reversal was based on a jury charge error: the omission of language detailing the vessel owner's limited duty to intervene, and the stevedore's primary responsibility for employee safety. The court found this omission was likely to have caused an improper judgment, thus remanding the case for a new trial.

LongshoremanNegligenceMaritime Law33 U.S.C. § 905(b)Jury InstructionsDuty to InterveneAppellate ReviewSlip and FallVessel SafetyStevedore Liability
References
44
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