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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. ANA 0363299
Regular
Jan 03, 2008

JONATHON ROONEY vs. LOWE'S, KEMPER/RELIANCE By SPECIALTY RISK SERVICES

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board denied reconsideration, upholding a prior ruling that an employee can receive compensation for a psychiatric injury even if the underlying physical injury occurred within the first six months of employment. The Board's decision relies on precedent establishing that Labor Code Section 3208.3(d)'s six-month employment requirement is met if the total duration of employment exceeds six months, regardless of whether that period was fully completed before the date of injury. This interpretation aims to prevent fraudulent claims during an employee's initial probationary period, a purpose not undermined when employment continues beyond six months.

Labor Code Section 3208.3(d)psychiatric injurysix-month employment requirementcompensable consequencedate of injuryemployment durationpetition for reconsiderationworkers' compensationCaliforniaapplicant
References
6
Case No. 06-02-00107-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Oct 21, 2003

Joseph Vasquez and Guilda Vasquez, Individually and as Next Friends of Their Minor Child, Kraig Vasquez v. Six Flags Houston, Inc., D/B/A Waterworld and Ray Hedden, Individually

Kraig Vasquez, a minor and lifeguard, sustained a broken neck during a test ride at Six Flags Houston. Six Flags' insurer, TIG Premier Insurance, denied workers' compensation benefits, citing horseplay. Vasquez's parents filed common-law negligence and intentional conduct claims against Six Flags and Ray Hedden. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment, ruling that the injury occurred within the scope of employment and was not due to horseplay, thus the Texas Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy.

Workers' CompensationExclusive RemedySummary JudgmentNegligence ClaimsIntentional TortHorseplay ExceptionCourse of EmploymentTexas Labor LawAppellate AffirmationPersonal Injury
References
20
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Vasquez v. Six Flags Houston, Inc.

Kraig Vasquez, a lifeguard, suffered a broken neck during a test ride at Six Flags' Waterworld. His employer's insurer denied workers' compensation benefits, alleging horseplay. Vasquez's parents subsequently filed common-law negligence and intentional tort claims against Six Flags Houston, Inc. and lead guard Ray Hedden. This appellate court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment, ruling that Vasquez was within the scope of his employment and not engaged in horseplay, thus making workers' compensation the exclusive remedy. The court also found insufficient evidence of intentional action by the employer.

Workers' CompensationExclusive RemedySummary JudgmentNegligence ClaimIntentional TortHorseplay ExceptionCourse of EmploymentTexas Workers' Compensation ActAppellate ReviewEmployer Liability
References
18
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Lamberson v. Six West Retail Acquisition, Inc.

Plaintiff Gregory Lamberson, a Caucasian male, sued his employer, Six West Retail Acquisition Inc., and individuals Sheldon Solow and Jeffery Jacobs, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and New York law. Lamberson claimed he was unlawfully discharged after complaining about the reassignment of an African-American employee, Derrick Caver, from a public-facing role due to his appearance. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Lamberson was fired for poor managerial judgment. The court granted summary judgment on the race discrimination claims, finding Lamberson, as a Caucasian, was not a member of a protected class and failed to show a hostile work environment or infringement on his right to interracial association. However, the court denied summary judgment on the retaliation claims, ruling that Lamberson raised a triable issue as to whether his complaints about Caver's reassignment were protected activity and if there was a causal connection to his discharge. Consequently, retaliation claims against Six West, Solow, and Jacobs survive.

DiscriminationRetaliationTitle VIIRace DiscriminationEmployment LawUnlawful DischargeSummary JudgmentManagerial DutiesEmployee ReassignmentHostile Work Environment
References
43
Case No. ADJ8222509
Regular
May 12, 2015

SARAI CRUZ CANSECO vs. NEW DESSERTS, INC., WAUSAU UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY

This case concerns whether an employee's psychiatric injury claim is barred by Labor Code section 3208.3(d), which typically requires six months of employment, unless the injury resulted from a "sudden and extraordinary employment condition." The applicant, employed for less than six months, injured her wrist and ankle when a bakery cart collapsed. The majority affirmed the WCJ's decision, finding the cart's collapse constituted a sudden and extraordinary event that did not bar the psychiatric claim. The dissenting commissioner argued the collapse was an unforeseen accident but not extraordinary enough to bypass the six-month rule, differentiating it from truly sudden and extraordinary events.

Labor Code section 3208.3(d)psychiatric injurysudden and extraordinary employment conditionsix-month employment rulebakery cart collapseindustrial injurycompensable consequenceroutine employment eventoccupational hazardno-fault system
References
3
Case No. ADJ7217859, ADJ7544106
Regular
Oct 21, 2014

YOLANDA MARTINEZ vs. MASS PRECISION, COMPWEST INSURANCE COMPANY, SCI @ BALANCE STAFFING SERVICE, ZURICH NORTH AMERICA

This case involves applicant Yolanda Martinez claiming industrial injuries (lumbar spine, right shoulder, psyche) from her employment at Mass Precision. Defendant Zurich North America, insurer for SCI @ Balance Staffing Service, contested liability for the psyche injury, arguing applicant's employment by SCI was less than the six-month statutory minimum. The Appeals Board affirmed the WCJ's finding of joint and several liability, holding that prior employment at the same worksite with dual employers counts towards the six-month requirement for psyche injury claims. This decision was based on the principle that the six-month rule aims to prevent claims from routine stress in new employment, a purpose not served when an employee has a longer-term relationship with the worksite.

Workers' Compensation Appeals BoardSpecific InjuryCumulative Trauma InjuryApportionmentPsychiatric InjuryLabor Code Section 3208.3(d)Six Month Employment RequirementDual EmploymentGeneral EmployerSpecial Employer
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In re the Claim of Forbes

Claimant, a psychiatric social worker, was reclassified as an 'independent contractor' by Brooklyn Center for Families in Crisis, Inc. for the last six months of her employment, receiving an hourly rate. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board subsequently ruled that the Center exercised sufficient direction and control over her work, establishing her status as an employee and thus her eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. Despite the re-designation, the claimant continued to treat the same patients in the same manner on the Center’s premises, worked under a supervisor, and the Center established the fees. The court affirmed the Board’s ruling, concluding that substantial evidence supported the finding that claimant and similarly situated individuals were employees of the Center.

Unemployment InsuranceIndependent ContractorEmployee ClassificationPsychiatric Social WorkerEmployer ControlUnemployment Insurance Appeal BoardEmployee BenefitsEmployment StatusAppellate ReviewLabor Law
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Gray v. Myren

The case concerns an appeal regarding a personal injury action filed by a longshoreman against a vessel owner. The longshoreman had received workers' compensation awards for injuries sustained in 1972. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the personal injury action was time-barred under 33 U.S.C. § 933(b), which mandates commencing such actions within six months of accepting a compensation award. Specifically, the defendant claimed a May 8, 1973 "Memorandum of Informal Conference" constituted an award. The appellate court, adopting the Second Circuit's interpretation, ruled that an interim award for temporary total disability does not trigger the six-month statute of limitations. The court held that the limitation period begins only when the injured worker knows the full extent of their compensation, which occurred on May 6, 1974, with the award for permanent partial disability. Consequently, the plaintiff's action, filed within six months of the latter date, was timely. The court modified the lower court's order to deny the defendant leave to amend their answer, finding the proposed statute of limitations defense legally insufficient, and otherwise affirmed.

LongshoremenHarbor WorkersStatute of LimitationsPersonal InjuryThird-Party ActionInterim AwardPermanent Partial DisabilityTemporary Total DisabilityAppellate ReviewFederal Law
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Srite v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.

This opinion addresses an appeal from nine consolidated asbestos cases where a jury found liability but awarded no past damages to several plaintiffs. The court, HEDGES, Justice, reviewed the proper standard of appellate review for zero damages verdicts, distinguishing between objective and subjective symptoms of injury and adhering to the Pool v. Ford Motor Co. standard. The court upheld the jury's zero past damages awards for most plaintiffs, finding them not against the great weight of the evidence. However, it reversed the trial court's application of the statute of limitations to the Spikes family's claim, remanding it for further proceedings. Additionally, the court sustained the point of error regarding prejudgment interest calculation, ruling that under Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., interest should accrue six months after the last day of asbestos exposure, rather than six months after the lawsuit filing date, and remanded the Burt and Friley cases for recalculation. The court also addressed, but did not rule on the merits of, an expert testimony admissibility challenge due to procedural errors by the plaintiffs.

Asbestos litigationzero damagesprejudgment interestappellate reviewcomparative negligencestrict liabilitylatent diseasestatute of limitationsexpert testimonymedical examination
References
36
Case No. ADJ6714992
Regular
Dec 17, 2010

JILL RUTH HAMILTON vs. DOHERTY EMPLOYMENT GROUP, INC., WAUSAU INSURANCE

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board granted reconsideration and reversed the WCJ's decision, finding the applicant's claim for psychiatric injury barred under Labor Code section 3208.3(d). The Board clarified that "employment" for the six-month rule means actual performance of services, not just being on the company's books or receiving benefits. The applicant's actual paid work period was 179 days (5 months and 26 days), falling short of the required six months. Therefore, her claim for psychological injury was dismissed.

Workers' Compensation Appeals BoardReconsiderationLabor Code section 3208.3(d)Cumulative trauma injuryPsychiatric injurySix-month employment ruleActual servicesRemuneratedSudden and extraordinary employment conditionDate of injury
References
3
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