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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Second Injury Fund v. American Motorists Insurance Co.

This case addresses whether a 1971 amendment to Texas workers' compensation law (Article 8306, Sections 12c and 12c-l) permits an insurance carrier to be reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund when an employee's total and permanent incapacity results from a combination of general, rather than specific, injuries. The trial court had granted a $16,000 judgment for the carrier, American Motorist Insurance Company, but the Second Injury Fund appealed. Citing the precedent set in Second Injury Fund v. Keaton, the appellate court clarified that the 1971 amendment did not expand the fund's liability beyond specific injuries. The court emphasized that legislative intent to alter this established rule was not evident in the amendment. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, ruling against reimbursement for general injuries.

Second Injury FundWorkers' CompensationGeneral InjuriesSpecific InjuriesReimbursementStatutory InterpretationArticle 8306Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St.Appellate ReviewLegislative Intent
References
6
Case No. 03-98-00169-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 17, 1999

Texas Workers' Compensation Commission and Subsequent Injury Fund v. Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool

The Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool (Risk Pool) challenged the constitutionality of specific provisions within the Texas Workers' Compensation Act and related Texas Workers' Compensation Commission (TWCC) rules. These provisions mandated contributions to the Subsequent Injury Fund, which the Risk Pool argued violated constitutional restrictions on political subdivisions lending credit or granting public money, and imposing state ad valorem property taxes. The trial court initially sided with the Risk Pool, declaring the requirements unconstitutional as applied to its members. On appeal, the Court of Appeals addressed the Risk Pool's standing and the core constitutional arguments. The appellate court characterized the mandatory contributions as analogous to a custodial escheat statute, where the state assumes custody of unclaimed death benefits rather than gaining absolute ownership. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the Risk Pool failed to meet its burden for an "as applied" constitutional challenge, notably by not asserting a limitations defense.

Workers' Compensation ActSubsequent Injury FundDeclaratory JudgmentConstitutional ChallengeAs-Applied ChallengeAssociational StandingAcceptance of Benefits DoctrineEscheat LawCustodial EscheatUnclaimed Death Benefits
References
18
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Claude Henninger Company v. Bentley

Curtis Bentley, a manual laborer, suffered a fall from a scaffold while working for Claude Henninger Company, resulting in severe injuries to his left foot and heel. The injury necessitated medical care, including a cast and surgery, leaving him with persistent pain, numbness, arthritis, and requiring a brace, thereby significantly impacting his ability to perform manual labor. The lower court determined Bentley had a 75% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, awarding him workers' compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, rejecting the employer's argument to limit compensation to the specific injured member, and reiterated that if an injury to a specific member affects the body as a whole, compensation for general disability is appropriate.

Workers' CompensationPermanent Partial DisabilityBody as a Whole InjurySpecific Member InjuryScaffold AccidentFoot InjuryLaborer DisabilityAppellate ReviewTennessee Workers' Compensation LawPrecedent
References
5
Case No. No. 29-30
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 21, 2022

In the Matter of the Claim of Thomas Johnson; In the Matter of the Claim of Joseph D. Liuni

This opinion addresses two appeals concerning Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL) § 15, specifically whether a schedule loss of use (SLU) award for a subsequent injury to a subpart of an enumerated body "member" must be reduced by a prior SLU award to a different subpart of the same member. The Court of Appeals holds that WCL § 15 (7) allows for multiple SLU awards for successive injuries to the same statutory body member, provided the claimant demonstrates that the second injury, considered by itself, caused an increased loss of use. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division's order in Matter of Johnson v City of New York, finding that claimant Thomas Johnson failed to provide sufficient evidence that his knee injuries caused a further loss of use of his legs beyond that addressed in a prior SLU award for hip injuries. Conversely, the Court reversed the Appellate Division's order in Matter of Liuni v Gander Mountain, remitting the case for further proceedings because claimant Joseph D. Liuni did provide evidence that his later shoulder injury caused a distinct increase in the loss of use of his arm separate from a prior elbow injury. The decision clarifies the application of WCL § 15 (7) regarding successive SLU awards and the burden of proof on claimants.

Workers' Compensation LawSchedule Loss of Use (SLU)Successive InjuriesBody Member ImpairmentOffset RulePrior Disability CompensationEarning CapacityStatutory InterpretationAppellate ReviewMedical Evidence
References
33
Case No. 2020 NY Slip Op 06424 [188 AD3d 1381]
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 12, 2020

Matter of Hluska v. Central New York Psychiatric Ctr.

Claimant Kevin Hluska, who previously received a 13% schedule loss of use (SLU) award for his left arm due to a 2016 shoulder injury, sustained a new work-related injury to his left elbow in 2017. His physician determined this new injury resulted in a 10% SLU of the left arm. The Workers' Compensation Law Judge and the Workers' Compensation Board ruled that claimant was not entitled to a further SLU award for the elbow injury because the previous SLU award for the same arm exceeded the current impairment. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed this decision, citing Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (3), which limits SLU awards for permanent impairments to specific body parts and allows for multiple awards only if for more than one member or parts of more than one member, but the total award for a member is capped.

Schedule Loss of UseSLU AwardLeft Arm InjuryElbow InjuryShoulder InjuryWorkers' Compensation Board DecisionAppellate Division Third DepartmentPermanent ImpairmentPrior AwardSubsequent Injury
References
4
Case No. 10-93-224-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 18, 1994

Subsequent Injury Fund of the State of Texas (Formerly the Second Injury Fund) v. Larry Milligan

The Subsequent Injury Fund appeals a judgment awarding Larry Milligan lifetime benefits for injuries sustained at work. Milligan suffered two ankle injuries in 1987 and a third in 1989, leading to the total loss of use of both feet. He sued the Fund for lifetime benefits after settling with the workers' compensation carrier. The jury found permanent, total loss of use of both feet. The Fund challenged its statutory liability for lifetime benefits and the court's refusal to submit a jury question on total and permanent incapacity. The appellate court affirmed, finding the first issue unpreserved and the second resolved by a statutory conclusive presumption of total and permanent incapacity for the loss of both feet.

Workers' Compensation LawSubsequent Injury FundLifetime BenefitsTotal Permanent IncapacityAnkle InjuriesStatutory InterpretationAppellate ReviewJury InstructionsConclusive PresumptionOccupational Injuries
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Dotson v. Rice-Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc.

This workers' compensation case addresses whether reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) affecting a scheduled member always entitles a claimant to body-as-a-whole compensation. The plaintiff, Ronnie Dotson, sustained a work-related injury to his left arm, leading to RSD. The trial court awarded permanent total disability benefits, interpreting the AMA Guides as mandating body-as-a-whole apportionment for RSD. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, clarifying that while AMA Guides are tools for anatomical disability rating, they do not supersede statutory compensation classifications. The Court held that RSD compensation is limited to scheduled member benefits if the injury's effects are confined to that member, and body-as-a-whole compensation requires the injury to affect an unscheduled body portion or a specific combination of members. Finding no evidence that Dotson's RSD extended beyond his left arm, the Supreme Court vacated the total disability award and limited his benefits to 200 weeks for the total loss of his arm, remanding the case for consistent proceedings.

Workers' CompensationReflex Sympathetic DystrophyScheduled Member InjuryBody-as-a-Whole CompensationPermanent Partial DisabilityPermanent Total DisabilityAMA GuidesAnatomical ImpairmentVocational DisabilityTennessee Law
References
19
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Vandever v. Voris

This case is an appeal from a compensation order entered by former Deputy Commissioner Voris under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The order concerned Libellant C. M. Vandever, who suffered a 40% permanent partial disability in 1948, which combined with a previous 60% permanent partial disability from 1939, resulted in total permanent disability. The Deputy Commissioner had ordered the employer and its insurance carrier to pay $10,000 for the second injury, with the expectation that the remainder for total permanent incapacity would come from the Special Fund. The Libellant sought payment for total permanent disability, either directly or from the Special Fund. The present Deputy Commissioner moved for a remand, suggesting an error in the previous determination, but this motion was overruled. The central controversy involved the interpretation of section 8(f) and section 44 of the Act, specifically whether these sections applied only to specific member injuries or also to general injuries. The court affirmed the original award, holding that section 8(f) is not limited to specific injuries and that the Libellant is entitled to the balance of compensation for total permanent disability from the Special Fund.

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation ActPermanent Partial DisabilityPermanent Total DisabilitySecond Injury FundSpecial FundSubsequent InjuryDisability CompensationWage Earning CapacitySpinal InjuryPrior Injury
References
1
Case No. No. 08-07-00346-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 24, 2010

W.C. LaRock, D.C., P.C. D/B/A Auto & Work Injury Clinic and Maria Del Carmen Gallardo/Rosemary Smith v. Rosemary Smith/W.C. LaRock, D.C., P.C. D/B/A Auto & Work Injury Clinic and Maria Del Carmen Gallardo

Rosemary Smith, an El Paso Police Officer, sued W.C. LaRock, D.C., P.C., d/b/a Auto & Work Injury Clinic, and its employee Maria Gallardo, alleging negligence after a physical therapy session aggravated a prior back injury. The City of El Paso, Smith's worker's compensation subrogee, joined as a plaintiff. The jury found Gallardo negligent, awarding Smith $488,000, which the trial court reduced to $339,983.58. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals found the expert testimony on causation insufficient to establish that Gallardo's therapy proximately caused Smith's reherniation, as the expert only stated it was "possible." The court reversed the trial court's judgment.

Medical MalpracticeNegligenceCausationExpert TestimonyPhysical TherapyHerniated DiscSpinal SurgeryProximate CauseLegal SufficiencyAppeal
References
33
Case No. 2020 NY Slip Op 05264
Regular Panel Decision
Oct 01, 2020

Matter of Rickard v. Central New York Psychiatric Ctr.

Claimant James Rickard suffered a work-related injury to his left knee while restraining a patient. An orthopedist determined he sustained a 17.5% schedule loss of use (SLU) of his left leg, specifically 7.5% for loss of extension and 10% for chondromalacia. The workers' compensation carrier sought credit for a prior 10% SLU award to the same left leg stemming from a 2015 hip injury. Both the Workers' Compensation Law Judge and the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed this credit, resulting in a 7.5% SLU award for the current injury. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the Board's decision, holding that prior SLU awards for the same body member should be credited against subsequent awards, as all impairments to separate parts of a member are encompassed by the overall SLU award for that member.

Workers' CompensationSchedule Loss of UseLeft Leg InjuryPrior Injury CreditMaximum Medical ImprovementChondromalaciaKnee InjuryHip InjuryAppellate Division DecisionCredit Application
References
4
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