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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 02-S-01-9508-CV-00077
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 01, 1998

What Happened in Felix vs. Weber Metals Reconsideration?

The concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Janice M. Holder addresses the majority's decision regarding workers' compensation. Justice Holder concurs with the majority's conclusion that permanent and total disability awards are payable until age sixty-five and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a) is applicable to the case. However, she dissents from the majority's analysis of apportionment, arguing it discourages hiring the handicapped and contradicts the legislative intent of the Second Injury Fund. She contends that an employer's liability should be capped at 400 weeks unless a subsequent injury independently caused permanent and total disability. Furthermore, Justice Holder disagrees with the majority's interpretation that subsections (a) and (b) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102 are not mutually exclusive, advocating for the exclusive application of subsection (a) in cases of prior injuries leading to total disability, and subsection (b) solely when an employee has received multiple permanent partial disability awards exceeding 100 percent in aggregate.

Workers' CompensationPermanent Total DisabilityApportionmentSecond Injury FundStatutory InterpretationEmployer LiabilityPrior InjuriesSubsequent InjuryTennessee LawJudicial Dissent
References
1
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

How Did the WCAB Rule in Hardgrove vs. Intercon Security?

The Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed a workers' compensation case involving Betty Nelson, who sustained a broken hip while working for Wal-Mart, resulting in an 8% medical impairment to the body as a whole. The primary issues were whether there was a "meaningful return to work" under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 and the applicability of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242 to lift statutory disability caps. The Court affirmed the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel’s finding that there was no "meaningful return to work" because Wal-Mart's job offers were not reasonable given Nelson's physical limitations and lack of accommodation. Consequently, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(b) applied, allowing for a higher maximum disability award. The Court also affirmed that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242 applied due to Nelson's age, lack of education, and job skills, permitting the award to exceed the statutory cap. The Court upheld the trial court's award of 60% permanent partial disability, modifying the Panel's judgment regarding the specific statutory sections.

Workers' CompensationPermanent Partial DisabilityMeaningful Return to WorkStatutory CapsMedical Impairment RatingVocational DisabilityAge FactorEducational BackgroundJob Skills TransferabilityEmployer Accommodation
References
5
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

What Did the WCAB Decide in Cuadra vs. Community Home Care?

In this workers’ compensation action, employee Wayne Eldred Hill was determined by the trial court to be permanently and totally disabled. The trial court initially apportioned 10 percent of the award to the employer and 90 percent to the Second Injury Fund, applying Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a). The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel modified this apportionment, assigning 65 percent to the employer and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund under Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). Upon full-court review, the Supreme Court of Tennessee referenced its decision in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp. (Tenn.1998) and concluded that the trial court's original apportionment under § 50-6-208(a) was correct. The Court affirmed the employer's 10 percent liability for the disability resulting from the last compensable injury and the Second Injury Fund's 90 percent liability for prior injuries, effectively reversing the Appeals Panel's modification.

Workers' CompensationPermanent Total DisabilitySecond Injury FundApportionment of LiabilityCarpal Tunnel SyndromeBack InjuryBrain InjuryVocational DisabilityPre-existing ConditionSubsequent Injury
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

How Were Death Benefits Handled in Bocanegra vs. Sun-Gro Commodities?

The Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed a workers' compensation case to determine if a lump sum award, granted under Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-231, could be reconsidered and increased under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2) after an employee's loss of employment. Employee Christopher Niziol suffered a back injury while working for Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., receiving a $35,000 lump sum settlement based on 27.99% permanent partial disability. After Niziol's termination, he sought to increase his award, which the trial court granted, raising it to 50% permanent partial disability. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel reversed, citing the finality of lump sum awards. Relying on the precedent set in Brewer v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., the Supreme Court reversed the Panel's decision, reinstating the trial court's judgment, affirming that lump sum awards can be reconsidered and enlarged under § 241(a)(2) regardless of the reason for job loss.

Workers' CompensationLump Sum AwardPermanent Partial DisabilityStatutory InterpretationReconsideration of AwardLoss of EmploymentIndustrial DisabilityTenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2)Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-231Appeals Panel Reversal
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Can a WCJ Be Disqualified for Appearance of Bias?

This workers' compensation appeal addressed the calculation of permanent partial impairment benefits. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel reviewed a trial court's award of 75 percent permanent partial impairment. The Panel determined that the award must be limited to six times the medical impairment rating, as per Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241(b), because the plaintiff failed to present clear and convincing evidence to meet the exceptions outlined in Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-242. Consequently, the Panel modified the judgment, reducing the award to 36 percent permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole.

Workers' CompensationPermanent Partial ImpairmentMedical ImpairmentVocational ImpairmentDisability BenefitsStatutory InterpretationClear and Convincing EvidenceAppellate ReviewJudgment ModificationTennessee Law
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

What Were the Key Rulings in Torrez vs. SuperShuttle?

This case addresses the calculation of permanent partial disability awards for employees over age 60 under Tennessee's Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court of Tennessee was asked to determine if such awards should be calculated as a percentage of 400 weeks, with a cap at 260 weeks, or as a percentage of 260 weeks. The Court held that awards are properly calculated at 400 weeks, capped at 260 weeks, for employees over 60. Additionally, the Court considered the application of Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-242, which allows awards exceeding the statutory 'multiplier' provision of Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241(b) if supported by clear and convincing evidence. The case was remanded to the trial court for specific documentation of the clear and convincing evidence supporting an award in excess of the multiplier provision.

Workers' CompensationPermanent Partial DisabilityDisability Benefits CalculationAge 60+ EmployeesStatutory InterpretationTennessee LawVocational DisabilityMedical Impairment RatingMultiplier Provision ExceptionRemand for Findings
References
11
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Why Was Removal Denied in Rush vs. California Correctional Institution?

Plaintiff James T. Gibson was injured on June 12, 1984, while operating a machine at his workplace, Steiner-Liff Textile Products Company, leading to the traumatic amputation of four fingers. He initially sued CNA Insurance Company, his employer's workers' compensation carrier, in March 1985. Through discovery, he identified Lockwood Products as the manufacturer and sued them on June 10, 1985. Lockwood, however, denied manufacturing the machine and identified Loren Cook Company as the manufacturer and R.D. Herbert & Sons as the installer. Gibson then joined Loren Cook Company and R.D. Herbert & Sons as defendants. These new defendants moved to dismiss based on the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss and Lockwood's motion for summary judgment on January 7, 1986. Gibson appealed the dismissal of Loren Cook Company and R.D. Herbert & Sons. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that Gibson failed to exercise due diligence in identifying the actual manufacturer and installer, thus his suit was barred by Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104. The court also clarified that the employer's six-month extension for filing suit under Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-112(d) does not extend to the employee.

Statute of LimitationsDiscovery RuleProducts LiabilityDue DiligenceWorkers' CompensationTort LawPersonal InjuryManufacturer IdentificationAppellate Review
References
8
Case No. M2009-00813-COA-R3-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Sep 14, 2010

What Did the WCAB Clarify in Ontiveros vs. Savers Stores?

This is an administrative appeal concerning the suspension of Dr. Joseph Edward Rich's medical license by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners. The Board found Dr. Rich in violation of several provisions related to his use of chelation therapy, intravenous hydrogen peroxide therapy, and methadone. The chancery court affirmed the Board's decision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the findings for Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(b)(1), (4), and (12) due to the Board's failure to articulate the standard of care. However, the court affirmed violations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(b)(14), Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0880-2-.14(6)(c), Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0880-2-.14(6)(e)(3)(ii), and 21 U.S.C.A § 823(g)(1). The case was remanded for the Board to reconsider the sanctions.

Medical License SuspensionChelation TherapyMethadone TreatmentAdministrative LawStandard of CareDue ProcessEvidence ExclusionPhysician MisconductControlled SubstancesBoard of Medical Examiners
References
18
Case No. 01S01-9708-BC-00173
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 07, 1998

Why Was Reconsideration Denied in Gomez vs. Dorothy Stevens?

This case addresses whether the State of Tennessee may be held liable for discretionary costs in a workers' compensation claim. Plaintiff Billy R. Phillips sustained a work-related injury and sought to recover discretionary costs, including a treating physician's fee, court reporter costs, and a vocational disability expert's fee. The Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled that the State is only liable for costs expressly permitted by statute, specifically allowing the treating physician's fee under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-226(c)(1) as an exception to the general prohibition against taxing discretionary costs against the State found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(d). The Court affirmed the claims commission's judgment denying other discretionary costs, while upholding the modified disability award of thirty-seven percent to the body as a whole.

Discretionary CostsState LiabilityWorkers' Compensation ActClaims Commission StatuteStatutory InterpretationCourt CostsTreating Physician FeesVocational Disability ExpertRule 54.04Tennessee Supreme Court
References
5
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Why Was Reconsideration Dismissed in Sabino vs. Johnson Pump Company?

Roy L. Leab, a 58-year-old former coal miner with limited education, sustained a compensable back injury while working for S & H Mining Company. He was assigned a 12% whole person anatomical impairment rating and was unable to return to heavy manual labor. The trial court awarded Leab 85% disability to the body as a whole, exceeding the statutory multiplier provision by applying Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-242, and commuted the benefits to a lump sum. S & H appealed, arguing the requirements of § 50-6-242 were not met and that the trial court failed to document clear and convincing evidence or make a finding regarding the lump sum award being in Leab's best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed Leab's eligibility for benefits under § 50-6-242, clarifying its interpretation, but remanded the case for the trial court to document the clear and convincing evidence supporting the award and to make a specific finding on the record regarding the lump sum award being in Leab's best interest.

Workers' Compensation AppealPermanent Partial DisabilityStatutory InterpretationMultiplier ProvisionLump Sum AwardVocational DisabilityMedical Impairment RatingRemand for DocumentationClear and Convincing EvidenceEducational Attainment
References
10
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