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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING

Regular Panel Decision

Sep 09, 1998

In re the Claim of Peabody

The claimant appealed a decision by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed on September 9, 1998, which ruled that the claimant was not entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits. This denial was based on Labor Law § 591 (5), a 1996 amendment that limits unemployment benefits when a claimant also receives workers' compensation benefits exceeding their average weekly wage. The claimant contended that the statutory limitation should consider the pre-injury weekly wage used for workers' compensation. However, the Board, and subsequently the court, found no textual basis to interpret 'average weekly wage' in Labor Law § 591 (5) differently from its definition in Labor Law former § 590 (2). Consequently, the Board's conclusion was affirmed.

Unemployment benefitsWorkers' compensation offsetStatutory interpretationAverage weekly wage calculationBenefit eligibilityLabor Law § 591(5)Appeal Board decisionJudicial reviewAffirmed decision

References

Case No. 10-0245

Regular Panel Decision

May 27, 2011

Patrick O. Ojo, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Farmers Group, Inc., Fire Underwriters Association, Fire Insurance Exchange, Farmers Underwriters Association, and Farmers Insurance Exchange

Justice Willett's concurring opinion in Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc. agrees with the majority's outcome that the Insurance Code, as written, does not support a cause of action for disparate impact discrimination related to credit scoring. However, he sharply criticizes the majority's methodology, particularly its reliance on extratextual aids like legislative history and failed bills, arguing such practices are "inappropriate" when a statute is unambiguous. Willett emphasizes the principle of textualism, asserting that "where text is clear, text is determinative," and warns against the manipulation of legislative history. He also disputes Chief Justice Jefferson's proposed distinction between "contextualizing" and "construing" legislative materials, viewing it as a tenuous attempt to justify the use of unreliable evidence. Ultimately, Justice Willett advocates for consistent, predictable statutory interpretation rooted solely in plain language to ensure clarity and stability in the law.

Statutory InterpretationLegislative HistoryTextualismDisparate ImpactInsurance CodeTexas Supreme CourtJudicial PrecedentConcurring OpinionCredit ScoringAmbiguity

References

Case No. MISSING

Regular Panel Decision

Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc.

Justice Willett's concurring opinion agrees with the Court's outcome in Molinet v. Kimbrell, finding that the Insurance Code, as written, does not create a cause of action for disparate impact discrimination related to credit scoring. However, Justice Willett strongly criticizes the Court's methodological approach, arguing that it inappropriately resorts to extratextual aids and legislative history despite the statute's unambiguous language. He emphasizes the principle of textualism, where clear statutory text should be determinative, and deems the use of external sources like failed bills and statements from bill opponents as unreliable and inconsistent with established judicial precedent. Willett expresses concern that the Court's deviation undermines interpretive consistency and predictability in statutory interpretation, which is vital for courts, litigants, and citizens. He also finds the Chief Justice's distinction between 'contextualizing' and 'construing' legislative history to be a 'gossamer-thin' and hazardous distinction, potentially inviting semantic manipulation and reliance on untrustworthy evidence.

Statutory InterpretationTextualismLegislative HistoryJudicial PrecedentInsurance CodeDisparate ImpactCredit ScoringLegal MethodologyConcurring OpinionTexas Supreme Court

References

Case No. MISSING

Regular Panel Decision

Reed v. Cooper (In Re Cooper)

This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses a motion by The Cadle Company, an individual creditor, seeking authorization to prosecute the Chapter 7 estate's causes of action, specifically a Section 542 turnover action and state law fraud claims. The motion was opposed by the debtors, Gary R. and Junanne M. Cooper, and conditionally by the Chapter 7 Trustee. The court analyzes whether an individual creditor in a Chapter 7 case can be granted independent or derivative standing to pursue estate causes of action, distinguishing between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 contexts. The court concludes there is no textual basis in the Bankruptcy Code for such standing in a Chapter 7 case, noting the unique role of the Chapter 7 trustee as an independent fiduciary without the conflicts of interest often present in Chapter 11. Even if such power existed, the court finds Cadle did not present a compelling argument, as the Trustee had exercised business judgment in attempting to settle the claims. The court ultimately DENIES Cadle's Standing Motion, stating that while Cadle can pursue its independent Section 727(d) action, it cannot usurp the Trustee's role.

Chapter 7 BankruptcyDerivative StandingCreditor StandingTrustee AuthorityEstate Causes of ActionAvoidance ActionsBankruptcy Code InterpretationEquitable PowersJudicial DiscretionMotion Denied

References

Case No. 574 F.3d 24

Regular Panel Decision

Zakrzewska v. NEW SCHOOL

Dominika Zakrzewska filed a diversity suit against KwangWen Pan and The New School, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York initially considered the employer's liability, assuming the Faragher-Ellerth defense might apply. The District Court then found the Faragher-Ellerth defense inconsistent with the plain language of NYCHRL 8-107 (13) (b), which appears to impose vicarious liability on employers for discriminatory acts of managers or supervisors regardless of the employer's knowledge or corrective actions. The District Court certified an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit regarding the applicability of the Faragher-Ellerth defense under the NYCHRL. The Second Circuit, in turn, certified this question to the New York Court of Appeals. The New York Court of Appeals, affirming the District Court's textual interpretation, concluded that the Faragher-Ellerth defense does not apply to sexual harassment and retaliation claims under NYCHRL 8-107 because the local law imposes strict liability for acts of managers and supervisors and provides for mitigation of penalties rather than a complete defense.

Sexual HarassmentRetaliationEmployer LiabilityVicarious LiabilityFaragher-Ellerth DefenseNew York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL)New York Administrative CodeStatutory InterpretationSummary JudgmentCertified Question

References

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In re the Claim of Peabody

Unemployment benefitsWorkers' compensation offsetStatutory interpretationAverage weekly wage calculationBenefit eligibilityLabor Law § 591(5)Appeal Board decisionJudicial reviewAffirmed decision

Patrick O. Ojo, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Farmers Group, Inc., Fire Underwriters Association, Fire Insurance Exchange, Farmers Underwriters Association, and Farmers Insurance Exchange

Statutory InterpretationLegislative HistoryTextualismDisparate ImpactInsurance CodeTexas Supreme CourtJudicial PrecedentConcurring OpinionCredit ScoringAmbiguity

Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc.

Statutory InterpretationTextualismLegislative HistoryJudicial PrecedentInsurance CodeDisparate ImpactCredit ScoringLegal MethodologyConcurring OpinionTexas Supreme Court

Reed v. Cooper (In Re Cooper)

Chapter 7 BankruptcyDerivative StandingCreditor StandingTrustee AuthorityEstate Causes of ActionAvoidance ActionsBankruptcy Code InterpretationEquitable PowersJudicial DiscretionMotion Denied

Zakrzewska v. NEW SCHOOL