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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In re Eastern District Repetitive Stress Injury Litigation

The defendants sought to transfer 78 repetitive stress injury (RSI) cases from the Eastern District of New York to districts where the claims arose, also seeking severance of individual claims. Over 450 RSI cases, involving over 1,000 plaintiffs against more than 100 equipment manufacturers, were initially consolidated in the Eastern District. However, the Second Circuit later vacated the consolidation orders, finding it an abuse of discretion due to lack of common facts and varying state laws. Relying on this guidance, the court granted transfer in 75 cases and denied it in three, citing factors such as convenience of parties and witnesses, judicial economy, and the public interest in local adjudication of local controversies. The court also ordered severance where necessary to facilitate transfer.

Transfer of VenueMultidistrict LitigationRepetitive Stress InjuryProducts LiabilityForum Non ConveniensSeverance of ClaimsConsolidation of CasesJudicial EconomyWitness ConvenienceChoice of Forum
References
16
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Second Injury Fund v. Martinez

Vera Martinez, an injured worker, sought compensation after a workplace injury combined with a pre-existing condition resulted in total permanent incapacity. The Industrial Accident Board initially awarded her limited compensation. Martinez appealed this decision, filing suit against her compensation carrier and, over seven months later, against the Second Injury Fund. The appellate court addressed whether the statutory 20-day period for filing suit after appealing an Industrial Accident Board decision applies to claims against the Second Injury Fund. The court held that this jurisdictional prerequisite applies, and because Martinez failed to timely file suit against the Second Injury Fund, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Fund. Consequently, the judgment against the Second Injury Fund was reversed.

Workers' CompensationSecond Injury FundTexas LawJurisdictionTimelinessStatutory InterpretationAppellate ProcedureIndustrial Accident BoardPermanent IncapacityPolio
References
10
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

State Ex Rel. Second Injury Fund v. Mireles

Felix T. Míreles, who lost vision in one eye in childhood, suffered a second workplace injury resulting in total blindness. After receiving 100 weeks of benefits for the second injury from his employer's insurer, he sought lifetime benefits from the Second Injury Fund. The State of Texas, as trustee of the Fund, appealed a trial court judgment ordering lifetime benefits, arguing Míreles was only entitled to 301 additional weeks based on the 401-week maximum under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The appellate court examined statutory provisions, emphasizing liberal construction in favor of the employee and the legislative intent behind the Second Injury Fund to fully compensate employees with successive injuries. The court concluded that article 8306, section 12c-l, provides for lifetime benefits from the Second Injury Fund in such cases, affirming the trial court's judgment.

Workers' CompensationSecond Injury FundLifetime BenefitsStatutory InterpretationTotal Permanent IncapacitySuccessive InjuriesHandicapped EmploymentTexas LawAppellate ReviewVisual Impairment
References
6
Case No. 2020 NY Slip Op 04437 [186 AD3d 401]
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 06, 2020

Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp.

This case, part of the New York City Asbestos Litigation, involved claims from William E. Robaey and Marlena Robaey against Federal-Mogul Asbestos Personal Injury Trust, among others, for peritoneal mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure from gaskets. A jury awarded significant damages for pain and suffering and loss of consortium. On appeal, Federal-Mogul challenged the sufficiency of evidence for specific causation and the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the finding of specific causation, distinguishing the facts from prior rulings, particularly Juni. However, the court found the damages for past pain and suffering and past loss of consortium materially deviated from reasonable compensation and ordered a new trial on those damages unless the plaintiff agreed to a stipulated reduction.

Asbestos LitigationMesotheliomaToxic TortSpecific CausationExpert TestimonyDamages RemittiturPain and SufferingLoss of ConsortiumAppellate ReviewJury Verdict
References
16
Case No. 10-93-224-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 18, 1994

Subsequent Injury Fund of the State of Texas (Formerly the Second Injury Fund) v. Larry Milligan

The Subsequent Injury Fund appeals a judgment awarding Larry Milligan lifetime benefits for injuries sustained at work. Milligan suffered two ankle injuries in 1987 and a third in 1989, leading to the total loss of use of both feet. He sued the Fund for lifetime benefits after settling with the workers' compensation carrier. The jury found permanent, total loss of use of both feet. The Fund challenged its statutory liability for lifetime benefits and the court's refusal to submit a jury question on total and permanent incapacity. The appellate court affirmed, finding the first issue unpreserved and the second resolved by a statutory conclusive presumption of total and permanent incapacity for the loss of both feet.

Workers' Compensation LawSubsequent Injury FundLifetime BenefitsTotal Permanent IncapacityAnkle InjuriesStatutory InterpretationAppellate ReviewJury InstructionsConclusive PresumptionOccupational Injuries
References
6
Case No. No. 08-07-00346-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 24, 2010

W.C. LaRock, D.C., P.C. D/B/A Auto & Work Injury Clinic and Maria Del Carmen Gallardo/Rosemary Smith v. Rosemary Smith/W.C. LaRock, D.C., P.C. D/B/A Auto & Work Injury Clinic and Maria Del Carmen Gallardo

Rosemary Smith, an El Paso Police Officer, sued W.C. LaRock, D.C., P.C., d/b/a Auto & Work Injury Clinic, and its employee Maria Gallardo, alleging negligence after a physical therapy session aggravated a prior back injury. The City of El Paso, Smith's worker's compensation subrogee, joined as a plaintiff. The jury found Gallardo negligent, awarding Smith $488,000, which the trial court reduced to $339,983.58. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals found the expert testimony on causation insufficient to establish that Gallardo's therapy proximately caused Smith's reherniation, as the expert only stated it was "possible." The court reversed the trial court's judgment.

Medical MalpracticeNegligenceCausationExpert TestimonyPhysical TherapyHerniated DiscSpinal SurgeryProximate CauseLegal SufficiencyAppeal
References
33
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Johnson v. Second Injury Fund

Walter Johnson, who had previously lost vision in his right eye, suffered an injury at work resulting in the loss of vision in his left eye, leaving him totally and permanently disabled. He received benefits from Texas Employer’s Insurance Association and the Second Injury Fund. Johnson and his wife then sued Texas Industries, Inc. for negligence. Both TEIA and the Second Injury Fund intervened, seeking subrogation rights. The trial court denied the Second Injury Fund's claim to subrogation, but the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court reviewed whether the Second Injury Fund is subrogated to Walter Johnson's rights in his personal injury suit. The Court concluded that subrogation is a legislative creation and the statute funding the Second Injury Fund explicitly enumerates funding methods without including subrogation. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and affirmed the trial court's decision, denying subrogation for the Second Injury Fund.

SubrogationSecond Injury FundWorkers' CompensationStatutory InterpretationExpressio Unius Est Exclusio AlteriusTotal DisabilityPersonal InjuryTexas Supreme CourtFunding MechanismsLegislative Intent
References
9
Case No. 01 Civ. 6060; 01 Civ. 6062; 01 Civ. 11878; 02 Civ. 1719; 02 Civ. 1724; 02 Civ. 9952
Regular Panel Decision

In Re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation

Defendants Pfizer, Inc. sought summary judgment against nine plaintiffs in an MDL concerning the diabetes drug Rezulin. The plaintiffs claimed either no injury, fear of future injury, or subcellular mitochondrial damage. The court ruled that while subcellular injury might establish Article III standing, it was not a compensable injury under Texas law without a clinically manifest detriment. Similarly, claims for fear of future injury failed under both Texas and Louisiana law due to the absence of a manifest physical injury or special circumstances. Economic claims for fraud and redhibition under Louisiana law were also dismissed. Consequently, the court granted Pfizer's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claims of the specified plaintiffs.

Product LiabilitySummary JudgmentNo-Injury ClaimsFear of Future InjuryMitochondrial DamageSubcellular InjuryArticle III StandingTexas LawLouisiana Products Liability ActEconomic Damages
References
10
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Ruedemann v. Energy Operators, Inc.

Plaintiff Charles Ruedemann initiated a personal injury lawsuit after sustaining injuries on a drilling platform off the coast of Africa. He sued several entities, including Energy Operators, Inc. (EOI) and CMS Oil and Gas Company. EOI and CMS Oil subsequently filed motions to compel arbitration and stay litigation, citing an arbitration clause in Ruedemann's Independent Contractor Agreement, which designated Texas law for governance. The Court, presided over by District Judge Kent, denied both motions. It concluded that Ruedemann's personal injury claims did not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement under Texas law, as they did not require reference to the contract to be maintained.

ArbitrationPersonal InjuryIndependent ContractorChoice of LawTexas LawFederal Arbitration ActScope of Arbitration ClauseMotion to CompelDrilling PlatformNegligence
References
9
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 26, 2016

The Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation , Doris Kay Dummitt v. A.W. Chesterton , The Matter of Eighth Judicial District Asbestos Litigation , Joann H. Suttner v. A.W. Chesterton Company

This New York Court of Appeals opinion addresses the scope of a manufacturer's duty to warn regarding dangers arising from the use of its product in combination with a third-party product. The Court held that such a duty exists when the third-party product is necessary for the manufacturer's product to function as intended, whether due to design, mechanics, or economic necessity, and the danger is known and foreseeable. Applying this rule, the Court affirmed judgments against Crane Co. in two separate asbestos litigations, finding that Crane had a duty to warn users of its valves about asbestos exposure from third-party sealing components. The decision clarified the balance of risks and costs in products liability law.

Product LiabilityFailure to WarnAsbestos ExposureMesotheliomaManufacturer DutyCombined Product UseForeseeability of HarmEconomic NecessityComponent Parts DoctrineStrict Liability
References
91
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