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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Claim of Blanchard v. Eagle Nest Tenancy In Common

Claimant's decedent, a superintendent for Eagle Nest Tenancy In Common, died in an unwitnessed one-car motor vehicle accident on the employer's premises. His widow filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, arguing his death was causally related to his employment. Both the Workers' Compensation Law Judge and the Board affirmed this finding, prompting an appeal by the employer's insurance carrier. The carrier contested that the accident occurred "in the course of employment," despite testimony suggesting the decedent intended to address maintenance issues after returning home. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board's amended decision, finding sufficient evidence to support that the accident occurred in the course of employment, especially given the presumption afforded to unwitnessed accidents within the scope of employment under Workers' Compensation Law § 21.

Workers' Compensation BenefitsEmployment CausalityMotor Vehicle FatalityOn-Premises AccidentWorkers' Compensation Board AppealScope of EmploymentUnwitnessed Accident PresumptionJudicial ReviewAppellate Division AffirmationInsurance Carrier Appeal
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
May 21, 1996

Fair v. 431 Fifth Avenue Associates

The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied summary judgment motions by Flushing Ironworks Corp. and Practical Construction Ltd., seeking to dismiss personal injury claims under Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6). On appeal, the order was affirmed. The appellate court found issues of fact regarding Flushing Ironworks Corp.'s control of the work site under Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence. Additionally, questions of fact existed regarding a violation of Labor Law § 241 (6) related to a steel beam hoisting incident and 12 NYCRR 23-2.3 (a), where the load may have been released prematurely.

personal injuryLabor Lawsummary judgmentwork site controlcommon-law negligencehoisting accidentsteel beamIndustrial Codeappellate reviewfactual issues
References
4
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 07, 2011

De Oleo v. Charis Christian Ministries, Inc.

In this case, the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries sustained during construction work at a building owned by Charis, whose employer was St. Loren Construction Corp. Charis, the defendants/third-party plaintiffs, moved for a default judgment on their third-party claims for common-law and contractual indemnification and contribution against St. Loren, the third-party defendant. The Supreme Court denied the motion. On appeal, the court modified the lower court's order, granting the motion as to the claim for common-law indemnification, while otherwise affirming. The appellate court found Charis provided sufficient proof of St. Loren's negligence and their own lack of negligence. It was also noted that Charis did not need to disprove Workers’ Compensation Law § 11, as it must be pleaded as an affirmative defense.

common-law indemnificationcontractual indemnificationcontributiondefault judgmentconstruction injuryemployer negligenceaffirmative defenseappellate reviewmotion practice
References
7
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 30, 1997

Host Marriott Corp. v. North

The Supreme Court, New York County, affirmed an order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' causes of action for contractual indemnification and common-law contribution. The denial was based on a contract providing for mutual indemnification between the parties. Furthermore, the defendant had failed to inform the plaintiff of a potential Workers' Compensation defense in an underlying action. The court rejected the defendant's argument that a motion to amend the answer to assert this defense would have been untimely. It emphasized that both Federal and State practice require leave to amend pleadings to be freely given in the absence of undue delay, bad faith, or undue prejudice.

indemnificationcontributionworkers' compensation lawfederal rules of civil procedurestate practiceleave to amendmotion to dismissunderlying actionmutual indemnificationuntimely defense
References
5
Case No. ADJ3533713
Regular
Nov 07, 2011

JUANA LOPEZ vs. THE MERCHANT OF TENNIS, HARTFORD INSURANCE

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) removed this matter for the purpose of imposing sanctions. The WCAB found that the petition for reconsideration filed by SIR Practice Solutions, LLC on behalf of several lien claimants was skeletal, unintelligible, and violated multiple WCAB rules regarding evidentiary and legal support. The lien claimants and SIR Practice Solutions, LLC failed to object to the Notice of Intention to Impose Sanctions within the allotted time. Therefore, the WCAB imposed sanctions of $250.00 against each individual lien claimant and found SIR Practice Solutions, LLC jointly and severally liable for these sanctions.

Workers' Compensation Appeals BoardRemovalSanctionsLien ClaimantsSIR Practice SolutionsPetition for ReconsiderationSkeletal PetitionAppeals Board Rule 10846Labor Code Section 5813Notice of Intention to Impose Sanctions
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

McFadden v. Lee

The plaintiff, a self-employed painter, suffered personal injuries after falling from a ladder while performing exterior painting for the defendants at their home. He filed an action alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and 241 (6). The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims. The appellate court affirmed this decision, concluding that the defendants did not exercise supervisory control over the plaintiff's work, which is a prerequisite for liability under these specific statutes and common-law negligence when the injury stems from the work method rather than a dangerous premises condition.

Personal InjuryLadder FallLabor Law 200Common Law NegligenceSummary JudgmentAppellate DecisionHomeowner LiabilityIndependent ContractorSupervisory AuthoritySafe Place to Work
References
8
Case No. 11 civ. 913, 11 civ. 4212
Regular Panel Decision

Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.

Irving Picard, the SIPA Trustee for Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (BMIS), sued JPMorgan Chase & Co. and UBS AG, along with their affiliates and feeder funds, to recover billions in damages. The Trustee alleged that these defendants aided and abetted Madoff's Ponzi scheme through common law claims such as fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the Trustee lacked standing to pursue claims belonging to BMIS's customers, not BMIS itself. The court agreed, holding that a bankruptcy trustee typically represents the debtor, and Madoff's misconduct, imputed to BMIS, invoked the in pari delicto doctrine, precluding BMIS from suing. The court also rejected the Trustee's arguments for standing based on Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a), New York's contribution statute, and common law bailment or equitable subrogation. Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss all common law claims was granted due to the Trustee's lack of standing.

Ponzi SchemeSecurities Investor Protection ActBankruptcy TrusteeStanding to SueCommon Law ClaimsAiding and Abetting FraudBreach of Fiduciary DutyIn Pari DelictoCreditor ClaimsDebtor's Estate
References
22
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Friends of Thayer Lake LLC v. Brown

This dissenting opinion argues against the majority's conclusion that the Mud Pond Waterway does not meet the navigable-in-fact test under common law. The dissent highlights the waterway's physical characteristics, including its shallowness, narrowness, impassable rapids, and dense vegetation, asserting these features render it impractical for common public use as a highway for travel or transport. It emphasizes that despite recent public access opportunities via the Lila Traverse and its potential for recreational canoeing, the waterway lacks the practical utility for general public or commercial purposes. The opinion also notes the historical private ownership and use, contrasting it with the stringent New York common law standard for navigability, which prioritizes commercial utility over recreational use alone. Ultimately, the dissent warns against expanding the navigability-in-fact doctrine, which could destabilize private property ownership by opening remote, privately owned bodies of water based solely on arduous public access.

Waterway NavigabilityCommon LawDissenting OpinionPublic EasementPrivate PropertyRecreational UseCommercial TransportNew York LawMud Pond WaterwayLila Traverse
References
27
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Konopczynski v. Adf Constr. Corp.

Plaintiff brought a Labor Law and common-law negligence action for injuries sustained after tripping in a floor depression at a worksite. The Supreme Court initially granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the order was modified. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim, agreeing that the floor depressions were an integral part of the construction. However, the court reinstated the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, finding that the defendant failed to prove a lack of constructive notice regarding the hazardous conditions, despite the open and obvious nature of the depression.

Personal InjuryWorkplace AccidentTripping HazardSummary JudgmentPremises LiabilityConstructive NoticeComparative FaultLabor Law § 200Labor Law § 241(6)Common-Law Negligence
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 03, 2000

Tapia v. 126 First Avenue, L. L. C.

The Supreme Court, Bronx County, initially denied cross motions for summary judgment between defendant-appellant 126 First Avenue, L. L. C. (126) and defendant Kinta Corp. regarding common-law indemnification. The Appellate Division modified this order, granting 126's cross motion for summary judgment on its indemnification claim. The court found that 126's liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) was purely vicarious as an owner without supervisory authority over the worksite where the plaintiff was injured. Therefore, 126 was entitled to full common-law indemnification from Kinta, the actively negligent contractor. Kinta's argument for protection under Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 was rejected due to a lack of evidentiary proof that it was the plaintiff's employer, with documentary evidence showing the plaintiff was employed by a different entity.

Summary JudgmentCommon-Law IndemnificationVicarious LiabilityLabor LawWorkers' Compensation LawCross ClaimActive NegligenceOwner LiabilityContractor LiabilityEmployer Status
References
3
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