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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 03-10-00358-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 27, 2012

Russell H. Fish, III, Individually and Derivatively on Behalf of Texas Legislative Service, Partnership v. Texas Legislative Service, Partnership Andrew K. Fish And John C. Fish

This case concerns a dispute within the Texas Legislative Service (TLS) partnership, where Russell H. Fish, III, sued his brothers Andrew K. Fish and John C. Fish for alleged breaches of their partnership agreement, fiduciary duties, and intellectual property misappropriation. Russell claimed Andrew and John improperly set their compensation, denied him access to partnership records, and violated terms regarding the sale of their mother's partnership interest. Furthermore, Russell alleged that Andrew competed with TLS by operating similar businesses in other states and misused TLS's trade secrets and software. The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Andrew and John on all claims. On appeal, the court affirmed most of the trial court's rulings but reversed and remanded the breach of contract claim related to partner compensation, citing a partial limitations bar and a remaining factual dispute regarding waiver.

Partnership AgreementBreach of ContractFiduciary DutySummary JudgmentStatute of LimitationsWaiverTrade SecretsCopyright InfringementPartner CompensationAccess to Records
References
27
Case No. 03-06-00501-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 25, 2007

Edd Hendee, Individually and as Executive Director of C.L.O.U.T. v. David Dewhurst, Tom Craddick, State of Texas, and the Texas Legislative Budget Board

This case originated from a suit filed by Edd Hendee and Citizens Lowering Our Unfair Taxes (C.L.O.U.T.) against the Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House, Comptroller, members of the Legislative Budget Board, and the State of Texas. Plaintiffs challenged H.B. 1, enacted in response to the Neeley v. West Orange Cove case, which aimed to shift public school funding. They alleged that H.B. 1's appropriation violated Article VIII, Section 22 of the Texas Constitution and Chapter 316 of the Government Code by exceeding the biennial cap on the rate of growth of appropriations. Plaintiffs also argued that Chapter 316 constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The district court granted the State Defendants' plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the claims. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the unconstitutional delegation claim but reversed and remanded the claims regarding the unconstitutionality and illegality of H.B. 1's appropriation for further proceedings, noting that Plaintiffs are entitled to amend their pleadings to address associational standing defects.

Constitutional LawState AppropriationsSpending CapLegislative Budget BoardTaxpayer StandingSeparation of PowersJudicial ReviewPublic School FinanceTexas ConstitutionGovernment Code
References
45
Case No. 10-0245
Regular Panel Decision
May 27, 2011

Patrick O. Ojo, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Farmers Group, Inc., Fire Underwriters Association, Fire Insurance Exchange, Farmers Underwriters Association, and Farmers Insurance Exchange

Justice Willett's concurring opinion in Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc. agrees with the majority's outcome that the Insurance Code, as written, does not support a cause of action for disparate impact discrimination related to credit scoring. However, he sharply criticizes the majority's methodology, particularly its reliance on extratextual aids like legislative history and failed bills, arguing such practices are "inappropriate" when a statute is unambiguous. Willett emphasizes the principle of textualism, asserting that "where text is clear, text is determinative," and warns against the manipulation of legislative history. He also disputes Chief Justice Jefferson's proposed distinction between "contextualizing" and "construing" legislative materials, viewing it as a tenuous attempt to justify the use of unreliable evidence. Ultimately, Justice Willett advocates for consistent, predictable statutory interpretation rooted solely in plain language to ensure clarity and stability in the law.

Statutory InterpretationLegislative HistoryTextualismDisparate ImpactInsurance CodeTexas Supreme CourtJudicial PrecedentConcurring OpinionCredit ScoringAmbiguity
References
45
Case No. 14-04-00701-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Oct 06, 2005

Dennis H. Taylor and Shepherd, Smith & Bebel, P.C. v. Valerie Wilson

The concurring opinion agrees with the majority's conclusion that a legal malpractice claim does not fall under the personal injury exemption of the Texas Arbitration Act. However, it criticizes the majority's reliance on legislative history, arguing that such history is silent on the specific issue. The opinion asserts that a legal malpractice claim fundamentally concerns damage to intangible property interests and pecuniary loss, not physical or personal bodily injury. It supports this stance by referencing various state court decisions and historical interpretations of "personal injury" in Texas law, which previously included non-physical injuries like libel and slander. The concurring justice concludes that the court should simply hold that legal malpractice is not a "personal injury" claim based on a plain-meaning analysis, without delving into inconclusive legislative intent or the broader definition of "personal injury."

Texas lawArbitrationLegal MalpracticeStatutory interpretationPersonal injury definitionLegislative intentDamagesPecuniary lossIntangible interestsConcurring opinion
References
18
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc.

Justice Willett's concurring opinion agrees with the Court's outcome in Molinet v. Kimbrell, finding that the Insurance Code, as written, does not create a cause of action for disparate impact discrimination related to credit scoring. However, Justice Willett strongly criticizes the Court's methodological approach, arguing that it inappropriately resorts to extratextual aids and legislative history despite the statute's unambiguous language. He emphasizes the principle of textualism, where clear statutory text should be determinative, and deems the use of external sources like failed bills and statements from bill opponents as unreliable and inconsistent with established judicial precedent. Willett expresses concern that the Court's deviation undermines interpretive consistency and predictability in statutory interpretation, which is vital for courts, litigants, and citizens. He also finds the Chief Justice's distinction between 'contextualizing' and 'construing' legislative history to be a 'gossamer-thin' and hazardous distinction, potentially inviting semantic manipulation and reliance on untrustworthy evidence.

Statutory InterpretationTextualismLegislative HistoryJudicial PrecedentInsurance CodeDisparate ImpactCredit ScoringLegal MethodologyConcurring OpinionTexas Supreme Court
References
61
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Sutter v. Perales

The plaintiff, a home relief recipient, received a lump-sum Social Security settlement, leading to the discontinuation of her public assistance and a period of ineligibility under a Commissioner's regulation (18 NYCRR 352.29 [h]). She challenged the regulation's validity, arguing the Commissioner lacked rule-making authority for Home Relief recipients since the program is not federally funded and State amendatory legislation did not explicitly require such a rule. The court disagreed, holding that the 1981 amendatory legislation, read in its entirety and with legislative history, provided sufficient implicit authority for the Commissioner to enact the regulation. The court found that the legislative intent was to ensure consistency between the ADC and Home Relief programs to prevent shifting caseloads, despite the lack of direct federal mandate for Home Relief. The order of the lower court was modified and affirmed, with two judges dissenting.

Lump Sum IncomeHome ReliefPublic Assistance EligibilityRegulatory AuthoritySocial Services Law InterpretationLegislative IntentStatutory ConstructionDeclaratory JudgmentInjunctive ReliefAFDC Program
References
7
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Tzolis v. Wolff

The dissent argues that the majority overstepped its bounds by judicially creating a right for Limited Liability Company (LLC) members to bring derivative actions, a right that the New York Legislature explicitly considered and rejected during the enactment of the LLC Law in 1994. Justice Read highlights the legislative history, demonstrating that while the Assembly initially included derivative action provisions in proposed LLC bills, the Senate consistently omitted them, leading to a deliberate legislative compromise that excluded such rights from the final statute. The dissent criticizes the majority's justification based on existing common law and analogies to other business entities, asserting that there is no settled law regarding derivative suits for LLCs, which are a relatively new statutory form. Citing precedents, Justice Read emphasizes the Court's consistent deference to legislative intent, particularly when proposed statutory language is omitted. The dissenting opinion concludes that the majority has effectively rewritten the law, undermining legislative prerogative and providing a remedy unfettered by the safeguards typically imposed by the Legislature.

Limited Liability Companies (LLCs)Derivative SuitsLegislative IntentStatutory InterpretationJudicial ActivismAppellate ProcedureBusiness LawCorporate GovernancePartnership LawCommon Law Equity
References
12
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Brown v. Edwards Transfer Co., Inc.

Justice Spears, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, argues that the Texas Wrongful Death Act's term "children" should not include illegitimate, adult, non-dependent children. The opinion contends that neither case law, statutes like the Probate Code or Family Code, nor legislative history supports such a broad interpretation, highlighting the statutory origin of wrongful death actions. Spears distinguishes the current case from U.S. Supreme Court precedents, Levy v. Louisiana and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, by emphasizing that those cases focused on dependent illegitimate children, whereas the children in the present case were adults and not financially dependent. The Justice concludes that extending the act to non-dependent adult children constitutes judicial legislating and goes against legislative intent.

Illegitimate ChildrenWrongful Death ActStatutory InterpretationDependencyTexas LawProbate CodeFamily CodeWorkers Compensation ActEqual ProtectionSeparation of Powers
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Neagle v. Nelson

Justice Robertson concurs with the majority opinion but respectfully disagrees with Justice Kilgarlin’s conclusions. Robertson argues that the legislative intent to abolish the “discovery rule” in *Gaddis v. Smith* via Tex.Ins.Code Ann. art. 5.82 and Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 4590i is not manifest in the plain language of the statutes and that legislative history should not be the starting point without ambiguity. He also finds the analogy to workers’ compensation law for determining permissible delay in malpractice cases to be strained due to numerous distinctions. Robertson maintains that the "discovery rule" issue and alternatives to workers' compensation analogy remain open questions, suggesting common law and equitable doctrines like laches. Justice Kilgarlin also provides a concurring opinion, addressing questions left unanswered by the court. He states that if the fact that Neagle reasonably should not have known of his injury during the limitations period is controverted, Neagle bears the burden of proof. Kilgarlin concludes that the legislative intent was to overrule *Gaddis v. Smith*'s discovery rule, and therefore, a two-year period after discovery cannot be reinstated. He proposes adopting the "good cause" standard from workers’ compensation law to determine permissible delay for filing suit after discovery in medical malpractice cases where discovery could not occur within two years of the tort or last treatment. Both justices concur in reversing and remanding the case.

Medical MalpracticeDiscovery RuleStatute of LimitationsLegislative IntentWorkers' Compensation AnalogyOpen Courts ProvisionGood CauseTexas LawConcurring OpinionJudicial Interpretation
References
9
Case No. 889 F. Supp. 98
Regular Panel Decision
Jun 02, 1995

Haley v. Pataki

Legislative employees of New York State sought a preliminary injunction to compel payment of their bi-weekly salaries, which were withheld by Governor Pataki after March 31, 1995, amidst a state budget dispute. They alleged violations of the Contract Clause, Equal Protection, Due Process, and separation of powers. The court dismissed the State of New York as a defendant due to Eleventh Amendment immunity but proceeded against Governor Pataki. Finding irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the Contract Clause claim, the court issued a mandatory preliminary injunction. This order requires the Governor, when seeking future appropriations for state workers, not to exclude legislative employees and to allocate funds for their payment.

Preliminary InjunctionContract ClauseEleventh AmendmentState EmployeesWage DisputeSeparation of PowersDue ProcessEqual ProtectionNew York StateGovernor's Powers
References
33
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