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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

McDonald v. City of New York

The plaintiff sustained personal injuries while working on a dry dock at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. The Supreme Court initially denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, asserting the case did not fall under admiralty jurisdiction. On appeal, the higher court reversed this finding, concluding that a maritime nexus and situs existed, thus invoking substantive maritime law. This preemption by federal maritime law rendered the strict liability provisions of New York Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 inapplicable. Consequently, the appellate court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss claims based on these labor laws, while affirming the denial of dismissal for claims under common law negligence and Labor Law § 200.

Admiralty JurisdictionMaritime LawLabor LawPreemptionPersonal InjuryDry DockSummary JudgmentAppellate CourtNew YorkNegligence
References
18
Case No. 02 CV 7106(RPP)
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 25, 2003

In Re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc.

This case concerns an appeal by Assuranceforeningen Skuld (Skuld) from a Bankruptcy Court order. Skuld sought to establish a priority maritime lien for unpaid insurance premiums against vessels of Millenium Seacarriers, Inc., which was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court denied Skuld's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the Foreign Mortgagees (Allfirst Bank and Wayland Investment Funds, L.L.C.), ruling that Norwegian law, stipulated in Skuld's insurance contract, did not recognize such a lien. The District Court affirmed this decision, holding that federal choice of law principles dictate the enforcement of the choice of law provision in the international insurance agreement, leading to the application of Norwegian law where no such maritime lien exists.

Maritime LawChoice of LawForum Selection ClauseInternational ContractBankruptcy AppealSummary JudgmentAdmiralty LawShip MortgagePreferred Maritime LienInsurance Premiums
References
13
Case No. 01 Civ. 6600(RLC)
Regular Panel Decision

Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Management, LLC

Internet Law Library, Inc. and Hunter M.A. Carr (Internet Law) moved to consolidate two separate legal actions and sought designation as the plaintiff in the combined litigation. Cootes Drive LLC and other entities (Cootes Drive) opposed Internet Law's plaintiff designation but did not object to consolidation itself. The first action, initiated by Internet Law in Texas, alleged securities law violations and fraud by Cootes Drive regarding a Stock Purchase Agreement. The second action, filed by Cootes Drive in New York, accused Internet Law of breaching the same agreement and committing fraud. The Texas court subsequently transferred Internet Law's action to New York for potential consolidation. The court, finding common legal and factual questions and minimal risks of confusion or prejudice, granted the consolidation. Additionally, the court designated Internet Law as the plaintiff and *sua sponte* consolidated a third related case, *Brewer, et al. v. Southridge Capital Management LLC, et al.*

Consolidation of actionsRule 42(a) F.R. Civ. P.Realignment of partiesCompulsory counterclaimForum shoppingFirst-to-file ruleStock Purchase AgreementSecurities fraudBreach of contractJudicial economy
References
27
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Cammon v. City of New York

Willie Gammon, a foreman dock builder, was injured while repairing a pier in New York City and sought compensation under New York Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and 241 (6) against the City of New York and Anjac Enterprises, Inc. The central issue was whether Federal maritime law preempts these State Labor Laws. The Supreme Court initially dismissed the complaint, but the Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the Labor Law claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, concluding that under the circumstances, the plaintiff's Labor Law claims were not preempted by Federal maritime law, emphasizing the "maritime but local" exception and New York's strong interest in worker protection. The court noted that strict liability is not entirely antithetical to Federal maritime law and that local regulations governing landowner/contractor liability do not unduly interfere with maritime commerce or uniformity.

Maritime LawFederal PreemptionNew York Labor LawStrict LiabilityWorkers' CompensationLongshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation ActAdmiralty JurisdictionPier RepairConstruction Worker InjuryState Police Powers
References
23
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Konopczynski v. Adf Constr. Corp.

Plaintiff brought a Labor Law and common-law negligence action for injuries sustained after tripping in a floor depression at a worksite. The Supreme Court initially granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the order was modified. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim, agreeing that the floor depressions were an integral part of the construction. However, the court reinstated the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, finding that the defendant failed to prove a lack of constructive notice regarding the hazardous conditions, despite the open and obvious nature of the depression.

Personal InjuryWorkplace AccidentTripping HazardSummary JudgmentPremises LiabilityConstructive NoticeComparative FaultLabor Law § 200Labor Law § 241(6)Common-Law Negligence
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 09, 2009

Prand Corp. v. Town Board of Town of East Hampton

This case involves a hybrid proceeding initiated by petitioners/plaintiffs to challenge a determination by the Town Board of the Town of East Hampton. The petitioners sought to annul Local Law No. 25 (2007), which amended the Open Space Preservation Law, and to declare Local Law No. 16 (2005) and Local Law No. 25 (2007) null and void. The Town Board, acting as the lead agency, had issued a negative declaration under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) for Local Law No. 25, obviating the need for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The Supreme Court annulled Local Law No. 25 as it applied to the petitioners' property, finding it was enacted in violation of SEQRA, and remitted the matter for full SEQRA review. The appellate court affirmed this judgment, concluding that the Town Board failed to take the requisite "hard look" at potential environmental impacts such as soil erosion, vegetation removal, and conflicts with the community's comprehensive plan, thus improperly issuing the negative declaration.

SEQRAEnvironmental LawZoning LawLand UseLocal Law No. 25 (2007)Local Law No. 16 (2005)Comprehensive PlanNegative DeclarationEnvironmental Impact StatementTown Board
References
16
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jul 12, 2006

Amantia v. Barden & Robeson Corp.

Plaintiff, a subcontractor's worker, sued defendants for personal injuries under Labor Law and common-law negligence after falling from a cargo truck while unloading forms. The Supreme Court denied plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment under Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) and partially denied defendants' motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division modified the order, granting defendants' motion in its entirety and dismissing the complaint. It found Labor Law § 240 (1) inapplicable as there was no significant elevation risk, and Labor Law § 241 (6) claims, based on specific industrial code violations, were also dismissed due to their inapplicability to the facts.

Labor Law § 240(1)Labor Law § 241(6)Industrial Code ViolationsSummary Judgment MotionPersonal InjuryConstruction Site AccidentFall from ElevationWorker SafetyNegligenceAppellate Review
References
9
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 23, 2007

Lee v. Astoria Generating Co.

This dissenting opinion argues that the majority incorrectly concluded that a power-generating barge, on which the plaintiff was injured, was not a 'vessel' under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). Citing Stewart v Dutra Constr. Co. (2005), the dissent asserts that the barge, which is periodically moved for maintenance and to provide power, is 'practically capable of maritime transportation' and thus qualifies as a vessel. Consequently, the dissent argues that the LHWCA's exclusivity provision (33 USC § 905 [b]) should preempt the plaintiff’s state Labor Law claims (Labor Law § 240 [1] and § 241 [6]), which are based on vicarious liability against the vessel owner. The dissent contends that section 905(b) expressly immunizes vessel owners from liability without fault under state law, advocating for the affirmation of the original summary judgment dismissal.

LHWCAVessel DefinitionStatutory PreemptionLabor Law § 240 (1)Labor Law § 241 (6)Vicarious LiabilityMaritime LawDissenting OpinionBarge ClassificationFederal Preemption
References
21
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 10, 1998

Turchioe v. AT&T Communications, Inc.

Plaintiff, a laborer, sustained a back injury while manually transporting a heavy ductlift up a stairway with a co-worker, alleging the co-worker crouched and shifted the full weight onto him. The initial order granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) claims. The appellate court modified this, dismissing the complaint in its entirety, including all cross claims and third-party actions. The Labor Law § 240 (1) claim was dismissed as the lifting activity was not a 'special hazard'. The Labor Law § 241 (6) claim lacked evidence of lighting violations or causation by debris. The Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims were dismissed due to the absence of supervisory control by the owner or general contractor over the work.

Labor LawWorkplace InjurySummary JudgmentConstruction AccidentThird-Party ClaimsCommon Law NegligenceSupervisory ControlAppellate DecisionPremises LiabilityWorker Safety
References
4
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 22, 1996

Eriksen v. Long Island Lighting Co.

Plaintiff Kenneth Eriksen, a dock builder, was injured at a LILCO plant in Glenwood Landing, New York, after slipping on loose gravel and falling into water. He and his wife sued LILCO, alleging negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 (1), 240 (1), and 241 (6). The Supreme Court initially dismissed these claims, citing preemption by Federal maritime law. On appeal, the court affirmed the applicability of Federal maritime law and the preemption of Labor Law § 240 (1) due to its strict liability provisions. However, it modified the order, holding that Labor Law §§ 200 (1) and 241 (6) are not preempted as they codify common-law duties and do not impose strict liability, thus supplementing maritime law without conflict.

Personal InjuryLabor LawFederal Maritime LawPreemptionNavigable WatersSummary JudgmentAppellate DecisionSafe Place to WorkStrict LiabilityBulkhead Replacement
References
13
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