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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 7053 (VLB)
Regular Panel Decision
Sep 29, 1992

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Spark Tarrytown, Inc.

District Judge Broderick's memorandum explains the decision to grant an ex-parte order for the appointment of a receiver in a mortgage foreclosure case initiated by Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). The judge justified the extraordinary remedy by citing the defendants' inability to be located, the imminent collection of rents, and a history of non-payment despite repeated requests. The decision emphasizes stringent due process requirements for ex-parte relief, referencing Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedents on pre-deprivation notice. The accompanying order formally appoints Jerry Waxenberg as Receiver, detailing his comprehensive powers and duties for property management, rent collection, and compliance with legal requirements in Westchester County.

Ex-parteReceivershipMortgage ForeclosureDue ProcessProperty RightsNotice RequirementsDefaultRent CollectionProperty ManagementJudicial Order
References
6
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 29, 2010

Mauro v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

Plaintiff Maria Mauro brought an action against Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and several other defendants, including her investment advisor Peter J. Dawson and the Kaplan defendants (attorneys for Countrywide), alleging federal claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and various state law claims. Mauro claimed that the proceeds from two mortgage loans, secured by her investment rental properties, were misappropriated by Dawson. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that TILA was inapplicable because the loans were for business purposes and that the Kaplan defendants were not 'creditors' under the statute. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the TILA claim, concluding that the loans were indeed for business purposes, thus exempting them from TILA's coverage. The court also found that the Kaplan defendants did not qualify as 'creditors' under TILA. Consequently, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.

Truth in Lending ActTILA ExemptionBusiness PurposeInvestment PropertySummary JudgmentFederal JurisdictionSupplemental JurisdictionState Law ClaimsMortgage FraudCreditor Definition
References
57
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 23, 2011

EF Consulting LLC v. General Electric Capital Corp.

The appellants, EF Consulting LLC and Oasis HC LLC, appealed a Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of their adversary complaint against General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC). The complaint alleged various claims, including fraud and conversion, stemming from GECC's use of lockbox funds and a Medicaid retroactive adjustment payment to satisfy outstanding debts on a revolving line of credit extended to debtors Highgate LTC Management, LLC, and Highgate Manor Group, LLC. Following the debtors' default and bankruptcy, Long Hill and later EF Consulting LLC served as receivers for the nursing home operations. The central issue was whether GECC was authorized to apply accounts receivable to its loans before other receivership expenses were paid. The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision, concluding that GECC's actions were consistent with the loan documents, purchase agreement, foreclosure court orders, and bankruptcy court orders, which allowed GECC to use the lockbox funds as collateral and to reduce the principal on the loans.

Bankruptcy AppealReceivership LawSecured LendingLockbox FundsAccounts ReceivableMedicaid ReimbursementForeclosure ActionLoan AgreementsCash CollateralDebtor-Creditor Relations
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Greenwich Financial Services Distressed Mortgage Fund 3, LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp.

Plaintiffs Greenwich Financial Services Distressed Mortgage Fund 3, LLC and QED LLC filed a putative class action against Countrywide Financial Corporation and its subsidiaries. Plaintiffs, who hold mortgage-backed securities, claimed that Countrywide's modifications to mortgage loans, stemming from a settlement with state Attorneys General, obligate Countrywide to repurchase these loans as per the Pooling and Servicing Agreements. Countrywide removed the case to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, arguing that the claims involved substantial federal questions under the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA). The Court, under Judge Richard J. Holwell, concluded that neither CAFA's securities-related exception nor TILA provided the necessary grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction. As a result, the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court was granted.

RemandSubject Matter JurisdictionClass Action Fairness ActTruth-in-Lending ActMortgage-Backed SecuritiesPooling and Servicing AgreementsFederal Question JurisdictionState Law ClaimsContract InterpretationPredatory Lending
References
21
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

FSI Group v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n

Plaintiff FSI, a New York limited partnership, filed a complaint against defendant First Federal Savings and Loan Association, based in South Dakota, alleging repudiation and breach of a standby agreement to purchase Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) securities. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. The court, presided over by Judge Motley, denied the defendant's motion, finding that personal jurisdiction was established under New York CPLR § 301 and § 302(a)(1) due to the defendant's purposeful business transactions within New York through agents. Furthermore, the court determined that venue was proper in the Southern District of New York, considering the limited partnership's principal place of business as its residence for venue purposes, distinct from its individual partners.

Personal JurisdictionImproper VenueLimited PartnershipBreach of ContractStandby AgreementGNMA SecuritiesMinimum ContactsDue ProcessAgent ActivityPurposeful Availment
References
11
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In re the Voluntary Dissolution of Endicott Laundry Co.

This case addresses two disputed claims within the receivership of Gladding Laundry Company, Inc., regarding the validity of two mortgages on its real property. The first claim is from the State Bank of Endicott for $15,000, and the second, originally to Ralph E. Gladding and later assigned to Workers Trust Company, is for $10,000. The receiver challenged the mortgages, citing non-compliance with Section 16 of the Stock Corporation Law of 1909, which required two-thirds stockholder consent. The court, however, applied equitable principles, reasoning that since the corporation benefited from the loans and a supermajority of stockholders participated in or assented to the transactions, both the corporation and participating stockholders are estopped from disputing the mortgages' validity. Consequently, the court declared both mortgages valid and subsisting liens, with the State Bank of Endicott's mortgage having first priority.

Mortgage ValidityCorporate LawStockholder ConsentEquitable EstoppelReceivership ProceedingsCorporate GovernanceFirst MortgageSecond MortgageNew York LawBroome County
References
11
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 17, 2006

D.I.S., LLC v. Sagos

This case concerns an appeal by a mortgagee from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, which granted the mortgagor's petition to direct the mortgagee to accept a specific sum in full satisfaction of the mortgage debt and issue a satisfaction of mortgage. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's order, ruling that the mortgagor's tender of payment of the entire mortgage principal plus interest, in response to the mortgagee's acceleration of debt, did not constitute a 'prepayment' within the meaning of the mortgage's prepayment clause. Consequently, the mortgagee was precluded from assessing a prepayment penalty as no such provision was specified in the mortgage. Additionally, the court declined to consider the mortgagee’s remaining contention regarding the acceleration clause because it was raised for the first time in her reply brief.

Mortgage LawPrepayment PenaltyMortgage Debt SatisfactionAcceleration of DebtRPAPL 1921Appellate ProcedureCivil ProcedureNassau County Supreme CourtContractual ProvisionsTender of Payment
References
7
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortgage Co.

The present case addresses a class action filed by homeowners and former homeowners against Emigrant Mortgage Company and its affiliates, alleging a predatory "No Income, No Assets" (NINA) loan program. Plaintiffs claim Emigrant engaged in a systematic equity-stripping scheme, disproportionately targeting minority homeowners in New York City with unaffordable mortgages designed to default at high interest rates. The lawsuit cites violations of federal statutes including the Fair Housing Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and Truth in Lending Act, alongside New York State and City anti-discrimination laws. The court, led by Senior District Judge Johnson, reviewed a Magistrate Judge's recommendations regarding the defendant's motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. Ultimately, the court denied Emigrant's motion to dismiss, finding the plaintiffs' claims, including disparate impact and TILA violations, to be timely and adequately pleaded under the discovery rule and equitable tolling, and granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.

predatory lendingmortgage refinanceNINA loanequity strippingdiscriminatory lendingFair Housing ActEqual Credit Opportunity ActTruth in Lending Actequitable tollingdisparate impact
References
35
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Pechinski v. Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n

Plaintiffs Matthew J. Pechinski and Brooke Ritvo Pechinski sued Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association, alleging that a $2,479 assignment fee violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and constituted a hidden finance charge or an undisclosed prepayment penalty. They also brought state law claims for common law equity, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, and deceptive practices under New York General Business Law § 349. The dispute arose when Astoria Federal, after acquiring the original lender, charged the fee when the plaintiffs sought to refinance their mortgage and assign it to a new lender. The court, presided over by District Judge Stein, granted Astoria Federal's motion to dismiss the TILA claims, ruling that the assignment fee was neither part of the finance charge nor a prepayment penalty under TILA and Regulation Z, as it was imposed years after the loan origination and was not solely due to prepayment. The court also declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.

Truth in Lending ActTILA ViolationMortgage Assignment FeePrepayment PenaltyFinance Charge DisclosureRegulation ZFederal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)Supplemental JurisdictionMotion to DismissConsumer Credit Protection
References
45
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Domino v. Professional Consulting, Inc.

Gregory Domino, a carpenter employed by Carlin Contracting Co., Inc., was injured while working on a Village of Mount Kisco water treatment facility, allegedly due to the installation of floor panels hoisted by a crane owned by Smedley Crane Service, Inc. He and his wife commenced an action for personal injuries against Professional Consulting, Inc. (PCI), the construction manager, and Smedley. The Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to PCI, finding it was not a "contractor" or "owner" under Labor Law sections 240(1) or 241, nor liable under Labor Law section 200 or common-law negligence due to lack of supervisory authority. The appellate court affirmed this part of the decision, noting PCI's contracts expressly precluded it from supervising the work or safety procedures. However, the Supreme Court erred in granting summary judgment to Smedley, as Smedley failed to establish it lacked authority to control or supervise the crane's rigging activity, thus the appellate court reversed that portion of the decision.

Construction AccidentLabor LawSummary JudgmentReargumentConstruction Manager LiabilityCrane OperationWorker SafetyAgency LawStatutory LiabilityPremises Liability
References
12
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