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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

In re the Claim of Keselman v. New York City Transit Authority

The claimant appealed two decisions by the Workers’ Compensation Board concerning a discrimination claim. In 1986, the claimant sustained a shoulder injury and was placed on disability retirement in 1990 by the self-insured employer. In 2001, the claimant filed a discrimination claim, alleging retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Both a Workers' Compensation Law Judge and the Board found the discrimination claim untimely, as it was filed almost 11 years after the alleged discriminatory practice in 1990, exceeding the two-year statutory period under Workers’ Compensation Law § 120. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board's decision, rejecting the claimant's argument that the two-year period should start from a later Board decision.

workers' compensationdiscrimination claimtimelinessstatute of limitationsretaliationdisability retirementAppellate DivisionBoard decisionNew York lawjudicial review
References
4
Case No. 03-94-00270-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 08, 1995

Leslie B. Hargraves v. Armco Foods, Inc. D/B/A Foodland

Leslie B. Hargraves appealed a summary judgment granted in favor of Armco Foods, Inc., d/b/a Foodland. Hargraves filed a lawsuit for damages arising from an accident where she fell on wooden pallets at Foodland. The suit was filed two years and one day after the incident, leading the trial court to grant summary judgment based on the two-year limitations period. Hargraves argued the limitations period should be tolled because she was of 'unsound mind' due to being groggy and disoriented from medication for two days following the accident. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that a minor, drug-induced mental impairment does not meet the criteria for 'unsound mind' as defined in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.001(a)(2) to toll the limitations period.

Summary JudgmentStatute of LimitationsTolling ProvisionUnsound MindLegal DisabilityDrug-Induced ImpairmentPersonal InjuryTexas Civil Practice and Remedies CodeAppellate ReviewPremises Liability
References
14
Case No. Appellate Division Docket No. 2022-000000
Regular Panel Decision
Oct 26, 2023

Matter of Howard v. Facilities Maintenance Corporation

Shamira Bell appealed a Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) decision regarding reimbursement for lost wage payments from the Special Disability Fund. The WCB had determined that the employer's application for reimbursement was untimely, filed more than two years after the final decision that the case was subject to Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (8) (d). The Appellate Division affirmed the WCB's decision, rejecting Bell's argument that the two-year period for filing a claim under Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (8) (d) should commence only after a final administrative award determined the total reimbursement amount. The court clarified that the two-year period begins upon the Board's final determination that the case falls under the specified section of the Workers' Compensation Law. In this instance, the Board's August 2019 decision established this final determination, rendering the employer's July 2022 reimbursement application untimely.

Workers' Compensation LawSpecial Disability FundReimbursement ClaimTimeliness of ApplicationWorkers' Compensation BoardAppellate DivisionSection 15 (8) (d)Final DeterminationLost Wage PaymentsStatutory Interpretation
References
13
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

L. B. Smith, Inc. v. Circle Air Freight Corp.

Defendant and third-party plaintiff Circle Air Freight Corp. moved to dismiss two affirmative defenses raised by third-party defendant Iberia Air Lines of Spain. The court denied the motion to strike the first affirmative defense, 'failure to state a cause of action,' as it is not subject to such a motion. Regarding the second affirmative defense, which asserted that the action was time-barred by the two-year period in Warsaw Convention article 29, Circle argued this period was inapplicable to contribution claims. However, the court ruled that Warsaw Convention article 29 constitutes an absolute condition precedent to suit, not merely a statute of limitations, and its two-year period applies broadly to all actions for damages, including those for contribution, overriding conflicting State laws. Consequently, Circle's motion to strike Iberia's second affirmative defense was also denied.

Warsaw ConventionContributionStatute of LimitationsCondition PrecedentAir Carrier LiabilityThird-Party ActionAffirmative DefenseDismissal MotionFederal SupremacyTreaty Interpretation
References
9
Case No. LAO 0854791, LAO 0854792
Regular
Sep 12, 2007

JOSE GONZALO VASQUEZ vs. CITY OF PASADENA, legally uninsured

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board granted reconsideration and rescinded a prior award, finding that Labor Code section 4656(c)(1) limits temporary disability indemnity to 104 compensable weeks within a two-year period. The Board determined that since the applicant sustained two injuries to the same body part less than two weeks apart, and temporary disability began after the second injury, the two-year limitation runs concurrently for both, not consecutively. Therefore, the applicant is not entitled to double the maximum temporary disability period.

Workers Compensation Appeals BoardCity of Pasadenalegally uninsuredindustrial injuryright shoulderneckmaintenance public workertemporary disabilityLabor Code section 4656(c)(1)104 compensable weeks
References
1
Case No. ADJ3866110 (MON 0354424)
Regular
Apr 15, 2009

ISABEL VALLADARES vs. HOTEL AND RESTAURANT TEMPS OF CALIFORNIA, STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND

The Appeals Board granted reconsideration to address the WCJ's finding of temporary total disability for applicant Isabel Valladares from June 30, 2006, to June 30, 2008. The Board found no substantial evidence supported this broad finding of continuous disability for the entire two-year period. Therefore, the prior Findings and Award were rescinded, and the case was returned to the trial level for further proceedings and a decision based on admitted evidence regarding the applicant's actual periods of temporary disability. The Board also noted potential Labor Code § 4656(c)(1) limitations on indemnity payments within a two-year period from the first payment.

Workers' Compensation Appeals BoardReconsiderationTemporary total disabilityFindings and AwardReport and RecommendationAppeals Board Rule 10848Labor Code § 4656(c)(1)Substantial evidenceEscobedo v. MarshallsBurden of proof
References
2
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Hargraves v. Armco Foods, Inc.

Leslie B. Hargraves appealed a summary judgment granted to Armco Foods, Inc., d/b/a Food-land, in a personal injury lawsuit. Hargraves filed suit for damages from a 1991 accident, but her filing on July 7, 1993, was one day past the two-year statute of limitations. She argued that a temporary, drug-induced mental impairment after the accident, which made her "groggy and disoriented" for two days, should toll the limitations period under the "unsound mind" provision of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.001(a)(2). The appellate court rejected this argument, holding that such minor, drug-induced conditions do not qualify as "unsound mind" sufficient to toll the statute, especially given her ability to work and file a worker's compensation claim during the two-year period. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment.

Statute of LimitationsTolling ProvisionUnsound MindPersonal InjurySummary JudgmentAppellate DecisionTexas LawMental IncapacityDrug-Induced ImpairmentLegal Disability
References
14
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Luna v. Frito-Lay, Inc.

Gregory Luna appealed a summary judgment in favor of Frito-Lay, Inc. in a wrongful discharge lawsuit. Luna claimed a four-year statute of limitations applied under former articles 5527 or 5529, or if a two-year period applied under former article 5526, a fact issue existed regarding the discharge date. The court determined that the two-year statute of limitations in article 5526 was applicable as the cause of action for wrongful discharge under article 8307c more closely resembled a tort. The court also found no fact issue regarding the discharge date, concluding Luna was informed of his replacement on May 31, 1983, which constituted his discharge. Therefore, his lawsuit filed on June 3, 1985, was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

Summary judgmentWrongful dischargeStatute of limitationsWorkers' compensationEmployment lawTexas lawTort actionAccrual of cause of actionAppellate reviewFrito-Lay
References
12
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

MacTaggart v. Gibbs & Cox. Inc.

This appeal concerns the dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute for over five years. The plaintiffs' primary excuse for the delay was their involvement in another litigation concerning similar issues. However, the court found that the issues in the two cases were not identical, and a significant period of a year and a half elapsed after the conclusion of the prior litigation without any further action on the present case. The court also considered the prejudice to the defendant, noting the difficulty and impracticability of recouping extra costs from clients related to contracts completed between February 1944 and December 1945. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the action.

failure to prosecutedismissal of actionappellate reviewdiscretionary powerprejudice to defendantdelay in litigationstipulationsamended complaintnote of issueextra compensation
References
1
Case No. OAK 0311431
Regular
Nov 30, 2007

JESUS GUERRERO vs. HERTZ HEAVY EQUIPMENT RENTAL, SPECIALTY RISK SERVICES, INC.

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board granted reconsideration and rescinded an award of temporary disability indemnity beyond two years from the initial payment. The Board held that Labor Code section 4656(c)(1) strictly limits temporary disability payments to 104 weeks within a two-year period from the commencement of such payments. Therefore, the applicant's claim for benefits commencing in 2007 was barred, as the two-year window from his 2004 injury had already expired.

Labor Code section 4656(c)(1)temporary disability indemnity104 compensable weekstwo-year periodcommencement of temporary disability paymentPetition for ReconsiderationFindings of Fact and Awardrescindstipulatedindustrial injury
References
6
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