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Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 3-94-122-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Jan 18, 1995

Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Facility v. State Board of Insurance, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, Houston General Insurance Company, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, United States Fire Insurance Company

The Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Facility (Facility) appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an order by the State Board of Insurance. The Board had ordered the Facility to indemnify several servicing companies for legal expenses incurred in litigation brought by Standard Financial Indemnity Company (SFIC). The Facility argued that Article 5.76-2, section 2.05(i) of the Texas Insurance Code, which states the Facility 'may not indemnify the servicing companies,' terminated the servicing companies' right to indemnification. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the servicing companies had a vested contractual right to indemnification which arose when they entered into servicing company agreements, and that section 2.05(i) could not be applied retroactively to impair these vested rights. The court found that the law existing at the time the contracts were made, which included the Facility's bylaws allowing for indemnification, was incorporated into the agreements.

Workers' CompensationInsurance LawContractual RightsVested RightsRetroactive Application of LawIndemnificationStatutory InterpretationAdministrative LawAppellate ReviewTexas Insurance Code
References
32
Case No. 03-99-00606-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 21, 2000

Stan Stumph, D/B/A Concrete Concepts/Dallas Fire Insurance Company v. Dallas Fire Insurance Company/Stan Stumph, D/B/A Concrete Concepts

Stan Stumph, d/b/a Concrete Concepts, initiated a lawsuit against Dallas Fire Insurance Company due to their refusal to defend and indemnify him in a prior suit. A jury ruled in Stumph's favor, awarding damages. Both parties appealed: Stumph sought treble damages, and Dallas Fire contested the actual damages. The Court of Appeals found Dallas Fire liable for unfair insurance practices and unconscionable conduct, stemming from misrepresentations by its agent regarding Stumph's policy and the agent's authority. The court concluded that coverage should have existed under the original policy, imposing a duty to defend and indemnify on Dallas Fire. Consequently, the appellate court modified the judgment to grant Stumph two times his actual damages and affirmed the modified judgment.

Insurance coverage disputeUnfair insurance practicesDeceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)Insurance agent misrepresentationDuty to defendDuty to indemnifyActual damagesTreble damagesAppellate reviewContract law
References
25
Case No. 13-08-00589-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Nov 10, 2010

National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa and Industrial Risk Insurers v. John Zink Company Fisher Controls Company, Inc. Fisher Controls International, Inc. Fisher Controls Installation and Service Company And Valtek, Inc.

This litigation, stemming from refinery explosions and fires in the 1980s, involved an appeal by National Union Fire Insurance Company and Industrial Risk Insurers (the Insurers) against various contractors (the Contractors). The Insurers, as subrogees of Valero Energy Corporation, sought damages for product liability, negligence, breach of contract, and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) violations. The core legal dispute centered on whether the Contractors qualified as 'subcontractors' under a master contract between Valero and M.W. Kellogg Construction Company, which contained extensive waiver and release provisions. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's final summary judgment, concluding that the Contractors were indeed subcontractors, the express negligence doctrine did not apply to the post-act release, and Valero had validly waived its DTPA claims, thereby binding its subrogees.

Contractual WaiversSubrogation RightsSummary Judgment AppealExpress Negligence RuleDeceptive Trade Practices ActParol Evidence Rule ApplicationJudicial AdmissionsConstruction ContractsInsurance LitigationThird-Party Beneficiary
References
31
Case No. 14-09-00860-CV
Regular Panel Decision
May 26, 2011

Weingarten Realty Management Company and Scottsdale Insurance Company v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company

This case involves an appeal from a trial court's summary judgment in an insurance-coverage dispute. Appellants Weingarten Realty Management Company and Scottsdale Insurance Company sought to compel appellee Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company to defend Weingarten Management in an underlying lawsuit where it was mistakenly identified as a lessor. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, allowing the consideration of extrinsic evidence as a narrow exception to the eight-corners rule. This exception applies when an insurer proves, using extrinsic evidence, that the party seeking defense is a stranger to the policy and could not be entitled to coverage under any circumstances, without touching on the merits of the underlying claim. The court concluded that Weingarten Management was not an actual lessor and therefore not an insured under Liberty Mutual's policy.

Insurance CoverageDuty to DefendEight-Corners Rule ExceptionExtrinsic EvidenceSummary Judgment ReviewAppellate Court DecisionInsurance Policy InterpretationLessor StatusContractual DisputesTexas Civil Procedure
References
30
Case No. 01-08-00487-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 11, 2010

United Fire & Casualty Company v. Boring & Tunneling Company of America D/B/A Bortunco

On cross motions for summary judgment in a suit to collect on a McGregor Act payment bond, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, Boring & Tunneling Company of America ("Bortunco"), and denied the motion of appellant, United Fire & Casualty Company ("United Fire"). United Fire appealed, arguing that Bortunco failed to substantially comply with the notice provisions of the McGregor Act due to a missing notary signature and seal on its sworn statement. Bortunco, a subcontractor, contended that its notice substantially complied as the omission was merely a clerical error. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, emphasizing the remedial nature of the McGregor Act and that substantial compliance is adequate for notice provisions, especially when actual notice was received. The court concluded that Bortunco's document met the essential requirements of the statute and protected all parties from undue liability.

McGregor ActPayment BondSubstantial ComplianceNotice ProvisionsSuretySubcontractorClerical ErrorSummary JudgmentTexas Government CodeAppellate Review
References
14
Case No. 13-05-065-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 15, 2007

Phoenix Assurance Company of New York v. Dallas Fire Insurance Company and Anthony Brown

This appeal arises from a summary judgment granted in favor of Dallas Fire Insurance Company (Dallas Insurance) and against Phoenix Assurance Company of New York (Phoenix Assurance) in a workers' compensation case. The core issue revolves around determining whether Staff Force, Inc. or Roofing Supply of Corpus Christi was the employer of Anthony Brown for workers' compensation purposes, which dictates the responsible insurer. The trial court initially granted summary judgment to Dallas Insurance, identifying Roofing Supply as the employer. However, the appellate court found a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of an agreement for workers' compensation coverage between Staff Force and Roofing Supply. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve this factual dispute.

Workers' CompensationSummary JudgmentJudicial EstoppelEmployer-Employee RelationshipInsurance Carrier LiabilityTemporary Staffing AgencyBorrowed Servant DoctrineFact IssueRemandAgreement Interpretation
References
20
Case No. 3-92-291-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Mar 10, 1993

Ronald David Patton v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Jean Auvenshine and American International Adjustment Company, Inc.

Ronald David Patton sued National Union Fire Insurance Company, Jean Auvenshine, and American International Adjustment Company, Inc., alleging violations of the duty of good faith and fair dealing related to his workers' compensation claim. Patton had injured his back in 1985, and his claim was formally denied by National Union in June 1987. The trial court granted a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of the appellees, ruling that Patton's suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment, holding that the cause of action accrued at the time of the denial of coverage in June 1987, and that the tort was not a continuous one, nor was the statute of limitations tolled by subsequent events or the involvement of an adjuster.

Workers' CompensationInsurance Bad FaithStatute of LimitationsSummary JudgmentDuty of Good Faith and Fair DealingTexas Court of AppealsDenial of CoverageAccrual of Cause of ActionContinuous TortInsurance Adjuster Liability
References
4
Case No. 06-1030
Regular Panel Decision
Aug 29, 2008

Zurich American Insurance Company, Federal Insurance Company, and National Union Fire Insurance Company v. Nokia, Incorporated

This is a dissenting opinion from Justice Hecht of the Supreme Court of Texas, joined by Justice Brister, concerning a petition for review by various insurance companies (Zurich American, Federal, National Union Fire) against Nokia, Inc. The central issue is whether the insurers have a duty to defend Nokia in class action lawsuits. These lawsuits allege "biological injury" from cellphone radiation but meticulously avoid claiming "bodily injury," instead seeking damages for the lack of provided headsets. Justice Hecht argues that despite a liberal interpretation rule for pleadings, these class action complaints do not trigger the insurers' duty to defend, as the damages claimed are not for personal injury and class counsel explicitly denied seeking personal injury compensation. He concludes that the majority's decision, which implies a duty to defend, rewards ambiguous pleading.

Insurance LawDuty to DefendClass ActionBodily InjuryBiological InjuryPleading InterpretationCellphone RadiationAppellate ReviewDissenting OpinionTexas Supreme Court
References
11
Case No. 01-19-00852-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Sep 21, 2021

National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA v. Exxon Mobil Corporation

This case involves two related appeals concerning insurance coverage for bodily injury claims against Exxon Mobil Corporation by its contractor's employees, Kevin Roberts and Arturo Munoz. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. challenged a trial court's summary judgment in favor of Exxon and Starr Indemnity and Liability Insurance Company, arguing its umbrella policy did not provide coverage beyond its CGL policy, as dictated by the Exxon-Savage Contract. Exxon also challenged a summary judgment favoring Starr. The appeals court reversed the judgment against National Union, finding that 'Commercial General Liability insurance' in the contract referred only to primary coverage, not umbrella or excess policies. Consequently, Exxon was not entitled to coverage under National Union's umbrella policy. The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Starr, as its bumbershoot policy was also considered an umbrella policy. The case was remanded for reconsideration of attorney's fees and costs.

Insurance Policy InterpretationCommercial General LiabilityUmbrella Liability InsuranceExcess Liability InsuranceAdditional Insured EndorsementSummary Judgment ReviewBreach of ContractDeclaratory JudgmentAppellate ProcedurePersonal Injury Claims
References
34
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.

This case details a dispute between a primary insurer, United States Fire Insurance Company (U.S. Fire), and an excess insurer, Scottsdale Insurance Company, regarding liability coverage for LTC Healthcare, Inc., a nursing home operator. Scottsdale, acting as LTC's subrogee, sued U.S. Fire, alleging that U.S. Fire failed to meet its contractual obligations under the primary policy by not paying the full amount owed. Key issues included the interpretation of aggregate limits under Commercial General Liability (CGL) and Care Providers Professional Liability (CPPL) coverage forms, and the applicability of self-insured retention (SIR) provisions. The trial court initially granted summary judgment for Scottsdale, but the appellate court, while largely affirming that the CGL's higher aggregate limit applied and rejecting U.S. Fire's reformation counterclaim, found that the SIR provisions should have been applied. Consequently, the judgment was modified to reduce Scottsdale's award and the case was remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest.

Insurance DisputeLiability CoveragePrimary InsuranceExcess InsuranceSubrogation ClaimSummary Judgment AppealContract InterpretationPolicy AmbiguityCGL CoverageProfessional Liability Coverage
References
29
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