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Case Law Database

Access over workers' compensation decisions, including En Banc, Significant Panel Decisions, and writ-denied cases.

Case No. 05-19-01013-CV
Regular Panel Decision
Dec 01, 2020

Luxottica of America Inc. F/K/A Luxottica Retail North America Inc. and EyeMed Vision Care LLC, Gutman Vision, Inc., Alex Gutman, and Milana Gutman v. Jeffrey Gray, Dawn Gray and Brave Optical, Inc.

The case is an interlocutory appeal from the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas concerning the denial of motions to dismiss filed by Luxottica of America Inc. and EyeMed Vision Care LLC (Luxottica Appellants), and Gutman Vision, Inc., Alex Gutman, and Milana Gutman (Gutman Appellants). Jeffrey Gray, Dawn Gray, and Brave Optical, Inc. (Gray Appellees) sued the appellants for claims including conspiracy to commit fraud, alleging that the appellants failed to disclose crucial information during negotiations for the purchase of two Pearle Vision optical stores. Specifically, appellees claimed appellants withheld the fact that EyeMed had terminated its contract with Gutman Vision due to fraudulent billing practices prior to the sale. Appellants moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), asserting their communications were protected. The trial court denied these motions by operation of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, concluding that the appellees' claims were based on the appellants' alleged failure to disclose information or misrepresentations, rather than on communications protected by the TCPA's rights of free speech or association.

fraudconspiracyTexas Citizens Participation ActTCPAinterlocutory appealbusiness disputenondisclosureEyeMedLuxotticaPearle Vision
References
20
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc.

The Chief Justice concurs with the majority's opinion except for its holding that a release signed by Mrs. Newman waived Tropical Visions' liability for gross negligence. The Chief Justice argues that under existing Texas case law and public policy, gross negligence cannot be waived, citing *Smith v. Golden Triangle Raceway* which held such a release void. The opinion emphasizes that gross negligence and simple negligence are distinct and separable issues in Texas, requiring different proofs of mental state and character of the act. It further asserts that actual damages can be awarded for gross negligence, serving as a predicate for exemplary damages, and notes exceptions where actual damages need not be recoverable for punitive damages. The dissent draws an analogy to worker's compensation claims where gross negligence claims survive despite waivers for ordinary negligence. The Chief Justice concludes that public policy forbids the waiver of gross negligence, and the appellees failed to establish a defense of release for the gross negligence claim as a matter of law because 'gross negligence' was not explicitly mentioned in the release.

WaiverGross NegligenceOrdinary NegligencePublic PolicyReleaseExemplary DamagesActual DamagesSummary JudgmentTexas LawContract Law
References
16
Case No. 2017 NY Slip Op 01454
Regular Panel Decision
Feb 23, 2017

Sokolovic v. Throgs Neck Operating Co., Inc.

This case involves an appeal concerning hold harmless and indemnity agreements. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, initially granted Vision Healthcare Services' motion to enforce a hold harmless agreement and Throgs Neck Operating Company, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on its contractual indemnity claim against Vision. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed these orders. The court held that the plaintiff was obligated to hold Vision harmless from Throgs Neck's indemnification claim due to a hold harmless agreement executed during settlement. It further clarified that a nurse provided by Vision to Throgs Neck remained Vision's general employee, thereby triggering Vision's contractual indemnity obligation, despite being considered a special employee of Throgs Neck for the purpose of Throgs Neck's liability to the plaintiff.

hold harmless agreementcontractual indemnityspecial employeegeneral employeestaffing agreementsettlement agreementsummary judgmentnegligenceagency liabilityappellate review
References
3
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Ogden v. Matrix Vision of Williamson County, Inc.

In this workers' compensation case, plaintiff Roberta Ogden sustained injuries on January 11, 1986, while working for defendant Matrix Vision. She sought treatment from Dr. David W. Gaw, who diagnosed a soft tissue strain but consistently found no permanent impairment despite her persistent pain. Ogden filed a workers' compensation complaint on April 25, 1989, over three years after the accident. The trial court dismissed her claim, ruling it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations, as her injury manifested more than a year before the filing, and subsequent voluntary payments did not revive the expired statute. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the trial court's judgment, agreeing that the claim was time-barred.

Statute of LimitationsWorkers' Compensation LawAccrual of Cause of ActionMedical DiagnosisSoft Tissue StrainPermanent ImpairmentVoluntary PaymentsTolling StatuteAppellate ReviewInjury Date
References
11
Case No. ADJ10261158
Regular
Aug 30, 2017

ERIKA CASTRO vs. SUNALP LASER VISION, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS BENEFIT TRUST FUND

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board denied Sunalp Laser Vision's petition for removal of an order appointing an Independent Medical Evaluator. Removal is an extraordinary remedy requiring a showing of substantial prejudice or irreparable harm, which was not demonstrated here. The Board found that the administrative law judge can address the issue at trial and that reconsideration of a final adverse decision would be an adequate remedy. Therefore, the petition for removal was denied.

Petition for RemovalIndependent Medical EvaluatorWCJUninsured Employers Benefit Trust FundExtraordinary RemedySubstantial PrejudiceIrreparable HarmReconsiderationMSCAdjudication
References
2
Case No. ADJ10262965
Regular
Aug 03, 2017

BILLIE LAUREN vs. SUNALP LASER VISION, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS BENEFIT TRUST FUND

Defendant Sunalp Laser Vision petitioned for removal of the order appointing an Independent Medical Evaluator (IME) for applicant Billie Lauren and three other consolidated cases. The Appeals Board denied the petition, citing that removal is an extraordinary remedy requiring a showing of substantial prejudice or irreparable harm, which was not demonstrated. The Board found that the trial judge can address the issue at trial, and reconsideration will be an adequate remedy if an adverse final decision is issued. Therefore, the petition for removal was denied.

RemovalIndependent Medical EvaluatorPetition for RemovalWorkers' Compensation Appeals BoardUninsured Employers Benefit Trust FundAdministrative Law JudgePrejudiceIrreparable HarmReconsiderationMSC
References
2
Case No. ADJ10266896
Regular
Aug 03, 2017

PEARL GONZALES vs. SUNALP LASER VISION, uninsured; UNINSURED EMPLOYERS BENEFIT TRUST FUND

This case involves Sunalp Laser Vision's petition for removal of an order appointing an Independent Medical Evaluator (IME). The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board denied the petition. Removal is an extraordinary remedy requiring a showing of substantial prejudice or irreparable harm. The Board found no such prejudice, as the issue could be addressed at trial, and reconsideration would be an adequate remedy if an adverse final decision issues. Therefore, the petition for removal was denied.

Petition for RemovalIndependent Medical EvaluatorUninsured EmployerUninsured Employers Benefit Trust FundWorkers' Compensation Appeals BoardWCJSubstantial PrejudiceIrreparable HarmReconsiderationMSC
References
0
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision
Apr 07, 1969

Gulf Stevedore Corp. v. Hollis

Plaintiffs Gulf Stevedore Corporation and Texas Employers’ Insurance Association appealed a compensation order awarding Gabelus Picard disability benefits for the loss of his right eye under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. The primary legal question was whether the deputy commissioner, when determining a scheduled loss of vision, should consider corrected vision (with lenses) or uncorrected vision. The Court ruled that the plain language of the Act for scheduled losses does not require consideration of corrective lenses, thereby affirming the deputy commissioner's interpretation that uncorrected vision should be used. Consequently, the motions for summary judgment by the deputy commissioner and Picard were granted, denying the plaintiffs' motion. The Court also declined to issue a mandatory injunction or assess a delay penalty against the plaintiffs.

Longshoremen's ActDisability BenefitsEye InjuryVisual ImpairmentCorrected VisionScheduled LossCompensation OrderSummary JudgmentAppealDeputy Commissioner
References
17
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Korman v. Sachs

This case concerns an appeal challenging the invalidation of Lorraine Backal's designating petition for Judge of the Surrogate’s Court, Bronx County. The Supreme Court initially ruled her petition invalid, citing fewer than the required 5,000 signatures under Election Law § 6-136 (2) (b). On appeal, while the court upheld the factual finding of insufficient signatures, it deemed the 5,000-signature requirement for Bronx County unconstitutional. The court found this disparity, compared to 2,000 signatures for counties of similar population outside New York City, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the judgment invalidating Backal's petition was reversed, and the Board of Elections was directed to place her name on the ballot.

Election LawDesignating PetitionsConstitutional LawEqual ProtectionBallot AccessSignature RequirementsJudicial ElectionsNew York StateAppellate ReviewSurrogate's Court
References
5
Case No. MISSING
Regular Panel Decision

Svensen v. Svensen

This case is an appeal contesting the dismissal of a divorce action. The trial court dismissed the husband's petition because he had not met the six-month Texas residency requirement at the time of filing or hearing. The appellate court clarifies that the residency requirement is not jurisdictional but a qualification, meaning a plea in abatement should lead to retaining the case on the docket rather than outright dismissal. Consequently, the court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the suit and refusing its reinstatement after the residency condition was fulfilled. The case was reversed and remanded for reinstatement and trial on the merits.

DivorceResidency RequirementsPlea in AbatementJurisdictionDismissalRemandTexas Family CodeCivil ProcedureAppellate ReviewMarital Law
References
10
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